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My dissertation investigates turn-of-the-20th-century fiction’s fascination with ‘other’ 
bodies—their forms, constitutions, and meanings—and the corresponding biopolitical enterprises 
meant to address them. Prompted by Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theories in the 19th century, 
and adopting his language of the “normal” and “abnormal,” a host of wide-ranging efforts to 
optimize human development emerged on either side of the Atlantic during this period. My 
project examines the contemporaneous literary and filmic responses to such efforts, specifically 
those aimed at identifying and correcting ‘abnormality’ in the fields of degeneration, psychology, 
criminal law, and genetic science. I reconceptualize the aesthetic grotesque, as traditionally 
defined by Wolfgang Kayser and Mikhail Bakhtin, to include a biological component that 
reveals how grotesque characters might simultaneously embody and destabilize the concept of 
abnormality. In attending to the grotesque as individualizing the impact of biopower’s mass, 
population-based interventions, I demonstrate how the violence of biopolitical classifications 
results, paradoxically, from their instability—i.e., from attempts to ‘fix’ what, in essence, eludes 
human comprehension and control. 
Each chapter studies a different biopolitical discipline and its target subjects, pairing a 
German and an American work to investigate the surprisingly under-examined parallels between 
the racist American after-effects of slavery and pre-Holocaust German anti-Semitism, especially 
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in their common systematic attempts to classify and then neutralize perceived threats to their 
populations. I look at American and German fictional texts by authors Frank Norris, Thomas 
Mann, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Georg Heym, Gertrude Barrows Bennett, Franz Kafka, H.P. 
Lovecraft, and director Fritz Lang. Reading across these texts, I uncover a surprising contrast 
between an American willingness to define difference as biological, while the German fiction 
remains more circumspect, refusing to either endorse or reject biological classifications of 
humanity. Ultimately, I show how literature and film, rather than providing solutions to the 
problem of biopolitics and its obsession with categorization, tease out the nuances of that 
problem; unfettered by real-world stakes, fictional characters have the freedom to test multiple 
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION 
 
Whenever I discuss a German fictional work, I use my own translations into English for 
direct quotes, and add the original German in a footnote. While excellent English translations 
exist for the German works I examine, I use my own translations to ensure that the connotations 
of importance for this project are readily available to my English-speaking readers. For 
theoretical and critical texts originally in German, I use existing English translations when 
available as such translations are largely reliable and written to ensure comprehensibility as well 
as stylistic authenticity. When German critical texts are not available in English, I translate them 










“The mad criminal makes his appearance first and foremost  
as a monster, as an unnatural nature.” (Foucault, Abnormal 109) 
 
The proliferation of literature and film centrally figuring grotesque characters throughout 
history, from The Odyssey’s strange Skylla to Frankenstein’s corpse-creature, demonstrates an 
enduring fascination with imagining the ‘other.’ The fin-de-siècle grotesque, while retaining 
elements from its roots in the types of mythical monster/animal/human hybrids of previous 
centuries, introduces a new focus: the biological human. Following Charles Darwin’s revelations 
in the 19th century about evolution, and adopting his language of the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ 
within species, a host of wide-ranging efforts to optimize human development emerged on either 
side of the Atlantic during this period. At the turn of the 20th century, then, the grotesque comes 
to signal the presence of anomaly, of individuals in some capacity deemed harmful to humanity’s 
evolution. In the above quote by Michel Foucault, we begin to see the multiplying and various 
criteria by which such harm is defined at this time: madness, criminality, and monstrosity, and 
“foremost” the concept of an “unnatural nature.” My project investigates these various categories 
of ‘abnormality,’ examining how literature and film of the late 19th and early 20th centuries 






I will begin with some preliminary observations about the nature of the efforts made to 
classify and remove the ‘abnormal’ individual; these efforts are most easily defined as belonging 
to what Foucault names “biopower,” or “biopolitics.” Foucault defines biopower as that which 
first establishes biological norms based on data collection and analysis over large populations, 
and then creates “regulatory mechanisms” that will “establish an equilibrium, maintain an 
average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations,” with the end goal of 
ensuring that the population in its entirety remains ‘healthy’ and viable (Society 246). The logic 
that creates a need to protect “the whole from internal dangers” is described thus (249):  
‘The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the 
fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I—as species 
rather than individual—can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will 
be able to proliferate.’ (255) 
 
In this language, we see the potential for the racism that Foucault identifies as an inescapable 
byproduct of a biopolitical society, if we take “races” to include, as he does, not only ethnicities 
but also “criminals,” “madness,” and “various [physical] anomalies” (258). Within biopower, 
racism has two functions: to “fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum 
addressed by biopower,” and to encourage the elimination of certain groups since the “death of 
the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make 
life in general healthier: healthier and purer” (255). Biopower thus acts as a means of uncovering 
“biological threat” and then containing or removing that threat for “the improvement of the 
species or race” (256). 
 As specific institutions begin to turn to the biological as a means of defining ‘danger,’ 
those individuals deemed ‘outliers’ undergo treatment, punishment, and outright death in the 
attempt to push them back towards an acceptable norm. Literature and film at the turn of the 20th 
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century pick up on this biological shift, and this dissertation will explore how they move beyond 
mere illustration, adopting contemporaneous theoretical and scientific language to interrogate the 
efficacy and outcomes of biopolitical efforts. In each of my chosen texts, moreover, I 
demonstrate how the aesthetic grotesque acts as the beacon of ‘abnormality,’ sometimes in the 
service of endorsing biopolitical actions, and sometimes as the indication of its inherent flaws 
and failures. In either case, grotesque characters are the fictional rendition of the biopolitical 
norm’s opposite, precisely because of their biologically-read difference. This definition is 
corroborated by various statements from theorists of the grotesque: Wolfgang Kayser finds the 
grotesque occurring when “the laws of statics, symmetry, and proportion are no longer valid,” 
and “the natural order of things has been subverted” (Kayser 21). Mikhail Bakhtin states in 
Rabelais and His World that the grotesque appears in the “suspension of all hierarchical rank, 
privileges, norms, and prohibitions” (Bakhtin 10). Justin Edwards and Rune Graulund likewise 
point out that the “abnormal and the grotesque function […] as a way to define and fix normality 
through a range of legitimate, rigid and authoritative norms” that are its opposite (Edwards 32).  
Kayser and Bakhtin both add to this definition of the anti-normative grotesque its past 
artistic iterations, and their more concrete examples of physical grotesqueness will allow me to 
define and elaborate upon the ‘other’ qualities of the characters I examine. For Kayser, this 
includes the figure of the eccentric artist, individuals who blend plant, animal, and human 
characteristics, insanity/madness, and characters with multiple selves or identities. For Bakhtin, 
grotesque bodies involve as well a “degradation,” a “lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, 
abstract,” and a “transfer to the material level” (Bakhtin 10, 19). In particular, Bakhtin’s 
grotesque involves a body “in the act of becoming, […] continually built, created, and build[ing] 
and creat[ing] another body” because it is all orifices and openings that constantly link to the 
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material world around it (317). This manifests in a literary emphasis on various body parts such 
as bulging eyes, nose, and mouth, and “acts of bodily drama” such as sneezing, sweating, eating, 
drinking, pregnancy, etc.; many of these biological traits appear in my chosen texts (317). 
 
Historical Background 
 The turn to biology following evolutionary theories of the 19th century thus results in 
specialized biopolitical actions against ‘abnormal’ individuals, who are signaled through 
biopower’s companion opposite, the aesthetic grotesque. My theoretical focus on the 
combination of biological sciences with power and aesthetics accounts for the first half of my 
title. As to the second half, I will now explain my project’s concentration specifically on German 
and American literature and film. Biopower is certainly not limited to any particular 
geographical region, and the interest in grotesque figures spans continents as well as centuries. 
However, the United States and Germany in particular have in their past two of the largest 
examples of systematic racism against ‘outlier’ populations: antebellum slavery and the 
Holocaust, respectively. By pairing American and German works, I investigate the surprisingly 
under-examined parallels between the racist American after-effects of slavery and pre-Holocaust 
German anti-Semitism; the concentration on biology in the time between these two events links 
them.1 At the turn of the 20th century, scientific theories on subjects such as biology, eugenics, 
psychology, and degeneration circulate freely across continents. For instance, Darwin mentions 
his debt to German biologist Ernst Haeckel and to English scientist Herbert Spencer, while 
                                                
1 I begin in 1890 as the time in which authors begin to move away from realism and towards naturalism, a literary 
movement particularly concerned with biology, the evolution of our species, and ‘abnormal’ bodies. I end in 1933, 
when Adolf Hitler takes power as the chancellor in Germany and the Nazi party gains popularity and control. While 
this date is somewhat arbitrary in the American context, stopping at 1933 allows me to explore the increasing 
eugenic fervor in both countries, while leaving the rapidly changing German political climate and its fascist 
culmination in WWII to other scholars. 
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German theorist Max Nordau dedicates his work Degeneration to Italian scientist Cesare 
Lombroso, and in return is later critiqued by American psychologist William James, who 
exchanges ideas on psychology with Austrian Sigmund Freud. 
Fiction writers and film directors of the time pick up on this exchange of information, and 
several of the works I examine use the same touchstone texts as validations for their conclusions. 
H. P. Lovecraft and Fritz Lang both reference Lombroso’s theories on physiognomy, for 
example, while Frank Norris and Thomas Mann both use Nordau’s Degeneration as an outline 
for descriptions of their main characters. It is the disparities between the conclusions of fictional 
works from the United States versus Germany, however, that makes the greatest case for the 
need to read these countries’ artistic output side-by-side. In particular, the American texts I look 
at suggest a willingness to define difference as biological, and support biopolitical endeavors to 
remove biological ‘anomaly,’ if not providing an outright push to increase such endeavors. 
Surprisingly, however, their pre-Third Reich German counterparts remain more circumspect, 
refusing to endorse biological classifications of humanity, and in many cases actively rejecting 
the type of biological racism that will soon increase in their country. My dissertation will show 
how literature and film uniquely illuminate the inconsistent and contradictory cultural attitudes 
towards biological classifications, and how the biopolitics that Foucault characterizes as 
ubiquitous was not always a foregone conclusion. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 To my knowledge, no one has written a longer project on German and American fin-de-
siècle literature and film together. Furthermore, while much has been written about biology and 
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biopower at this time, and even in relation to individual texts that I examine,2 my inclusion of the 
aesthetic grotesque in particular allows me to move beyond the texts’ reflections of such themes, 
to their interrogations of the biological turn within specific disciplines. I have therefore 
organized this project so that each chapter examines one institution in particular, pairing an 
American and a German text that place their main characters in direct contact with that 
institution. I move roughly chronologically, first examining the scientific and aesthetic theory of 
degeneration in the late 19th century, which contains myriad internal contradictions and therefore 
acts as a catalyst for subsequent attempts to define ‘abnormality’ based on more specialized 
criteria. The next three chapters take up one discipline and its response to the ‘crisis’ of 
degeneration: Chapter Two looks at the shift in the budding field of psychology from a 
concentration on curable, environmentally-contingent mental illness to hereditary definitions of 
madness. Chapter Three reveals how this shift in psychology informs and drives the concept of 
the ‘born criminal,’ where criminality moves from being measured by arbitrary governmental 
yardsticks, to equally arbitrary, although biologically-based, definitions. The final chapter 
unveils how criminality, once biologically-defined, incites new genetic sciences to lay bare the 
complicated relationship between invisible genotypes and visible appearances and actions. 
 As each of these biopolitical or protobiopolitical institutions evolves, the concentration 
on the biological body moves as well from the macro to the micro; scientists and theorists read 
ever further below the surface of the body, chasing ‘abnormality’ ultimately to the level of genes. 
Conversely, the interest in individual biological bodies shifts to a larger scale, as ‘abnormality’ 
becomes definable through collections of data and subsequent generalizations about larger 
populations (e.g., a change in scale from the case-study of Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s 
                                                
2 In particular, critics with whom I engage in multiple chapters include Sander Gilman, Dana Seitler (Atavistic 
Tendencies), and Angela Smith (Hideous Progeny). 
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‘hysterical’ narrator to an examination of the entire alien population of Lovecraft’s fictional 
Innsmouth). The stakes of the literary and filmic depictions of these shifts thus change as well; 
degeneration narratives ultimately fail to define abnormality, whereas narratives of madness and 
criminality gesture towards new biological modes of definition without fully realizing their 
implications. The final chapter, however, deals with a full-blown mania for uncovering and 
defining genetic background that continues today, as seen in current developments in 
biotechnological engineering which allow the active manipulation of human DNA. As the 
American texts of the fin-de-siècle suggest the positive possibilities of biologically shaping 
humanity’s future, the German texts anticipate the potential danger of this turn, pushing against 
the wave of eugenic fervor that culminates in the Holocaust.3 As I will demonstrate, the 
hesitancy of German authors and directors to speculate on alternatives to biopolitical means of 
defining the ‘abnormal’ thus becomes their mode of critique, a refusal to buy into the ‘scientific’ 
attempts to direct humanity that only increase into the 21st century. 
My first chapter begins with an outline of degeneration theory as defined by Friedrich 
Nietzsche and his (begrudging) follower, Max Nordau. I trace several contradictions inherent in 
their writings, which posit degeneration as a mutually-influencing aesthetic and biological lack 
or excess of natural form. While Nietzsche and Nordau conclude that degeneracy is sterile (even 
though contagious), the proliferation of fin-de-siècle degeneration narratives suggests that in the 
cultural imagination, the threat still looms large. I therefore look at Frank Norris’s novel 
Vandover and the Brute, written in 1895, and Thomas Mann’s “The Blood of the Walsungs” 
from 1905, which present characters who precisely fit Nietzsche’s and Nordau’s definitions, but 
                                                
3 Norris advocates for the uses of degeneration theory, Gilman writes pro-eugenic essays, Bennett enthusiastically 
endorses biological markers of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ and Lovecraft famously frets about miscegenation. On the German 
side, however, Mann mocks degeneration theory, Heym simultaneously sees the need for and critiques mental 
institutions, Kafka rejects all modes of governmental classification, and Lang presents the complication involved in 
defining ‘monstrosity,’ without picking sides. 
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who spill over the edges of degeneration theory and ultimately cannot be contained. In Norris’s 
case, he fervently believes in the efficacy of Nordau’s text as a field guide for identifying 
aberrancy, but his protagonist Vandover proves to be neither sterile nor ill-adapted. Instead, 
Norris details Vandover’s increasing grotesqueness to suggest a pressing need for the types of 
specialized means of identifying and containing degenerates that will follow. Mann on the other 
hand uses Nietzsche’s and Nordau’s conceptions of degeneration only in order to critique them 
from within. He parallels his story to Richard Wagner’s opera The Valkyrie to demonstrate the 
ridiculous distinctions that degeneration theory makes about who counts as biological threat 
(who should be considered grotesque), and he thereby disavows subsequent endeavors of 
biological classification.  
My next chapter takes up psychology’s response to degeneration theory, as psychologists 
shift at the turn of the 20th century from definitions of mental illness based on visible symptoms 
to the examination of inherited explanations of mental ‘abnormality.’ Their responses to mental 
illness thus undergo a change as well, from physical treatments meant to push individuals back 
into socially acceptable behavior patterns to attempting to uncover ‘hidden’ mental difference 
and then contain those individuals thereby deemed ‘dangerous.’ I look at works by two authors 
focused on mental issues: Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Georg Heym. First, I examine Gilman’s 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” (1892) and Heym’s “Jonathan” (1913) as stories which present 
“hysterical” protagonists who are confined and isolated, undergoing disciplinary treatment meant 
to correct their ‘abnormal’ mental states. That treatment, however, backfires and instead pushes 
them to become physically grotesque, suggesting a critique of authoritarian stances towards 
psychological cures. In reading across several pieces by these authors, however, it becomes clear 
that Gilman and Heym do not fully commit to their own critiques; Gilman published several later 
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essays, and the novel Herland, demonstrating a pro-eugenic stance, a disconnect that I argue 
reveals her ambivalence towards changing attitudes in psychology, which had not yet fully 
incorporated considerations of heredity during her time. For Heym, writing almost two decades 
after Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper,” biological concerns within psychology introduce the 
possibility that mental illness might be ubiquitous, and I read his story “The Madman” as 
demonstrating a simultaneous desire for and aversion to the types of mental institutions meant to 
uncover and contain inherited madness. 
The protagonist of “The Madman” murders several passersby, so that his mental illness 
becomes conflated with his criminality; in fact, the same biological shift appears in criminal law 
in the early 1900s, where punishments and sentences move from an emphasis on the crimes to 
the criminals themselves. My third chapter thus explores two works caught between the old 
models of criminal law, based on arbitrary rules created by various systems of government, and 
the new model based on biological considerations. I look at Gertrude Barrows Bennett’s The 
Heads of Cerberus and Franz Kafka’s In the Penal Colony, both published in 1919, which 
combine the older governmental mode of sovereignty with socialism and bureaucracy, 
respectively, to portray dystopian societies where citizens are deemed criminal based on actions 
against the sovereign’s will. I argue that Bennett and Kafka portray their fictitious governments, 
mirroring contemporaneous historical models, as corrupt and ineffectual, as evidenced by their 
grotesque effects on their citizens. Both texts then gesture towards the biological modes of 
defining criminality which will follow; Bennett embraces what she deems a less arbitrary means 
of classifying ‘dangerous’ individuals, while Kafka critiques what comes next as equally 
arbitrary and corrupt.  
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The shift towards classifying individuals as biologically ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal,’ as 
portrayed by my first three chapters, culminates with the eugenic actions predicated on new 
genetic sciences appearing in the late 1920s and early 1930s. My final chapter, therefore, 
examines how the logic of genetic sciences, which seek to uncover hidden ‘otherness’ below the 
body’s surface, drives the plot of two stories concentrated on genetic monstrosity: H. P. 
Lovecraft’s “The Shadow Over Innsmouth,” and Fritz Lang’s film M, both from 1931. Lovecraft 
and Lang turn to physiognomy as a means of highlighting moments of visible genetics in their 
‘monstrous’ protagonists, using the grotesque to signal the necessity of uncovering those genetic 
dangers hiding beneath a seemingly ‘normal’ human exterior. In both stories, however, 
classifications of the ‘monstrous,’ ‘abnormal,’ and ‘normal’ break down, rendering eugenic 
actions taken against the monsters especially horrific because they are predicated on a falsely 
constructed hierarchy. While Lovecraft’s personal racist views mean that his story reaches such 
conclusions in spite of himself, Lang purposefully demonstrates the impossibility of imagining 
‘just’ punishments for monsters who, essentially, remain entirely human. By ending with the 
genetic sciences and eugenics of the 1930s, finally, I am able to gesture towards the biopolitical 
actions which follow in Nazi Germany, and biology’s continued importance today in various 
fictional imaginings of who we consider ‘other.’ 
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CHAPTER 1: ARTISTIC DEGENERATES: 
FRANK NORRIS AND THOMAS MANN 
I. Introduction 
 In 1892, Max Nordau published his theory on degeneration, dedicating the book 
(originally titled Entartung) to Italian criminologist Caesar Lombroso. As an explanation for his 
work, Nordau writes:  
Degenerates are not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, and pronounced lunatics; 
they are often authors and artists. These, however, manifest the same mental 
characteristics, and for the most part the same somatic features, as the members of the 
above-mentioned anthropological family, who satisfy their unhealthy impulses with the 
knife of the assassin or the bomb of the dynamiter, instead of with pen and pencil. 
(Nordau vii) 
 
Nordau lists ‘dangerous’ groups classified by Lombroso through the study of physiognomy and 
the biological body, lending his own book similar ‘scientific’ weight, yet Nordau takes as his 
focus instead the artistic world, those individuals who might not precisely fit one of Lombroso’s 
categories. Nordau’s exploration of artistic degeneracy follows closely on the heels of that of 
another famous German author, Friedrich Nietzsche, whose own concern with degeneration and 
the “style of decadence” is most clearly outlined in his 1888 essay “The Case of Wagner” 
(Nietzsche 626).4 Both writers correlate the perceived fin-de-siècle cultural decline, as noticed 
primarily through the body, with the influence of select artists on the whole of society; it is this 
link between aesthetics and biology that I will illuminate in this chapter, through works of 
literary fiction by Frank Norris and Thomas Mann. 
                                                
4 Nietzsche often uses the terms “decadence” and “degeneration” interchangeably; both terms refer to the perceived 
cultural decline specific to the turn of the 20th century. 
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I will begin with a closer look at how, precisely, definitions of degenerate art in the late 
19th century were constructed. Nordau and Nietzsche disagree fundamentally on who should 
count as degenerate; Nietzsche throughout his oeuvre makes clear his disdain for the masses, or 
herd (the ‘norm’), in contrast with its outlier artists. For Nietzsche, “in declining cultures, 
wherever the decision comes to rest with the masses, authenticity becomes superfluous, 
disadvantageous, a liability,” and the danger of degeneration increases as the “extraordinary 
human being stray[s] from his path and degenerate[s]” “into the perfect herd animal” (Nietzsche 
635, 308). Nietzsche thus equates degeneration with a lack of authenticity, with the suppression 
of “extraordinary” qualities, that accompanies the aesthetic tastes of the masses. In works such as 
Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche clarifies this disdain for a 
norm, stating that “morality in Europe today is herd animal morality” which causes “everything 
that elevates an individual above the herd [. . .] [to be] called evil” while “the fair, modest, 
submissive, conforming mentality, the mediocrity of desires attains moral designations and 
honors” (305, 304). 
While Nietzsche clearly prefers outlier aesthetics and warns against degeneration as the 
push of society towards a norm, Nordau on the other hand attributes degeneration to those 
outliers instead, naming it “a contempt for traditional views of custom and morality” (Nordau 5). 
Nordau points to a minority of degenerate artists who according to him have “the gift of covering 
the whole visible surface of society, as a little oil extends over a large area of the surface of the 
sea,” and as a result “it appears as if the whole of civilized humanity were converted to the 
aesthetics of the Dusk of the Nations” (7). Yet while his language echoes Nietzsche’s 
apprehension of the potentially wide-spread nature of degeneration (whether through the 
influence of the many or the singular), Nordau repeatedly characterizes this degeneration as “the 
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end of an established order, which for thousands of years has satisfied logic, fettered depravity, 
and in every art matured something of beauty” (5). Nietzsche and Nordau thus disagree 
fundamentally on the nature of degeneration’s danger, respectively as either pushing society 
closer to an established (and unimaginative) norm, or as breaking with that norm.  
While Nietzsche and Nordau’s theories of degeneration might therefore seem at first 
incompatible, on several points Nordau (perhaps unconsciously) adopts Nietzsche’s language, 
resulting in several commonalities between their works. Their mutual concern with “the over-all 
degeneration of man” and its corresponding danger for humanity’s future leads both Nietzsche 
and Nordau to detail what traits, exactly, define a degenerate aesthetics, with the ultimate goal of 
identification as remedy or at least bulwark (Nietzsche 308). Nordau for instance states his 
primary reason for writing Degeneration as helping “accelerate the recovery of the cultivated 
classes from the present derangement of their nervous system”; in other words, to halt and 
reverse the spread of degeneracy (Nordau 550). By outlining the specifics of what counts as 
degenerate art, and how exactly that art begins to affect the rest of society, Nietzsche and Nordau 
figure degeneration as a contagion that must first be identified before humanity can attempt to 
overcome its threat. 
Most surprisingly, given their divergent opinions, a close-reading of Nietzsche’s and 
Nordau’s conceptions of degenerate art reveals the same overall principle: for both, degenerate 
aesthetics entails a move away from a whole or natural form, either as an excess (spilling out of 
the form) or as a lack (reducing the form to nothingness, or to its parts). Nietzsche asks, “What is 
the sign of every literary decadence? That life no longer dwells in the whole”; rather, the whole 
becomes an “anarchy of atoms, disgregation of the will, [. . .] life pushed back into the smallest 
forms” (Nietzsche 626). In this formulation, degenerate aesthetics involves the disintegration of a 
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whole, a lack of form and willpower, seen as well in the subsequent terms “paralysis, 
arduousness, torpidity”; on the other hand, those same aesthetics might include “hostility and 
chaos,” or an excess, a spilling over (626). Nordau likewise defines degeneracy through terms 
indicating excess or lack: “unbridled lewdness, the unchaining of the beast in man,” and also 
“the negation of a supersensuous world, the descent into flat phenomenalism, [. . .] the vanishing 
of ideals in art, and no more power in its accepted forms to arouse emotion” (Nordau 5). 
As Nietzsche and Nordau further clarify their conceptions of degenerate aesthetics, their 
language incorporates the biological, demonstrating a connection between excess and lack in art, 
and in the degenerate bodies producing and produced by such art. Nietzsche for example 
characterizes Richard Wagner’s music, where Wagner represents “the modern artist par 
excellence,” as demonstrating the “problems of hysterics—the convulsive nature of his affects, 
his overexcited sensibility, his taste that require[s] ever stronger spices,” and at the same time 
having an “incapacity for giving organic form,” instead concentrating on “spinning out the 
details” (Nietzsche 622, 626-627). The words “convulsive,” “overexcited,” and “stronger” imply 
excess while Wagner’s “incapacity” and concentration on “details” imply lack of form. With 
each of these phrases, however, Nietzsche also links to the “physiological types” of degeneration 
who are “pathological” and “sick,” through words such as “affect,” “hysteric,” and “organic”; 
Nietzsche summarizes that “Wagner est une névrose,” Wagner is a neurosis (622). Nietzsche 
thereby conflates the artist, Wagner, and his excessive and lacking art, with biological pathology, 
a theme he often repeats. For instance he states that “Wagner has the same effect as continual 
consumption of alcohol: blunting, and obstructing the stomach with phlegm,” causing 
“degeneration of the sense of rhythm” (640). Wagner “makes sick whatever he touches”; with 
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these statements, Nietzsche conceives of degenerate aesthetics as a contagion that infects and 
physically harms the masses (620). 
For Nietzsche, degenerate aesthetics work like a sickness on the body—Nordau’s account 
of degeneration likewise introduces the biological as he states that “the clearest notion we can 
form of degeneracy is to regard it as a morbid deviation from an original type,” adopting 
scientific language to figure degeneracy as a divergence from an established species (Nordau 
16). This “morbid deviation” shows in excessive acts of “vice, crime, and madness,” or “moral 
insanity,” and in excessive “emotionalism,” or in physical features which are “completely 
stunted, others morbidly exaggerated” (17, 18). Degenerate bodies for Nordau, like Nietzsche, 
either exhibit an excess of action, physicality, and emotion, or a lack thereof as with “stunted” or 
asymmetrical physicality, and when degenerates demonstrate an “incapacity for action” or a 
“predilection for inane reverie” (17, 21). Finally, Nordau echoes Nietzsche’s contagion model 
when he explains the seriousness of degeneracy’s danger for humanity: he states that “certain 
micro-organisms engendering mortal diseases have always been present [. . .] but they only cause 
epidemics when circumstances arise intensely favourable for their rapid increase” (537). Like 
“the bacillus of cholera,” degeneracy attacks the “Zeitgeist, weakened by fatigue, and rendered 
incapable of resistance” so that for Nordau, “We stand now in the midst of a severe mental 
epidemic; of a sort of black death of degeneration and hysteria, and it is natural that we should 
ask anxiously on all sides: ‘What is to come next?’ ” (537). 
Even as Nietzsche and Nordau thus figure degeneration as a biological contagion, they 
simultaneously insist on the sterility of degeneration. In the case of Wagner, Nietzsche notes that 
among Germans “he was resisted like a sickness” and that “the German character still possesses 
some degree of health, some instinctive sense for what is harmful and dangerous,” thereby 
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suggesting that Wagner and others like him will not be able to completely infect German society 
(Nietzsche 637). Nordau likewise attempts to reassure his reader, stating:  
That which distinguishes degeneracy from the formation of new species (phylogeny) is, 
that the morbid variation does not continuously subsist and propagate itself, like one that 
is healthy, but, fortunately, is soon rendered sterile, and after a few generations often dies 
out before it reaches the lowest grade of organic degradation. (Nordau 16) 
 
This ultimate sterility of degeneration directly contrasts its characterization as contagion, 
suggesting that Nietzsche and Nordau write their warnings ‘just in case,’ or primarily for reasons 
of taxonomy rather than cure. The immense fin-de-siècle proliferation of aesthetic and scientific 
theories of degeneration, and artistic interest in depicting degeneration in the United States as 
well as Germany, however, suggest a growing anxiety about humanity’s future, even if the threat 
appears to contain its own remedy. 
 
I have introduced these preliminary characterizations of degeneration by Nietzsche and 
Nordau in order to demonstrate several salient features of their definitions: first, Nietzsche warns 
against degeneration as a push to a norm that cuts off the possibility of unique art, while Nordau 
fears the destruction of that norm precisely because of a proliferation of deviating art. They both, 
however, conceive of degenerate aesthetics as simultaneous lack and excess of form, and as 
mutually influencing and influenced by lack and excess in the biological body. Lastly, while they 
define degeneration as a contagion negatively affecting humanity’s future, both likewise 
introduce the idea of its sterility, its inability to infect entire populations. Thus degeneration, both 
within each theorist’s conception and in reading their theories together, can be defined as a series 
of oppositions and contradictions. As Nietzsche puts it, “biologically, modern man represents a 
contradiction of values,” yet while he attempts to expose that contradiction in favor of one set of 
values (the destruction of modern morality), I will turn to the particular aesthetics of literature in 
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order to demonstrate precisely humanity’s inability to reconcile contradiction (Nietzsche 648). 
Specifically, I will look at degeneration narratives by Norris and Mann which closely follow 
Nietzsche and Nordau’s theories, as they introduce degenerate artists who affect and are affected 
by the aesthetics around them. Nietzsche and Nordau theorize the realm of aesthetics and art, yet 
the art (literature) that provides examples of their findings likewise theorizes degeneracy itself, 
and Norris’s and Mann’s works end up troubling degeneration theory as much or more than they 
mirror it. 
Norris’s novel Vandover and the Brute, written in 1895, introduces a degenerate 
character whose ‘abnormality’ is primarily figured as inherited and biological, and as mutually 
influencing and influenced by the degenerate aesthetics which surround him. While Norris 
closely follows Nordau’s definition, presenting his novel as a field guide for the identification of 
threat in upper-class society, he ends his story with the image of a degenerate who will continue 
to live, and perhaps even procreate. Norris’s anxiety about the threat of degeneration thus 
manifests itself ultimately as a contradiction to Nordau’s certainty of sterility, suggesting the 
need for further specialized means of identifying and containing such biological hazard. Mann, 
on the other hand, likewise presents what seems at first a taxonomy of degeneration with his 
1905 story “The Blood of the Walsungs,” closely following both Nordau’s and Nietzsche’s 
definitions, but several moments of irony make clear that in fact Mann adopts their theory only 
to critique it from within. Most notably, Mann’s story parallels Wagner’s opera The Valkyrie, 
and Mann uses ironic comparisons to suggest first the absurdity of attempts to identify specific 
individuals as degenerate, and second the flaws inherent in more general endeavors of biological 
classification. I end this chapter with the turn to just such biological institutions as Norris gladly 
anticipates, and Mann critiques; as Mann’s story “Tristan” intimates, the concept of degeneration 
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does not disappear, but rather morphs as it encounters individual disciplines attempting to tame 
the ‘other.’  
 
II. Relentless Degeneracy in Vandover and the Brute 
 Frank Norris, born in 1870 in Chicago, remains an important figure in the study of 
literary naturalism in part due to his own interests in biology and nature, as well as his affinities 
with other writers focused on “a deterministic view of the human condition like [. . .] Crane, 
London, and Dreiser,” or “his principal transatlantic mentor, Émile Zola” (McElrath 17). Norris 
took his ideas about human nature partially from Darwin, believing that “rational mankind 
descended from lower, non-rational life forms that were determined in their actions solely by 
instinct” and that the human “did not—and could not—sever its ties with its ancestors, and many 
of the predispositions and traits its antecedent species genetically transmitted are not vestigial” 
(21). Norris was likewise influenced by evolutionary theorist Joseph Le Conte, his “revered 
professor at Berkeley,” who “warned that ‘the mixing of primary races is bad, and such mixed 
races, as weaker varieties in the struggle for life, must perish’ ” (Bender 75, 81).  
Norris’s interest in heredity, human evolution, and the racist fears of inherited 
“weakness,” show most prominently in his treatment of degeneration in several of his short 
stories and novels. As David Holmberg argues, in the American context naturalist authors adopt 
a scientific mode, the Foucauldian “clinical gaze,” thus “impart[ing] naturalism with a new level 
of purpose and authority: the doctor tasked with discovering the disease” (Holmberg 53).5 
Inspired by the proliferation of scientific inquiries into evolution at the time, Norris undertakes 
                                                
5 Holmberg’s article focuses on the oscillation between the objective scientific gaze and the fantasy voyeurism of 




the serious task of illustrating the disease of degeneration through fiction. In particular, Norris 
was familiar with both Nordau’s Degeneration and Lombroso’s writings on ‘dangerous’ 
individuals, as evidenced by Norris’s story “A Case for Lombroso” (1897). Donald Pizer notes 
that the story was “less an allusion to Lombroso’s specific beliefs about criminals than to their 
adaptation by Max Nordau in his 1895 best-seller Degeneration” and clarifies that “Norris 
signified this debt when he wrote on a clipping of the story, ‘A subject for Max Nordau’ ” (Pizer 
17). Several critics concentrate on Norris’s interest in degeneration theory; notably Dana Seitler, 
Sherwood Williams, and Stephanie Bower all construct arguments linking degeneration theory to 
sexuality in Vandover and the Brute. However, no critics so far have concentrated on the novel’s 
portrayal of a curious feedback loop between aesthetics and biology, closely following Nordau’s 
writing, that suggests the paradoxical inability of aesthetics to cure degeneracy, even as 
aesthetics contribute to its spread. As I will show, Norris presents the full scope of Vandover’s 
degeneration in terms of lack and excess, mingling aesthetics with the body in order to 
demonstrate the ultimate danger of biologically-determined degeneracy.6 Most dangerous, Norris 
suggests (in contrast to Nordau), is Vandover’s adaptability and his will to continue living; 
Vandover represents an ever-present threat to humanity’s future, without easy cure. 
 
Vandover and the Brute works as an anti-bildungsroman, showing the rise and fall of 
Vandover as he slowly deteriorates. Vandover, born to a prominent Californian family, at first 
experiences all possible advantages, including an endless supply of money, his father’s support, 
                                                
6 While that danger is not overtly racialized in Vandover and the Brute, Bower demonstrates how several short 
stories by Norris “enact the causal connection between sexualized association with racial others and racial 
debilitation,” linking sexual disease and promiscuity with racialized degeneration (Bower 45). Seitler in Atavistic 
Tendencies likewise remarks on a short episode in Vandover involving a Jewish man, stating that “the ‘little Jew,’ 
placed into such deliberate and nagging (not to mention anti-Semitic) proximity to Vandover confirms the status of 
Vandover’s degeneracy” (Seitler 112). The implicit anti-Semitism and racism of Vandover foreshadow the 
prominence of racism in biopolitical interventions following degeneration theory. 
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and a prestigious education, with private art lessons. However, as he becomes older, he spends 
more time with male friends in various bars and gambling dens, and with women of ill repute, 
eventually being cast out from polite society for his sexual transgressions with two women of the 
upper classes. As Vandover loses his father, then his friends, and then the good-will of society in 
general, he undergoes mental and physical changes which render him and his artistic talents 
grotesque and destructive. Norris thus presents a long trajectory of descent, from Vandover 
merely having degenerate tendencies to becoming an example of the worst possible 
degeneration. 
 Norris uses Nordau’s conception of degeneracy as a simultaneous lack and excess of a 
‘natural’ form to demonstrate a constant feedback loop between biology and aesthetics. He first 
figures Vandover’s affliction as a biological, most likely inherited trait. In the first pages, Norris 
describes Vandover’s mother dying from an unspecified illness; her “tightly drawn” forehead 
hints at a ‘nerve disease’ such as “degeneracy [or] hysteria, of which the minor stages are 
designated as neurasthenia,” and her illness foreshadows the increasing frequency of nerve 
disease in Vandover as well (Norris 4, Nordau 15). Seitler likewise reads Norris’s description of 
the mother as coded allusion to “neurasthenia, atavism, and ‘feeble-mindedness’,” affirming that 
Vandover “inherits neurasthenia from his mother” (Seitler, Atavistic 104). Nordau clarifies that 
degenerates “possess the capacity of transmitting to its [their] offspring, in a continuously 
increasing degree, its peculiarities, these being morbid deviations from the normal form—gaps in 
development, malformations and infirmities” (Nordau 16, emphasis mine). Thus in Vandover, 
this nerve disease becomes heightened, as seen by several passages in which Vandover describes 
the “exalted, strained, and unnatural condition of his nerves,” often in conjunction with extreme 
emotion (Norris 169).  
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Vandover’s excess “emotionalism,” moreover, manifests in an increased susceptibility to 
aesthetic influence: Nordau describes how a degenerate 
 [. . .] Laughs until he sheds tears, or weeps copiously without adequate occasion; a 
commonplace line of poetry or of prose sends a shudder down his back; he falls into 
raptures before indifferent pictures or statues; and music especially, even the most 
insipid and least commendable, arouses in him the most vehement emotions. (Nordau 19, 
emphasis mine) 
 
That Norris accepts Nordau’s portrayal of art as affecting bodily functions like emotion shows in 
several passages, such as a description of dancing women where “the heavy perfume of the 
flowers, [and] the cadence of the music [. . .] react[s] in some strange way upon their 
oversensitive feminine nerves,” causing them to experience “a morbid hysterical pleasure [. . .] 
mixed with pain” (Norris 141). In both Nordau’s and Norris’s descriptions of these degenerates, 
the artistic surroundings create exaggerated physical reactions. Similarly, Vandover’s excessive 
and violent sexuality (whether biological urge or emotional state) is first incited through the 
aesthetic influence of an “old Encyclopaedia Britannica” with an article about “ ‘Obstetrics,’ 
profusely illustrated with old-fashioned plates and steel engravings” (8). The visual and written 
descriptions of human anatomy influence Vandover instantly; “the whole of his rude little 
standard of morality [i]s lowered immediately” and he is set on a path of sexual crime (8). Even 
in this moment of awakening, however, Norris makes clear that the potency of the aesthetic 
influence stems from Vandover’s biological predisposition; he describes how Vandover seeks 
knowledge about sexuality “with the instinct of a young brute,” and how upon his reading the 
article “the first taint cre[eps] in, the innate vice stir[s] in him, the brute beg[ins] to make itself 
felt” (8). Norris returns to this concept of the titular “brute” throughout the novel as a shorthand 
that emphasizes the “innate” nature of Vandover’s degeneracy. 
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 Norris’s descriptions of Vandover’s increasingly deviant sexual encounters likewise 
conflate biological excess and lack with aesthetic influence. Nordau notes particularly: “that 
which nearly all degenerates lack is the sense of morality and of right and wrong,” and this 
“lack” of morality allows Vandover to commit sexual crimes of ever greater degree (Nordau 18). 
Vandover begins his sexual descent by frequenting bars where prostitutes and ‘loose women’ 
work, often acknowledging and calling attention to his attraction to those women. Again 
aesthetics influence his biological urges, as Norris explains: 
It was the sensitive artist nature in him that responded instantly to anything sensuously 
attractive. Each kind and class of beautiful women could arouse in Vandover passions of 
equal force, though of far different kind. Turner Ravis [upper-class woman] [. . .] call[ed] 
out in him all that was cleanest, finest, and most delicate. Flossie [presumed prostitute] 
appealed only to the animal and the beast in him, the evil, hideous brute that made instant 
answer. (Norris 39) 
 
Norris links Vandover’s attraction to women like Flossie to the “brute” in order to figure his 
subsequent sexual violence as a biological excess of sexuality, overpowering the positive 
aesthetic influence of women like Turner, and causing him to commit the violent crime of rape. 
While Norris does not depict these sexual encounters, he hints at rape through Vandover’s 
mental turmoil: after his encounter with Turner one Sunday morning while drunk, Vandover 
“realize[s] the enormity of what he ha[s] done,” the “worst thing he ha[s] ever done,” and thinks 
that this encounter is “a long step onward in his progress of ruin and pollution” (48). However, 
even as Vandover regrets his actions, Norris foreshadows his sexual drive as ingrained and 
therefore unstoppable; Vandover declares that “he would take care never to do such a thing 
again,” and Norris replies, “but this was not so” (48).7 This scene indeed repeats shortly 
thereafter with Ida Wade, a middle-class woman whom Vandover feels is slightly beneath him; 
                                                
7 Williams in his article on Vandover’s sexual corruption discusses a historical turn from conceptions of ‘aberrant’ 
sexuality as a willfully chosen vice to “locating desire in physical impulses, [. . .] [where] sexual drives [are] both 
given and fixed”; Williams confirms that Vandover’s sexual ‘aberrance’ adheres to this latter, biological type (719). 
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after a meal together Norris hints at rape through Ida’s exclamations, “No—no [...] no, Van—
please,” after which “with a long breath she abandon[s] herself” (Vandover later admits that “she 
had consented, but he had forced her consent”) (58, 77). 
 The scene with Ida stands out particularly as it takes place in The Imperial, a bar 
frequented by Vandover and his friends, with “private rooms” where Flossie and her colleagues 
entertain male guests. Its unsavory reputation causes Ida to ask, “What kind of a girl do you 
think I am, anyway?” as Vandover steers her to the door (Norris 56). Norris intimates that the 
bar’s setting contributes to Vandover’s subsequent sexual attack, as its aesthetics create a 
particular atmosphere: in the main barroom a painting of a “Sabbath” includes “witches, goats, 
and naked girls,” and another depicts “the ladies of a harem at their bath” (32). In the private 
rooms, “women and girls pass up and down with [. . .] a rattle of stiff skirts and petticoats, and a 
heavy whiff of musk,” adding to the “heavy odorous warmth in which were mingled the smells 
of sweetened whiskey, tobacco, the fumes of cooking, and the scent of perfume” (37). These 
sensory details of nudeness and vice broken into composite parts make clear the degeneracy of 
The Imperial’s aesthetics, which have the effect of allowing Vandover and his friends to “relax 
that restraint, that good breeding and delicacy” so that their “talk and manners bec[o]me blunt, 
rude, unconstrained, the coarser masculine fibre reasserting itself” into “obscene” language (35).  
However, while aesthetics affect Vandover’s actions, Norris includes details of 
Vandover’s internal thoughts to make clear the simultaneous impact of his biological degeneracy 
on his aesthetic preferences. Vandover for instance actively seeks out The Imperial; when on his 
date with Ida, she asks about the bar and his thought—“Was it possible that Ida would go to a 
place like that with him?”—shows his secret desire to put her in such a setting, conducive to 
sexual activity (Norris 56). Though he describes the bar to Ida “indifferently,” internally “his 
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pulse was beating fast, and his nerves were strung taut”; he experiences physical excess at the 
thought of entering The Imperial. Vandover’s aesthetic surroundings are thus selected by his 
biological aberrancy; this influence shows as well in his obsession with material possessions, as 
inherited from his father who “indulge[s] in any harmless fad, such as collecting etchings, china, 
or bric-à-brac” (5). Vandover’s “rage for collecting, the piling up, in dwellings, of aimless bric-à-
brac,” as Nordau puts it, is foregrounded in several passages devoted to Vandover’s daydreams 
about his possessions and care in arranging his rooms (Nordau 27). Moreover, “all the details of 
one’s environment” are so important to him that when Vandover loses those possessions to a 
lack of funds, he writes their names on pieces of paper to use as placeholders in his room (11). 
His dwellings therefore swing from one extreme—packed with colors, textures, and trinkets of 
all sizes—to the other: empty rooms and possessions signified only by their lack. 
  
 Norris thus uses Nordau’s terms of lack and excess to set up an intricate relationship 
between aesthetics and biology, where Vandover’s predisposition to sexual violence, emotion, 
and nerve illness is both aided by and contributing to the degeneracy of his aesthetic 
surroundings. Norris uses the correspondence between aesthetics and biology, however, to move 
beyond a demonstration of the criteria by which one might, following Nordau, identify a 
degenerate in society. Instead, his concentration on the endless feedback loop of art and body 
opens the possibility of determining the degree to which a degenerate individual might be 
influenced, and therefore ‘cured,’ by the ‘right’ kind of aesthetics. For instance, the benevolence 
of Turner Ravis should counteract Vandover’s violent sexuality. Norris creates several other 
moments of potential salvation for Vandover, where his aesthetic surroundings seem to cancel 
out his degenerate tendencies and set him on an acceptable path. Ultimately, however, Norris 
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demonstrates Vandover’s ever increasing degeneration, and his simultaneous tenacious grip on 
life, to suggest that in fact biology will overpower aesthetics, as when he attacks Turner, and 
‘cure’ must therefore be sought elsewhere. 
 The first moment of potential salvation comes on the heels of three events—“Ida’s 
suicide, the [ship]wreck, and his father’s death”—after which “the fabric of [Vandover’s] 
character ha[s] been shaken, jostled out of its old shape” of vice and debauchery (Norris 132). 
Vandover figures this moment as “the chance to begin anew, to commence all over again” by 
“merely [. . .] remain[ing] inactive, impassive” so that “his character [can] of itself re-form upon 
the new conditions” (132). In Vandover’s estimation, by ridding himself of the aesthetic 
influences of his “life of luxury,” he might remove his own degenerate tendencies; Norris, 
however, declares this inaction a “fatal mistake” (132). Norris clarifies that “the brute in 
[Vandover] had only been stunned,” and to help himself stay on a socially-acceptable path 
Vandover would need: 
[. . .] Not a continued state of inaction and idleness [. . .], but rather an active and 
energetic arousing and spurring up of those better qualities in him still dormant and inert. 
The fabric of his nature was shaken and broken up, it was true, but if he left it to itself 
there was danger that it would re-form upon the old lines. (132-3) 
 
In other words, Vandover’s biological lack and excess require an “active” balancing to neutralize 
them and reshape his “nature” into a more ‘natural’ form. For instance, he “lack[s] both the 
desire and necessity to keep him at his easel,” and is “content to be idle, listless, apathetic”; as 
Nordau puts it, degeneracy is diagnosable in the “condition of mental weakness and 
despondency” which causes one patient to state, “ennui never quits me” (Norris 133, Nordau 19-
20). This lack of will-power requires its opposite, an infusion of motivation and hard work, to 
bring a ‘normal’ balance to Vandover’s “nature,” but through his inaction the lack only 
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increases, until Vandover feels that “everything [i]s an ennui, and [...] beg[ins] to long for some 
new pleasure, some violent untried excitement,” thus swinging instead to excess (Norris 207).8 
 The cycle of Vandover’s desire to ‘better’ himself, only to decay even further, repeats 
shortly thereafter when he visits the opera Faust by French composer Charles Gounod; Norris 
makes clear that Vandover’s “love for all art,” or what Norris and Nordau might deem ‘good’ 
art,9 has a positive influence (Norris 154). Nordau characterizes ‘good’ opera indirectly through 
his description of degenerate opera as music which irritates the listener by constantly opposing 
expected flow: the motif “differ[s] entirely from th[e] anticipated development,” “a dissonant 
interval must appear where a consonant interval [i]s expected,” “keys and pitch must change 
suddenly,” and “particular instruments [. . .] must address the listener simultaneously without 
heeding each other” (Nordau 12-13). Norris figures Gounod’s opera, on the other hand, as 
harmonious and following expectations: he describes how “all the bows [go] up and down 
together like parts of a well-regulated machine [and] the kettle-drums roll sonorously at exact 
intervals” (Norris 155). The “well-regulated” and “exact” nature of the instruments thus have a 
beneficial effect, “little by little tak[ing] possession of Vandover” (157). Instead of a degenerate 
music that causes its audience to become “nervously excited” and succumb to “nervous 
exhaustion,” in Norris’s novel “the slow beat and cadence of the melodies of the opera [. . .] 
cradle all [Vandover’s] senses, carrying him away into a kind of exalted dream” (Nordau 13, 
Norris 158). The calm, peaceful aesthetics of the opera create in Vandover “a vague sense of 
                                                
8 Norris again suggests the inherited nature of Vandover’s degeneracy by echoing the language used to describe his 
father at the beginning, who suffers from a “mortal ennui and weariness of the spirit” (Norris 5). 
 
9 Biographer Joseph McElrath identifies the unnamed opera as Faust, and notes that Norris was “quite mad” about 
opera according to his brother Charles; Faust was his “perennial favorite” (McElrath 81).That Nordau would 
consider Gounod’s Faust ‘good’ art, as opposed to degenerate, shows in several passages in which he praises 
Goethe’s original literary work; particularly, Nordau claims that any attempt to add music and modernize Faust “is 
so sure of success that it is superfluous; Faust in dress-coat would be no other than the unaltered embodiment of 
Goethe’s own Faust” (Nordau 194).  
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those things which are too beautiful to be comprehended, of a nobility [. . .], all goodness, all 
benignity”; he thinks that “to be better, to be true and right and pure, [. . .] these were the things 
that he seemed to feel in the music” (Norris 158). Thus Norris provides a moment where the 
‘right’ aesthetics have the potential to “wrestle with the brute” and halt Vandover’s “perversion 
and destruction” (158). 
 
 This beneficial influence of aesthetics, however, almost immediately dissipates in the 
face of Vandover’s overwhelming biological predisposition to degeneracy. Norris figures 
Vandover’s ultimate descent through the grotesque—an aesthetic mode that carries excessive 
form and formlessness to extremes—in order to signal the especial danger and persistence of 
Vandover’s degeneration. The grotesque turn begins with several descriptions of the innate 
“brute” living within: Vandover “look[s] inward and downward into the depths of his own 
character” and sees “the brute, squat, deformed, hideous,” which has “grown to be a monster, 
glutted yet still ravenous [. . .] horrible beyond words” (Norris 159). Vandover at this moment 
still conceives of the “brute” as separate from his ‘true’ or desired self, but Norris devotes the 
rest of the novel to demonstrating how Vandover becomes the brute, how his degenerate nature 
overpowers all other characteristics. The figure of the brute feeds on “the purest, the cleanest, 
and the best” parts of Vandover so that its “bulk [is] fattened upon the rot and the decay of all 
that [i]s good, growing larger day by day, noisome, swollen, poddy, a filthy inordinate ghoul, 
gorged and bloated” (159). Norris uses this grotesque “exaggeration of the inappropriate to 
incredible and monstrous dimensions” to foreshadow first the transformation of Vandover’s art 
from talented to grotesque forms, and then the transformation of the artist’s body as well 
(Bakhtin 306). 
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At the beginning of the novel, Vandover shows promise as an artist, as he “possesse[s] 
the fundamental afflatus that underlies all branches of art” and hones his skills through several 
art courses with private instructors (Norris 9). As his degenerate activities increase, however, 
Vandover experiences a “queer, numb feeling in his head, like a rising fog” or a “strange blurring 
mist,” and he is unable to “make his hand interpret what [i]s in his head” (167, 202, 166). Nordau 
explains that degenerates are “incapable of correctly grasping, ordering, or elaborating into ideas 
[. . .] the impressions of the external world” and remain stuck in “nebulously blurred ideas” 
(Nordau 21). The lack of mental clarity translates into a lack of form in his art: “forms lose their 
outlines and are dissolved in floating mist” (or “fog”), so that Vandover becomes a “wholly 
sterile” artist, unable to properly articulate or produce the images in his mind (6, 191). Instead he 
draws “grotesque and meaningless shapes, the mocking caricatures of those he saw in his fancy” 
(Norris 167). His biological predisposition to mental confusion thus overruns his artistic skill, 
rendering his aesthetics grotesque even as he tries desperately to regain a ‘good’ aesthetic. 
During a second attempt, Vandover’s art becomes destructive; he tries to draw “the true 
children of his imagination” but creates instead “changelings, grotesque abortions” (Norris 169). 
The word “abortions” suggests that any progeny Vandover creates (including his art), will be 
destructive and destroyed. The brute within has “stolen away the true offspring of his mind, 
putting in their place these deformed dwarfs, its own hideous spawn,”10 effectively ending any 
possibility of Vandover contributing to ‘normal’ society, and in fact unleashing grotesque 
horrors (spawn) upon society instead (170). Mark Seltzer in Bodies and Machines analyzes more 
                                                
10 In Norris’s use of the phrase “deformed dwarfs,” we see again an implied connection between physical 
‘otherness’ and danger to society, which occurs as well in Mann’s “The Little Herr Friedemann.” Both Norris and 
Mann echo Nietzsche’s characterization (consciously or not) of the “degeneration and diminution of man, [. . .] this 
animalization of man into the dwarf animal” (Nietzsche 308). The figure of the dwarf will appear again in Georg 
Heym’s story “Jonathan,” discussed in the next chapter.  
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in-depth this paradoxical relation of generation and destruction (excess and lack), noting that in 
‘feeding’ the brute growing within him, Vandover is involved in a “monstrous process of 
gestation,” and the brute’s influence on his artistic “abortions” reveals that the “gestation of the 
brute is at the same time an obstetrics-in-reverse” (Seltzer 36, 37). By figuring Vandover’s 
aesthetic output in this scene in terms of birth and birth-interrupted, Norris moves from biology’s 
influence on art to art as biology. He thereby proves Vandover’s danger as a simultaneously 
fertile and sterile individual, potentially spreading his dead “offspring” to the rest of society.11 
 The shift to grotesque aesthetics causes in Vandover “all the sensations of terror, but 
without any assignable reason,” a “groundless fear” that culminates, following the warping of his 
mind and artistic talent, in the physical alteration of his body (Norris 178). In this moment, 
Vandover’s mental terror stems from his inability to articulate the cause of his affliction; as 
Wolfgang Kayser explains, the grotesque includes that which “remains incomprehensible, 
inexplicable, and impersonal,” and is “the expression of our failure to orient ourselves in the 
physical universe” (Kayser 185). Vandover’s inability to “orient” himself, the lack of 
explanation and comprehension, lead to his “becoming” in a Bakhtinian sense physically 
grotesque as well. He undergoes “a slow torsion and crisping of all his nerves, beginning at his 
ankles, spread[ing] to every corner of his body,” and his hands begin to “swell, the fingers 
puffing to an enormous size, the palms bulging, the whole member from the wrist to the nails 
distended like a glove when one has blown into it” (Norris 179, 180). Mikhail Bakhtin states that 
“the grotesque starts when the exaggeration reaches fantastic dimensions,” as when the physical 
body begins to grow to incredible proportions, and “special attention is given to the shoots and 
                                                
11 Norris introduces the risk of degenerate progeny through hints that Vandover has made Ida pregnant, although 
Ida’s death removes that threat. Still, Vandover’s resilience and will to continue living, as I will demonstrate, leave 
open the possibility of future progeny. 
 
 31 
branches” of the body (such as the hands) (Bakhtin 315, 316). Vandover in fact describes the 
changes to his body in Bakhtinian language: “it seemed to him that his hands and head were 
rapidly swelling to enormous size,” and “he fancie[s] that he [is] in some manner changing, that 
he [is] becoming another man” (Norris 203, emphasis mine). 
Vandover thus exemplifies physical excess, spilling out of his human form “into an 
animal one” as he “sink[s] [. . .] to the level of some dreadful beast” (Bakhtin 316, Norris 204). 
A doctor diagnoses his new habit of “running along the floor upon the palms of his hands and his 
toes [. . .] like any dog” and growling “Wolf—wolf—wolf” as a result of “lycanthropy-pathesis,” 
suggesting that his animalistic qualities stem from a medical transformation into a canine (Norris 
204, 205). At another moment Norris describes how Vandover’s behavior makes it seem “as 
though an angry dog were snarling and barking over a bone there under the table,” how 
Vandover “raise[s] his upper lip above his teeth and snarl[s]” like a dog when threatened (221, 
222). Vandover’s inherited degeneracy changes his physicality, rendering his danger outwardly 
visible through the figure of a violent dog. Norris moreover adds flora to the mix when he 
describes Vandover’s “hysteria sh[aking] him like a dry, light leaf” (excessive motion) or calls 
him an “inert, plantlike vegetation” (motionlessness) after he loses the motivation to be 
productive in any sense (170, 205). In blending “plants, animals, and human beings” in his very 
physicality, Vandover enters a new stage, “the final decay, the last inevitable rot”; Norris states 
explicitly near the end that Vandover has “literally become the brute” (Kayser 21, Norris 205, 
233). By emphasizing the primacy of the biological over aesthetics in determining degree of 
degeneration, Norris thus suggests: aesthetics alone will not provide the cure. 
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It is through his subsequent troubling of two other potential checks on degeneration—
social pressure and natural selection—that Norris breaks with Nordau’s assessment of 
degeneracy’s threat to humanity. Nordau points to both beneficial social influence and the 
inevitable sterility of degenerates as proof that those individuals who cannot be cured will 
nevertheless remain self-contained. What renders Vandover’s degeneration particularly 
threatening, then, is its resistance to the primary form of remedy prescribed by Nordau, “the 
sacred duty of all healthy and moral men to take part in the work of protecting and saving those 
who are not already too deeply diseased” (Nordau 556-7). Prior to Vandover’s final breakdown, 
Norris enumerates several points at which social influence should contain Vandover’s slow 
degeneration and set him on an acceptable path, yet Vandover continues to decay. Most 
disturbing, Vandover himself demonstrates an extreme investment in social norms and a desire to 
adhere to those norms, yet even with externally- and internally-generated social pressure, he 
succumbs. For instance, in resistance to his sexual crimes, Vandover at several moments censors 
his own desires; when accompanying Ida, he is “not at all certain that he care[s] to be seen on 
Kearney Street as Ida Wade’s escort; one never knew who one was going to meet” (Norris 55). 
Besides a deeply-ingrained need to adhere to his perceived higher social class, Vandover 
experiences “the cold grip of hysterical terror” when he contemplates social reactions to his 
crimes, for example upon seeing Ida’s mother on the street after her suicide (111). When Ida’s 
parents file a lawsuit against him, Vandover feels “anxiety and exasperation,” as well as the 
same “hysterical terror”; he experiences shame because of his prior ‘abnormal’ deeds (his rape of 
Ida), and a wish to preserve his status in society (176). 
Vandover’s social circle moreover attempts to correct his undesirable behaviors and 
afford him opportunities to fulfill a proper life-path; Turner Ravis asks him, “Won’t you be 
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better now? [. . .] I have faith in you. I believe it’s in you to become a great man and a good 
man” (Norris 150). Vandover takes her words seriously, “resolv[ing] to lead a new and upright 
life,” a resolution that repeats itself throughout the novel whenever Vandover commits a 
particularly egregious breach of social norms (151). On the brink of his final collapse (before 
discovering the loss of his artistic ability), Vandover enumerates all the positive social influences 
in his life that should have corrected any tendencies towards degeneration: his father who 
“exerted a great influence over Vandover,” and Turner who “made him wish to be better” (160). 
Most importantly, Vandover ruminates that “public opinion had been a great check upon him, the 
fear of scandal, the desire to stand well with the world he knew,” yet Vandover drives away each 
of these sources of positive influence (161). By writing his novel as a cycle of moments where 
Vandover breaks from social norms, realizes his mistake, and demonstrates the potential to refit 
himself to social convention, only to commit even greater crimes, Norris highlights the innate, 
biological nature of Vandover’s degeneration, the impossibility of a cure. If a man at first so 
artistically productive, such an upstanding member of high society, degenerates despite every 
possible opportunity to course-correct, then Norris intimates the futility of Nordau’s 
prescriptions and opens the possibility that an increase in ‘born’ degenerates might decimate 
‘normal’ society. 
Even more threatening than the lack of a cure is Vandover’s tenacious grip on life which 
subverts “natural selection,” removing the possibility of letting his disease run its course. Most 
critics concentrate on Vandover’s decline, assuming his eventual death,12 yet several moments in 
                                                
12 For instance Donald Pizer, one of the first and most cited Norris scholars, asserts that the passage illustrating the 
“herd of humanity” suggests that Vandover will “lag behind and be crushed” due to a weak nature, but as I 
demonstrate, in fact Vandover has the dangerous capacity to keep up with the herd (Pizer 41). Katherine Fusco 
likewise ends her analysis of narrative temporality with a characterization of Vandover as “a monster swept to his 
doom by the irresistible onward flow of natural, or narrative, time” (Fusco 38). Holmberg describes Norris’s ending 
with similar vocabulary of “doom,” pointing to Vandover’s “destruction” and the “pleasure that ultimately consumes 
[him]” (Holmberg 57). 
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the novel suggest that in fact, Vandover’s will to live keeps him an ever present threat. Norris 
asks his readers to take seriously this threat in one particular repeating passage portending a 
dismal future for humanity: 
It was Life, [. . .] an engine that sped straight forward, driving before it the infinite herd 
of humanity, [. . .] crushing out inexorably all those who lagged behind the herd and who 
fell from exhaustion, [. . .] still driving on the herd that yet remained, [. . .] blindly on and 
on toward some far-distant goal, some vague unknown end, some mysterious, fearful 
bourne [. . .] (Norris 171) 
 
Norris hints at the removal of the weak or lesser humans who “lag behind the herd,” signaling 
that in some cases, degenerates are naturally removed from society, but he also forecasts a 
potentially gloomy (“vague,” “mysterious,” “fearful”) end for humanity. In the case of Vandover 
and others like him, they are not removed organically, instead remaining at pace with the rest of 
the “herd” and threatening its direction. That Vandover will not “lag behind” shows in “the 
certain pliability of his character easily fitting itself into new grooves, reshaping itself to suit new 
circumstances,” in direct contrast to Nordau’s assertion that “degenerates, hysterics, and 
neurasthenics are not capable of adaptation” and are therefore “fated to disappear” (Norris 20, 
Nordau 540). By the end of the novel, instead of being “capable of no useful individual effort, 
and still less of a common labour which demands obedience, discipline, and the regular 
performance of duty,” Vandover proves his ability to perform just such a labor as he spends an 
entire day cleaning a tenant apartment to their exacting specifications (Nordau 540). His ability 
to adapt to new circumstances proves that rather than “disappearing,” he will continue to live, 
and to affect those around him. 
 Vandover’s intention to continue living shows, paradoxically, most succinctly at the 
moment when he attempts to end his life, unwilling to give in to the “brute.” He experiences a 
“strange impulse to seat himself before the mirror,” and upon surveilling himself he “cram[s] the 
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[revolver] muzzle into his mouth” and pulls the trigger, but has forgotten to load the gun (Norris 
183). When he realizes that his suicide attempt has failed, Vandover experiences “misery” and 
thinks that “the horror of life overpasse[s] the horror of death,” that if he continues living, he will 
lose his “anguish of conscience” and “return once more to vice” without the compunctions he 
currently experiences (183). He further agrees with Nordau that it is his “duty” to “destroy 
himself” for the good of society, yet upon steeling himself for a second suicide attempt, he 
decides:  
It was only the better part of him that was suffering; in a little while this better part would 
be dead, leaving only the brute. It would die a natural death without any intervention 
from him. Was there any need of suicide? [. . .] His whole life had been one long suicide. 
(184) 
 
In Vandover’s case, rather than the degenerate “perish[ing] in a slow decay,” the socially-
acceptable parts of him will “die a natural death,” a “suicide” leaving behind only the insane 
brute, ferociously clinging to life (Nordau 540). Norris’s novel thus ends with a degenerate 
character whose danger is primarily biologically determined, and who remains a threat to 
humanity without the usual possibilities of correction or removal from society. 
The disconnect between Norris’s warning13 to his audience of the danger of biologically-
driven degeneration, and Nordau’s repeated insistence that in fact the threat will resolve itself 
eventually, demonstrates again the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding degeneration theory. 
Seitler takes up this uncertainty in her writings on Vandover’s atavism, although specifically 
regarding sexual perversion and “new modes of sexual personhood” (Seitler, Atavistic 100). She 
notes that “rather than fixing degeneracy as a stable and medically predictable object,” Norris’s 
                                                
13 Bower likewise reads Norris’s novel as a warning; her concentration on race in his short stories leads her to 
conclude that Vandover “functions as a warning to the Anglo-Saxons who make up Norris’s reading audience since 
they too are exposed to the contagious germs of degeneracy” (Bower 53). As previously mentioned, the importance 
of race to degeneration theory has been well-documented (see for instance Daniel Pick’s Faces of Degeneration), 
and influences the racial inflection of subsequent biopolitical actions, but I focus in this chapter more generally on 
degeneration’s attempt to categorize threat, whether racial or not. 
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novel portrays the “perverse body [as] recapitulat[ing] scientific decree only to perform the 
instability of its terms and, in turn, suggest the irreducibility of the body to the regulatory 
regimes of human and subhuman taxonomy” (“Down” 540). While she insists that Norris’s novel 
thus thwarts the “attempt to identify and manage aberrance” as related to sexuality, I demonstrate 
that in the larger narrative Vandover remains a dangerous representation of how humanity might 
be overrun and destroyed by ‘abnormality,’ and therefore spurs on those biological interventions 
that “identify and manage aberrance” (Atavistic 100). Far from “cleansing the social world of 
specific liability by casting [Vandover’s] excesses as an individual’s biological anomaly,” I 
argue that Norris’s novel demands society come up with new and more efficient methods of 
taming such “biological anomaly” (103). Norris reveals with his ending his continued anxiety 
about the dangers of degeneracy as Vandover’s decline occurs in spite of the presence of 
“healthy and moral men” who attempt to help him, suggesting the necessity of more targeted 
actions to identify and contain the ‘abnormal.’ He therefore adopts degeneration’s contradictory 
language purposefully to demonstrate its efficacy in identifying the ‘other,’ while also pointing 
out its limitations and the need for further categorization. 
 
The next section of this chapter will focus on Thomas Mann’s writing, which likewise 
adopts degeneration terminology purposefully, although Mann augments and enlarges its 
contradictions with the goal of exposing its fundamental flaws and therefore the flaws of other 
projects of classifying the ‘abnormal.’ I will concentrate on Mann’s “The Blood of the 
Walsungs” from 1905 as particularly focused on critiquing degenerate taxonomies as 
contradictory and arbitrary; although several of his stories take up the themes of degeneration 
and decadence, Mann’s earlier stories are less overtly critical of the degenerate label. As 
 37 
biographer Ronald Hayman puts it, “instead of achieving ironic detachment from fin de siècle 
decadence, most of Thomas Mann’s early stories conform to the fashion for distasteful subject 
matter” such as “gloomy predictions that the world was going to end with the century” (Hayman 
66). However, even in such early stories as “The Little Herr Friedemann” (“Der kleine Herr 
Friedemann,” 1896) and “The Dilettante” (“Der Bajazzo,” 1897) Mann’s awareness of 
degeneration theory’s internal contradictions is clear in his inconsistent use of his preferred 
motifs across stories. 
For instance, Mann signals Wagnerian opera as harmful for the individual (following 
Nietzsche) in “Friedemann” and “Tristan,” but uplifting in “The Blood of the Walsungs.”14 
Likewise, Mann equates degeneration with sterility in “Friedemann,” where the degenerate 
protagonist Herr Friedemann decides early in life to “renounce, renounce forever” any feelings 
of arousal or love, and thus experiences “impotent [. . .] rage” in relation to his unexpected love 
interest (Mann 62, 75). His love interest Gerda likewise is characterized as “ice-cold” and 
remains detached, sterile, rebuking all of Friedemann’s emotional advances until he finally 
drowns himself at the story’s end (66).15 In “Tristan” and “The Blood of the Walsungs,” 
however, Mann aligns degeneracy with fertility, as I will demonstrate shortly. By adopting the 
language and logic of degeneration theory, then, Mann purposefully emphasizes its 
                                                
14 Interestingly, “The Dilettante” features Gounod’s Faust, just like Norris’s novel; further similarities include a 
section where the “Bajazzo somewhat pedantically accounts for six years’ spending of his money” (Vandover also 
devotes some time to accounting and his dwindling finances), and a section “detail[ing] the carefully selected locale 
and decor of Bajazzo’s new dwelling” (Vandover’s obsession with dwellings and decor is omni-present) (Lesér 48, 
49). These similarities must stem from Norris’s and Mann’s equal interest in naturalist fiction (Zola) and 
degeneration themes; since Mann’s story was published in 1897 after Norris had already written Vandover, and 
Vandover was published much later, it is extremely unlikely that the authors read each other’s fiction. 
 
15 In the German, “er verzichtete, verzichtete auf immer,” “ohnmächtige [. . .] Wut,” and “eiskalt.” All translations 
of Mann’s writing into English are my own, unless noted otherwise. 
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contradictions and ultimate inefficacy in determining ‘abnormality,’ while simultaneously 
critiquing the type of logic that would require such categorizations in the first place. 
 
III. Parodic Degenerates in “The Blood of the Walsungs” 
 Born in 1875, Paul Thomas Mann remains today one of the most well-known German 
authors, primarily for his longer works such as The Magic Mountain and Death in Venice. 
However, his less-read short stories, written between the last decade of the 19th century and the 
first decade of the 20th, are nonetheless worth critical attention as both reflecting and critiquing 
various fin-de-siècle anxieties about the progress of humanity. His story “The Blood of the 
Walsungs” (“Wälsungenblut”), written in 1905, uses a degenerate family to explore both 
contemporaneous definitions of the degeneracy attributed to the decline of German society, and 
anti-Semitic theories about Jewishness as a large factor in such decline. Mann’s treatment of 
degeneration stems primarily from his lasting interest in Nietzsche’s writings, as shown for 
example by his 1896 story “The Will to Happiness,” a nod to Nietzsche’s “The Will to Power” 
(Hayman 72). Specifically, Mann owned a copy of Nietzsche’s essay The Case of Wagner, and 
thus “learned a genius-critical philosophical discourse through the late Nietzsche,” directed 
against Wagner as degenerate (Sprecher 165).16 
Mann follows Nietzsche’s conception of degeneration closely; Nietzsche claims that “all 
of us have, unconsciously, involuntarily in our bodies values, words, formulas, moralities of 
opposite descent—we are, physiologically considered, false” (Nietzsche 648). In other words, 
Nietzsche intimates that humanity holds both the degenerate (herd mentality) ideals, and the 
                                                
16 For German critical works that have not been translated into English, such as the essays collected in the volume 
edited by Thomas Sprecher, all translations into English are my own. In the German, “lernte Thomas Mann mit dem 
späten Nietzsche einen geniekritischen philosophischen Diskurs kennen.” 
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more ‘natural’ opposition to socially-constructed ideals that stifle artistic genius. He tells his 
reader that “a diagnosis of the modern soul” would require “a resolute incision into this 
instinctive contradiction, with the isolation of its opposite values, with the vivisection of the most 
instructive case—the case of Wagner” (648). While Mann at first glance appears to follow 
Nietzsche’s instruction perfectly with “The Blood of the Walsungs,” as he indeed vivisects 
Wagner’s opera The Valkyrie, Mann’s motive in highlighting the contradictions inherent in 
degenerate individuals is not to “diagnose” or favor one set of ideals over another. Rather, Mann 
attacks degeneration theory from the inside out, calling into question the logic of classification 
methods that at their very core remain contradictory and arbitrary. He adopts the language of 
excess and lack, portraying a traditional biologically and aesthetically degenerate family, but 
several key moments in the novel parody such rigid conceptions of ‘abnormality,’ ultimately 
rendering everyone, and no-one, degenerate.  
  
“The Blood of the Walsungs” provides a glimpse into the lives of the Aarenhold family: 
the parents Herr and Frau Aarenhold, and their four children, Kunz, Märit, and twins Siegmund 
and Sieglinde. Sieglinde is engaged to Herr von Beckerath, yet Mann reveals as the story 
progresses that she does not love her fiancé, instead committing incestuous acts with Siegmund. 
The story takes place over the span of a few days, in which von Beckerath visits for breakfast, 
and Siegmund and Sieglinde attend the opera The Valkyrie, thereafter consummating their love. 
Mann’s tale ends with the implication that Sieglinde becomes pregnant and will use her marriage 
to von Beckerath to hide the true origins of her progeny. 
While no biographical evidence exists to prove Mann’s knowledge of Nordau’s 
Degeneration (although both were deeply influenced by Nietzsche), as Helmut Koopmann notes 
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the “correspondences, if not even dependence [on Nordau’s writing], are surprising[ly]” obvious 
in several of Mann’s stories (Sprecher 124).17 In particular, as Mann builds his descriptions of 
the Aarenhold family as conventionally degenerate, several details echo both Nietzsche’s and 
Nordau’s conceptions of degenerate biology and aesthetics as a simultaneous excess and lack. As 
with Vandover, biological predisposition to degeneracy is foregrounded; Mann devotes several 
passages to physical descriptions of the Aarenhold twins, who inherit their degeneration from 
their parents in “continuously increasing degree” (Nordau 16). As Nordau explains, “degeneracy 
betrays itself among men in certain physical characteristics,” enumerated by both Morel and 
Lombroso under the category of physiognomy (16-17). The twins, for instance, both have “a 
slightly pressed-down nose, the same full and softly touching lips, prominent cheekbones, [and] 
black and blank eyes,”18 which might recall Lombroso’s characterization of criminals as having a 
“flattened” nose, or “lips [that are] fleshy, swollen and protruding” (Mann 302, Lombroso 15, 
16). Likewise, the “long and thin hands”19 of the twins connect to Lombroso’s idea that “long 
fingers are common to [...] sexual offenders”; their incestuous encounters certainly mark 
Siegmund and Sieglinde as such offenders (Mann 302, Lombroso 20). Siegmund, moreover, is 
often described as having a thick “unibrow which create[s] two black creases over the root of his 
nose,”20 and Lombroso recounts that the “born criminal’s” “eyebrows are bushy and tend to meet 
across the nose” and  “grow in a slanting direction” (Mann 312, Lombroso 18). Mann’s 
                                                
17 In the German, “Übereinstimmungen, wenn man nicht gar von Abhängigkeiten sprechen will, sind überraschend.” 
Although several of the essays in Sprecher’s edited volume Literature and Sickness in the Fin-de-Siècle, including 
Koopmann’s, treat degeneration in Mann’s writing, none look at “The Blood of the Walsungs.” 
 
18 In the German, “ein wenig niedergedrückte Nase, dieselben voll und weich aufeinander ruhenden Lippen, 
hervortretenden Wangenknochen, schwarzen und blanken Augen.” 
 
19 In the German, “ihre langen und schmalen Hände.” 
 




concentration on repeated physical descriptions of the Aarenhold twins thus highlights the 
genetic degeneracy which becomes more pronounced in the second generation. 
 Siegmund moreover inherits from his father a “taste that require[s] ever stronger spices”; 
he thus “fare[s] [. . .] the same as Herr Aarenhold,” who explains his philosophy that of utmost 
importance is “that things stay new to one, that one does not actually become accustomed to 
anything” (Nietzsche 622, Mann 310, 304).21 Yet Siegmund’s degeneracy is soon proven as 
more pronounced than that of his parents; unlike his father who enjoys working to support his 
family, Siegmund experiences a lack of willpower or direction. “Siegmund, in his innermost self, 
f[inds] no time for a will [or desire], let alone for achiev[ing]” that desire, and spends most of his 
energy and time on “being unassailable and blameless in his outer appearance from head to toe” 
(Mann 311).22 Nordau notes that in degenerates there is “a disinclination to action of any kind, 
attaining possibly to abhorrence of activity and powerlessness to will,” or as Nietzsche puts it, a 
“disgregation of the will” (Nordau 20, Nietzsche 626). This lack of drive moreover might 
accompany “a condition of mental weakness and despondency, which, according to the 
circumstances of his life, assumes the form of pessimism [...] or self-abhorrence” (Nordau 19). In 
fact, Siegmund often questions his life choices and trivial occupations, yet “in moments when an 
unease weakly stir[s] in him, surrounding what ‘reality’ is supposed to be, he f[inds] that the lack 
of social expectations paralyze[s] and dissolve[s] that unease” (Mann 311).23 Siegmund therefore 
quickly dismisses his own despondency and lack of will or direction; unlike Vandover, he has no 
                                                
21 In the German, “Es erging ihm darin [. . .] wie Herr Aarenhold,” and “daß die Dinge einem neu bleiben, und daß 
man sich eigentlich an nichts gewöhnt.” 
 
22 In the German, “dennoch fand Siegmund in seinem Innern keine Zeit zu einem Wollen, geschweige zu einem 
Vollbringen,” and “er mußte unangreifbar und ohne Tadel an seinem Äußeren sein vom Kopf bis zu Füßen.” 
 
23 In the German, “in Augenblicken, wenn eine Unruhe um das, was das ‘Eigentliche’ sein mochte, sich schwach in 
ihm regte, empfand er, wie dieser Mangel an fremder Erwartung sie wieder lähmte und löste.” 
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social checks on his degenerate tendencies, and his sexual crimes are correspondingly not a 
source of anxiety.  
Siegmund occupies his time mostly with sexual pleasure, suffering, like Vandover, from 
a lack of “the sense of morality and of right and wrong” (Nordau 18). For degenerates, “there 
exists no law, no decency, no modesty, [and] in order to satisfy any momentary impulse, or 
inclination, or caprice, they commit crimes and trespasses with the greatest calmness and self-
complacency”—in other words, what Nordau deems “moral insanity” (18). Siegmund both 
commits sexual crimes (incest),24 and exhibits mental instability that borders on insanity, lacking 
remorse for his actions. The first time the twins have a sexual encounter, Mann describes their 
caresses with slow, stilted phrases full of the “s” sound to impress the languid nature of their 
encounter, the “calmness and self-complacency.” Sieglinde “kisse[s] [Siegmund] on his closed 
eyes; he kisse[s] her on the neck, next to the jewel [necklace]. They kiss each other’s hands,” and 
with a “sweet sensuality” enjoy each other’s “exquisite cleanliness and their good scents” (Mann 
314).25 Their second encounter, on the last page of the story, begins with the exact same 
sentences, but the twins’ sexuality becomes excessive as they “los[e] themselves in caresses 
which cross over into a hurried turmoil and finally bec[ome] only sobbing” (325).26 Stefani 
Engelstein moreover notes that their incestuous encounter “accomplishes [. . .] what Narcissus 
can only long for,” as the “incest is transformed into a kind of masturbation” (Engelstein 292). 
                                                
24 In Henry de Halsalle’s 1917 text Degenerate Germany, he tracks an incline in “serious crime” from 1897 to 1907, 
revealing 573 cases of incest in Germany during that time (compared to only 56 cases in England) (De Halsalle 
180). 
 
25 In the German, “Sie küßte ihn auf seine geschlossenen Augen; er küßte sie auf den Hals, zur Seite des Edelsteins. 
Sie küßten einander die Hände,” “süßen Sinnlichkeit,” and “köstlichen Gepflegtheit und seines guten Duftes” 
(emphasis mine). 
 
26 In the German, “verloren sich in Liebkosungen, die übergriffen und ein hastiges Getümmel wurden und zuletzt 
nur ein Schluchzen waren.” 
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Nordau likewise marks egotism as a sign of excess, where in the degenerate is found “a love of 
self never met with in a sane person in anything like the same degree” (Nordau 26). The twins 
thus exemplify the degeneracy of sexual urges which contradict social norms of behavior. 
During their act of criminal consummation, Mann therefore calls them “egotistical sick 
people,” a phrase he repeats earlier when describing their exclusive bond, and moments before 
intercourse Sieglinde asks Siegmund, “are you sick?” (Mann 325, 324).27 The word “sick” 
(“krank”) in German signifies not only physical malady, but also sickness of the mind, as well as 
moral ‘sickness,’ so that the twins’ mutual love takes on connotations of mental and moral 
‘abnormality.’ Mann thereby echoes Nietzsche’s assessment of degeneration as a “total sickness, 
[an] overexcitement of the nervous mechanism” (Nietzsche 622). In fact, Mann hints at 
Siegmund’s potential mental illness earlier, noting that Siegmund has an “abnormal and 
continual need for cleanliness,” therefore spending much of his day making sure his body and 
clothing meet his singular standards (Mann 309).28 Siegmund’s mental instability shows itself as 
well, as with Vandover, in his muddied thoughts and speech, “as if out of a confused dream,” 
although Sieglinde does not mind “hearing such rough, such cloudy, convoluted speech” and 
indeed lets Siegmund’s words draw her into the sexual act “which she had never previously 
reached” (325).29 Nietzsche likewise characterizes degeneracy in terms of such mental 
obfuscation, the formless “throng of yet unborn thoughts,” “shaping clouds,” and “foggy 
                                                
27 In the German, “egoistische Kranke,” and “Bist du krank?” 
 
28 In the German, “ein außerordentliches und fortwährendes Bedürfnis nach Reinigung.” Critic German Berrios 
gives a history of hypochondriasis—a diagnosis that might include Siegmund’s “abnormal need for cleanliness”—
noting that in 1860 Morel writes: “true hypochondriasis was a form of insanity (folie hystérique)” (Berrios 13). 
 
29 In the German, “wie aus wirrem Traum,” and “Sie schämte sich nicht, ihn so Ungefeiltes, so Trübe-Verworrenes 
reden zu hören,” and “wohin sie noch nie gelangt.” 
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distances” (Nietzsche 623, 634). In their physical, mental, and emotional states, therefore, the 
Aarenholds, and especially Siegmund and Sieglinde, exemplify degenerate excess and lack. 
Their degeneracy moreover affects their aesthetic surroundings; like Vandover, the 
Aarenholds place particular emphasis on possessions, and their house decor corresponds 
precisely to Nordau’s descriptions of degenerate dwellings. Their dining room walls for instance 
are covered in “Gobelins [tapestries] with idyllic pastorals, like those panels which adorned a 
French castle in the distant past” (Mann 303).30 Nordau mentions how often “in the drawing-
room [of degenerate houses] the walls are hung with worm-eaten Gobelin tapestry, discoloured 
by the sun of two centuries” (Nordau 10). The Aarenhold dress and style also reflects their 
degenerate tendencies: Frau Aarenhold, for example, styles her hair “in many curlicues and 
projections leading to an intricate and towering Coiffure” topped with a “huge, colorfully 
sparkling [...] diamond hair-clip” (Mann 301).31 Nordau describes at length the appearance of 
degenerate women, who wear their hair “in such a fashion as to be startling in its revolt against 
the law of organic harmony, and the effect of a studied discord” (Nordau 8). Sieglinde, on the 
other hand, wears a “satin dress [...] in the style of the Florentine mode from 1500,” or as Nordau 
describes such apparel, “the stiff monumental trim of Catharine de Medicis,” and her brother also 
prefers elaborate and colorful dress (on which subject Mann devotes several paragraphs) (Mann 
302, Nordau 8). Siegmund’s aesthetics are more directly affected by his degeneracy: he learns 
drawing and painting from a renowned artist but “what he dr[aws] [is] nevertheless laughable,” 
and he himself admits “that the conditions of his existence [are] not exactly the proper ones for 
                                                
30 In the German, “Gobelins mit Schäfer-Idyllen, die wie die Täfelung vorzeiten ein französisches Schloß 
geschmückt hatten.” 
 
31 In the German, “Sie trug ihr graues Haar in vielen Schnörkeln und Ausladungen zu einer umständlichen und 
hochgebauten Coiffure angeordnet” and “eine große, farbig funkelnde [...] Brillant-Agraffe.” 
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the development of an impressive talent” (Mann 310).32 Although Siegmund has the same 
monetary advantages as Vandover to learn art, his degeneracy dominates from his birth on and 
he never gains the skills that Vandover eventually loses in his decline. 
 
While Mann at first glance thus seems to present a straight-forward case of degeneration, 
perpetuating the social anxiety around ‘abnormality’ as something to be corrected, moments of 
irony in the story reveal that, in fact, the Aarenhold’s degeneration remains an arbitrarily-
determined label and therefore an imaginary threat. Mann uses ironic humor to indicate that the 
Aarenholds, far from conceiving of themselves as deviant, find other, non-degenerate characters 
(e.g. von Beckerath) ‘abnormal.’ Indeed, the Aarenhold children even find their less-degenerate 
parents’ styles laughable; they attempt “more than once to admonish [Frau Aarenhold’s] Coiffeur 
with well placed words” though she “insist[s] doggedly on her own style” (Mann 301).33 Herr 
Aarenhold likewise notes that his children are “united against him and that they despise him: for 
his origins, for the blood that r[uns] in him and that they received from him, [. . .] [and] for his 
hobbies that in their eyes [are] unbecoming” (304).34 Although the Aarenhold children have 
inherited their degeneracy—and Mann insists on the primacy of this biological component 
through phrases such as “the blood that runs in him”—they disavow that inherited style, 
demonstrating that even among ‘degenerates,’ aesthetics remain subjective. 
                                                
32 In the German, “Es war gleichwohl zum Lächeln, was Siegmund malte,” and “daß die Bedingungen seines 
Daseins für die Entwickelung einer gestaltenden Gabe nicht eben die günstigsten waren.” 
 
33 In the German, “die Kinder hatten ihr diese Haartracht mehr als einmal mit gut gesetzten Worten verwiesen,” and 
“Frau Aarenhold bestand mit Zähigkeit auf ihrem Geschmack.” 
 
34 In the German, “für seine Herkunft, für das Blut, das in ihm floß und das sie von ihm empfangen, [. . .] für seine 
Liebhabereien, die ihm in ihren Augen nicht zukamen.” 
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In relation to others as well, the Aarenholds make clear that ‘abnormality’ is arbitrarily 
determined. For instance, during breakfast Siegmund tells a story “in an ironic tone” about an 
acquaintance, a “Parsifal” who speaks of a “checkered tuxedo,” an egregious error against taste 
in Siegmund’s opinion (Mann 306, 307).35 When his brother Kunz replies that he has “an even 
more moving story of innocence,” about a man wearing a tuxedo at “five o’clock tea,” Sieglinde 
remarks that “only animals” would commit such a faux-pas (307).36 The tone of their stories—
condescension, ironic humor, and disgust—suggests the Aarenhold aversion to those who do not 
adhere to their ‘degenerate’ aesthetic sensibilities. Von Beckerath, who “laugh[s] eagerly” even 
though he secretly remembers a time when he himself wore a tuxedo to tea, moreover becomes 
the stand-in for ordinary society, and therefore the Aarenhold’s scapegoat as representative of 
traits they find unbearable in others.37 Every word he utters during their meal, the Aarenholds 
“maul it, destroy it and replace it with a new one, a deadly significant one, that whir[s] [and] 
hit[s] its mark” so that by the end von Beckerath has “red eyes and a deranged appearance” 
(308).38 The Aarenhold contempt for ‘normal’ society thus renders von Beckerath abnormal in 
appearance, even as he sits opposite their degenerate physicality. 
Mann continues his ironic reversal of those considered ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ through 
the most significant motif of his story, its connection to Wagner’s The Valkyrie, which premiered 
in 1870. Just as von Beckerath becomes grotesque in the presence of the Aarenholds, the twins 
                                                
35 In the German, “in ironisch gerührtem Tone,” and “einem karierten Smoking.” “Parsifal” refers to an opera by 
Wagner of the same name, in which the titular character succeeds in his quest only because of his extreme innocence 
and lack of knowledge about the world around him. 
 
36 In the German, “einen noch beweglicheren Fall von Unverdorbenheit,” and “nur die Tiere.” 
 
37 In the German, “lachte eifrig.” 
 
38 In the German, “zerzausten es, verwarfen es und trieben ein anderes auf, ein tödlich bezeichnendes, das schwirrte, 
traf,” and “rote Augen und bot einen derangierten Anblick.” 
 
 47 
Siegmund and Sieglinde are grotesque in comparison to their Wagnerian counterparts (their 
namesakes). Unlike Norris, who uses the aesthetic grotesque to signal Vandover’s particular 
biological danger, Mann includes the grotesque to mock that danger through explicit parallels 
between Wagner’s opera and his own story. Mann demonstrates the subjectivity that allows an 
audience to deem his twins grotesque, yet Wagner’s twins heroic, likewise figuring the aesthetics 
of Wagner’s opera first as beneficial, and later as promoting degeneracy. By rewriting The 
Valkyrie, moreover, Mann moves from a parody of degeneration theory’s minute criteria for 
classifying offending individuals, to a larger critique of the types of biological classifications that 
become increasingly popular in anti-Semitic Germany in the early 20th century. 
Much has been written on the explicit parallels between Mann’s story, “Wälsungenblut,” 
and Wagner’s opera about the Wälsung family, which both tell of the incestuous twins Siegmund 
and Sieglinde. In Wagner’s version, Siegmund and Sieglinde Wälsung are the children of the god 
Wotan, separated in childhood, who meet and fall in love as adults. In defending Sieglinde 
against her brutish husband Hunding,39 Siegmund dies in battle, although Sieglinde first becomes 
pregnant with their son Siegfried who will become the “bravest hero” in Wagner’s subsequent 
operas (“Synopsis”). As Mann describes, moreover, when his protagonists attend the opera, in 
Wagner’s version Siegmund has “blue eyes under blond eyebrows, [and] a blond forelock,” and 
“strong legs wrapped in fur and leather straps” while Sieglinde has an “alabaster bosom which 
heave[s] wonderfully in the cutout of her fur-lined muslin dress” (Mann 315).40 The positive 
attributes of “strong legs” and “wonderful bosom,” their ‘natural’ form, show how Wagner’s 
                                                
39 Von Beckerath parallels Wagner’s Hunding, as evidenced during breakfast when the twins ask von Beckerath’s 
permission to attend the opera and their brother Kunz “drum[s] the rhythm of the Hunding-motif on the tablecloth” 
(Mann 308). 
 
40 In the German, “blauen Augen unter den blonden Brauen, dem blonden Stirngelock,” “seine starken, mit Fell und 




godly twins strike an impressive and heroic image, especially in contrast to Sieglinde’s husband 
Hunding, whom Mann calls “bulgy and knock-kneed as a cow,” with “buffalo eyes” (316).41 
When compared to Wagner’s twins, Mann’s twins become especially grotesque and 
unappealing, thus revealing the arbitrary nature of a distinction which would render incestuous 
acts heroic in one context, yet degenerate in another.42 For example, the presence of fur is 
grotesque for Mann’s Siegmund and Sieglinde; Bakhtin states that “the combination of human 
and animal traits is, as we know, one of the most ancient grotesque forms,” and Mann’s twins are 
described, like Hunding, in animalistic terms (Bakhtin 316). Sieglinde aims a “serious glossy 
stare” at von Beckerath for instance, which “sp[eaks] as uncomprehendingly as an animal’s” 
(Mann 306).43 Mann’s descriptions of how “Sieglinde’s dark little head half disappear[s] in the 
silver fox collar” of her coat, or how Siegmund, who has an intensely fast-growing beard/fur of 
his own, wears a “house jacket set with fur,” emphasize their animalistic qualities (314, 323).44 
Even more explicitly, Wagner’s heroic Siegmund “let[s] himself fall heavily on the bear fur rug” 
in his well-deserved and empathy-inducing exhaustion (315).45 Mann’s Siegmund, on the other 
hand, has a “polar bear fur rug [...] in which his feet disappear,” and when he later falls on the 
rug in ennui (described with the same phrasing as the Wagnerian scene), he blends into the fur 
such that Sieglinde “searche[s] for him in the room, without finding him right away” (312, 
                                                
41 In the German, “bauchig und x-beinig wie eine Kuh,” and “Büffelaugen.” 
 
42 Kayser’s The Grotesque in Art and Literature includes a section specifically about Mann’s writing (although he 
does not mention “The Blood of the Walsungs”), stating that for Mann, “the grotesque entails a distortion and 
exaggeration of reality which reveals the true nature of a phenomenon”; as I argue, by exaggerating his twins’ flaws, 
Mann reveals the “true” absurdity behind biological labeling (Kayser 159). 
 
43 In the German, “einem glänzend ernsten Blick, der [...] begrifflos redete wie der eines Tieres.” 
 
44 In the German, “Sieglindens dunkles Köfchen verschwand zur Hälfte in dem Silberfuchskragen,” and “die mit 
Pelz besetzte Hausjacke.” 
 
45 In the German, “ließ er sich schwer auf das Bärenfell fallen.” 
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324).46 Mann’s twins moreover consummate their relationship on that same polar bear rug, 
rendering their association with fur ultimately degenerate and grotesque, rather than heroic as in 
Wagner’s opera. 
Siegmund and Sieglinde Aarenhold likewise exemplify Bakhtin’s grotesque “becoming” 
bodies, where “special attention is given to the shoots and branches, to all that prolongs the body 
and links it to other bodies” (Bakhtin 316-17). Mann describes moments that suggest the twins’ 
bodies as morphing together, linking them for instance during breakfast when they “h[old] each 
other between their chairs by their thin and damp hands”; like Vandover, their physicality 
exceeds their contained forms (Mann 305).47 Siegmund later recalls how he often walked with 
Sieglinde, his “dark lovely double, whose thin and damp hand he held” while wandering the 
fields in their youth (311-12).48 The emphasized dampness of their hands “ignores the closed, 
smooth, and impenetrable surface of the body” as the “bodily drama” of sweating connects the 
twins, and their constant remarks on how similar they are (Siegmund tells Sieglinde, “you are 
just like me”49) furthermore suggests a grotesque blending into one another (Bakhtin 317, Mann 
324). In contrast, at the moment when Wagner’s Siegmund and Sieglinde realize their relation, 
that “their eyes and temples, foreheads and voices, [...] [are] the same,” the music signals their 
“torrential passion” as a pleasing resolution to the unfairness of Siegmund’s prior banishment 
and Sieglinde’s forced marriage (Mann 318, 319).50 The grotesqueness of Mann’s twins, 
                                                
46 In the German, “dem Eisbärfell [...] in dem seine Füße verschwanden,” and “Ihre Augen suchten nach ihm im 
Zimmer, ohne ihn gleich zu finden.” 
 
47 In the German, “Sie hielten einander zwischen den Stühlen an ihren schmalen und feuchten Händen.” 
 
48 In the German, “dunkel liebliches Ebenbild, dessen schmale und feuchte Hand er hielt.” 
 
49 In the German, “Du bist ganz wie ich.” 
 
50 In the German, “Ihre Augen und Schläfen, Stirnen und Stimmen, [...] fanden sie gleich,” and “reißender 
Leidenschaft.” 
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rendering their similarities repulsive rather than a symbol of their suitability together, thus serves 
as a rebuke to Wagner’s twins. 
Mann moreover uses the Aarenhold trip to the opera to highlight the subjectivity of 
“good” versus degenerate aesthetics in relation to music. The same music that renders Wagner’s 
twins tragic heroes begins to work on Siegmund Aarenhold; the “work that appears up there [on 
the stage] in an exalted, simple vision” makes him contemplate his life’s ambitions (Mann 
320).51 Siegmund reflects that “a pain was in [his] breast, a burning or tearing, something like a 
sweet affliction” when he realizes the shortcomings of his own life in comparison to Wagner’s 
creation (320).52 He enumerates his faults, much like Vandover after his visit to the opera; 
Siegmund reflects on his “life, that came together out of weakness and mockery, out of 
spoiledness and negation, luxury and contrariness, [. . .] this life which had [. . .] only deadly 
implications” (320).53 R. A. Nicholls notes Nietzsche’s philosophy that the “will to work and 
accomplishment” opposes degenerate tendencies; Nietzsche states that “it is our feeling of 
nobility which forbids us from being simply enjoyers of existence—this feeling rouses itself 
against hedonism—we wish to achieve something against it” (Nicholls 12).54 Though Siegmund 
correctly identifies the contradictory (degenerate) characteristics of his life and experiences this 
“rousing feeling against hedonism,” unlike Vandover, he has no clarity or insights on how to 
better himself, and makes no attempts to do so. Nonetheless, by having his protagonist so 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
51 In the German, “dies Werk, das dort oben in kindlich hohen Gesichten erschien.” 
 
52 In the German, “Ein Schmerz war in Siegmunds Brust, ein Brennen oder Zehren, irgend etwas wie eine süße 
Drangsal.” 
 
53 In the German, “dies Leben, das sich aus Weichheit und Witz, aus Verwöhnung und Verneinung, Luxus und 
Widerspruch [. . .] zusammensetzte, dies Leben, in dem es [. . .] nur tötendes Bezeichnen gab.” 
 




intensely question himself while watching Wagner’s opera, even as Nietzsche insists that 
Wagner’s music is “nihilistic” and “fatal and hostile to life in matters of the spirit,” Mann 
ironically suggests the potential beneficial effect of its aesthetics (Nietzsche 639). 
The Aarenhold twins soon thereafter, however, consummate their incestuous love in a 
manner that contradicts these beneficial qualities; Mann in this moment closely echoes Nietzsche 
and Nordau’s assessments of Wagner’s music as degenerate in order to emphasize again the 
subjectivity of valuing its aesthetics. Nordau for instance states that after watching such 
degenerate opera, “the audience [. . .] leave with all the nervous exhaustion of a young pair of 
lovers, who for hours at the nightly tryst have sought to exchange caresses through a closely-
barred window” (Nordau 13).55 In fact, as Siegmund and Sieglinde leave their opera its “world [. 
. .] works its magic on them, pulls them to it” so that even though they argue at dinner, Sieglinde 
seeks out her brother in his room (Mann 321).56 Nordau moreover calls Wagnerian love “the love 
of those degenerates who, in sexual transport, become like wild beasts,” and as previously noted, 
the Aarenhold sexual act occurs on a bear-skin rug, rendering Siegmund and Sieglinde beastly 
(Nordau 181-2, emphasis mine). Through purposeful oppositions between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ personal style, ‘heroic’ and ‘grotesque’ incest, ‘noble’ and ‘beastly’ musical effects, 
Mann thus insists on the arbitrary nature of Nietzsche and Nordau’s criteria for identifying 
degenerate individuals and their art. 
 
Beyond his satirical portrayal of the specificities of degeneration theory aimed against 
individuals, Mann uses “The Blood of the Walsungs” to call attention to the larger implications 
                                                
55 Even here Mann’s emphasis on contradiction is evident; Nordau characterizes Wagner’s music as that which ends 
in frustrated or thwarted desire, yet Mann’s twins are able to ‘open’ the “barred window” and act as they please. 
 
56 In the German, “Welt [. . .] die mit Zaubermitteln auf sie gewirkt, sie zu sich und in sich gezogen.” 
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of such theory’s concentration on biology as an indicator of “abnormality.” The second part of 
his title, “Blut” (“blood”), hints at a deeper critique of social anxieties surrounding biological 
inheritance, including the racist logic that fosters an increase in anti-Semitism in Germany during 
his time. Indeed, the most controversial aspect of Mann’s recasting of The Valkyrie stems from 
the original 1905 version of his story, in which Mann included the Yiddish word “Goy” to signal 
unambivalently that the Aarenhold family is Jewish. Due to a negative reception, which 
intimated that Mann’s story was a thinly-veiled autobiographical account (and therefore satire) of 
his own wife’s Jewish family, Mann both removed the offending word and kept his story from 
publication until 1921 (Vaget 369). However, the remaining hints of the Aarenholds as Jewish 
(mostly through their physical appearance), combined with the story’s controversial past, have 
led most critics to concentrate on Mann’s intentions regarding the anti-Semitism prevalent at the 
time.57 As Todd Kontje remarks, some critics emphasize the presence of anti-Semitism in 
“Mann’s potentially damning story,” while “others have come to Mann’s defense” in arguing 
that his story in fact critiques Wagner by rendering his Aryan heroes Jewish (Kontje 110).58 As 
Paul Levesque puts it, “Mann, in Wälsungenblut, musters his parodic talents against Richard 
Wagner with a viciousness unparalleled in his other writings”; to wit, “a Jewish Siegmund: what 
                                                
57 That Mann in private life held an ambivalent view towards anti-Semitism has been well-documented; he married 
into a Jewish family, yet was a fan of Wagner’s music, even visiting Wagner’s country home (Hayman 436). In 
1936 Mann publishes a letter in which he clearly states that “German anti-Semitism [...] is against Europe, [...] 
against the Christian and classical foundations of Western morality,” etc., to finally declare openly his disgust for 
Hitler and fascist Germany (Hayman 424). 
 
58 Kontje himself reads Mann’s story as partially autobiographical, mirroring Mann’s own experience of marriage, 
and his potential self-identification in the character of Siegmund, the “modern, homosexual, racially mixed artist,” in 
which case the anti-Semitic moments of the story stem from Mann’s ambivalence and antipathy towards himself 
(Kontje 115). Critic Sander Gilman on the other hand reads Mann’s story as perpetuating the anti-Semitic view of 
Jews as incestuous “parvenus,” whether purposefully or not. 
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would have been more galling for an anti-Semite like Wagner, author of the 1850 pamphlet Das 
Judenthum in der Musik?” (Levesque 12, 15).59  
Debates around Mann’s relationship to Jewishness and anti-Semitism are certainly 
important, yet by introducing the consideration of degeneration in “The Blood of the Walsungs,” 
I show that in fact Mann’s critique aims more generally at the subjectivity of endeavors of 
biological classification. As I have demonstrated, the unsavory descriptions of Siegmund and 
Sieglinde in particular portray the arbitrary nature of labels of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal.’ Mann 
furthermore ascribes non-specific biologically-read qualities to his twins to intimate the 
artificiality of racial (and racist) classifications, including hints at their Jewishness in tandem 
with more vague vocabulary. While Mann’s story in its first iteration ended with the word “Goy” 
to indicate Jewishness, the word’s placement on the last page still allowed for ambiguity during a 
first reading, and his final published iteration hints at Jewishness without removing the 
possibility of other genetic backgrounds. Gloria Erlich claims that the removal of that certitude 
renders the published version “much less effective than the original,” because that original 
conclusion “gathers up the scattered allusions to race, blood, dark and troubling origins, and 
illumines them with a flash of retrospective meaning,” namely (according to her), the Aarenholds 
as representing “the troubled psychology of the assimilated German Jew” (Erlich 113-14). 
However, I would argue that only by retaining ambiguity can Mann critique more generally the 
trend of biological labeling so pervasive during his time. Rather than including definitive 
indications of which ‘races’ are degenerate in “The Blood of the Walsungs,” Mann purposefully 
employs empty language that contains infinite possible connotations. 
                                                
59 Levesque acknowledges the difficulty of declaring Mann’s story either anti-Semitic or not, so he focuses his 
reading instead on Mann’s critique of Wagner as an attempt to ruin Wagner’s hold on German artistic society. For 
Levesque, Mann’s story demonstrates his anger at Wagner’s dismissal of the novel form, and his disgust for the “ 
‘dilettantish’ foundation of Wagner’s art” (Levesque 18). 
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For instance, in foreshadowing the end of his own story while describing Wagner’s 
opera, Mann reveals that “in the woman’s [Sieglinde’s] womb, [...] it germinat[es] tenaciously, 
that hated, disrespected and god-picked lineage [Geschlecht], out of which a pair of twins join 
their needs and their suffering into such free bliss” (Mann 321).60 By using the ambiguous 
“woman” and “pair of twins” without specifying whether referencing the Aarenholds or 
Wälsungs, Mann opens the possibility of multiple definitions for “Geschlecht” (“lineage,” or 
“family,” or “dynasty”) and again marks the impossibility of drawing clear distinctions between 
the ‘abnormal’ Sieglinde Aarenhold or the ‘heroic’ Sieglinde Wälsung. In fact, John Whiton 
notes that Mann himself points out this ambiguity as purposeful in his unpublished essay “On the 
Jewish Question”: the word “geschlecht” leads to “confusion: to wit, that of the reader, who does 
not know anymore which ‘geschlecht’ is being referenced” (Whiton 40).61  Soon thereafter, 
Siegmund Aarenhold studies himself carefully in the mirror (like Vandover), “investigat[ing] the 
indicators of his blood”; Mann then enumerates each physiognomical facial feature, using the 
same phrases discussed at the beginning of this section (Mann 323).62 By prefacing his 
enumeration with the general word “blood,” Mann emphasizes the degeneracy of those facial 
features (flat nose, full lips, sharp cheekbones, black eyes), while making clear their ambiguity: 
they might belong to any genetic background. Similarly, right before Mann’s twins consummate 
their incestuous love, Sieglinde “distort[s] her face in pain, so that the physiognomic singularities 
of her kind [Art] emerge especially”; again, Mann leaves the word “Art” (“kind,” or “species,” or 
                                                
60 In the German, “im Schoße des Weibes, [...] keimte es zähe fort, das verhaßte, respektlose und gotterwählte 
Geschlecht, aus welchem ein Zwillingspaar seine Not und sein Leid zu so freier Wonne vereint.” 
 
61 Quoted in the original German in Whiton’s article, translation is my own: “So ist auch das Verwirrung: des Lesers 
nämlich, der nicht mehr weiß, von welchem Geschlecht die Rede ist.” 
 
62 In the German, “[er] prüfte die Abzeichen seines Blutes.” 
 
 55 
“type”) purposefully open (324).63 By unmooring degeneracy and its indicators from any specific 
genetic background, and by unmasking the ironies inherent in labeling some individuals 
degenerate and some not, Mann suggests with “The Blood of the Walsungs” the absurdity of the 
type of biological labeling that will only rise to greater prominence in the next decades. 
Mann ends his story with one last jab at degeneration theory; the story’s final scene 
includes the hint of fertility, the suggestion that, in direct contradiction to Nordau’s and 
Nietzsche’s models of sterile degeneracy, Siegmund and Sieglinde will continue to propagate the 
Aarenhold family line. Mann’s degenerate Sieglinde has just as much ability to become pregnant 
as her heroic counterpart in The Valkyrie; as Whiton puts it, “the incest is not sterile or fruitless” 
(Whiton 42).64 Upon consummation, Sieglinde asks Siegmund what will happen with von 
Beckerath, and Siegmund replies, “He should be thankful to us. He will lead a less trivial 
existence, from now on” (Mann 325).65 Siegmund’s words signify that Sieglinde, pregnant, will 
be able to hide their criminal act by attributing her child to von Beckerath instead of to her 
brother. Engelstein likewise notes that, beyond this single encounter, Siegmund’s statement 
“introduces an indeterminacy in the paternity of any future children of Sieglinde’s” (Engelstein 
293).66 The fact that the twins, at least the second generation of degenerates themselves, will now 
contribute a third generation, suggests their virility rather than sterility, and the intimation that 
                                                
63 In the German, “verzog sie vor Schmerz das Gesicht, wodurch die physiognomischen Eigentümlichkeiten ihrer 
Art außerordentlich hervortraten.” 
 
64 Whiton’s article concentrates on these fertile implications of Mann’s new ending, in contrast to the old discarded 
ending, yet Whiton reads “The Blood of the Walsungs” ultimately as a parallel to Mann’s supposed bisexual 
tendencies and his anxieties about productivity in creating art. 
 
65 In the German, “dankbar soll er uns sein. Er wird ein minder triviales Dasein führen, von nun an.” 
 
66 Engelstein’s article looks more broadly at incest in German culture as simultaneously a method of preserving 
racial “purity,” and as an atavistic act denoting racial “otherness.” However, she reads “The Blood of the Walsungs” 
as “reintroduc[ing] a reified and static notion of race,” with the incestuous act “heighten[ing] the distinctiveness of 
racial markers,” while through the addition of degeneration theory I have shown how Mann unmoors those racial 
markers in order to reveal the constructedness of race (Engelstein 290). 
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their child will be readily attributed to von Beckerath suggests as well the possibility that hidden, 
this degenerate offspring might further propagate. Norris includes such a possibility in Vandover 
and the Brute as an intimation of the need for further and more effective methods of biopolitical 
classification and containment. Mann, however, ends his story not only as a declaration of the 
arbitrariness of biological classifications, but also presents the virility of precisely those deemed 
most “threatening” as an intentional mockery of theorists’ attempts to ease (to him ridiculous) 
anxieties around humanity’s future. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The contradictions Mann and Norris employ in their stories of degeneracy, contradictions 
indeed inherent within the definitions of degeneration provided by Nietzsche and Nordau, extend 
to the labeling of degeneration theorists themselves. For instance, Wagner’s anti-Semitism has 
been well-documented, especially in his essay “Judaism in Music” which attacked ‘Jewishness’ 
in German art and music in order to explain “the involuntary repellence possessed for us by the 
nature and personality of the Jews” (Wagner 80). Yet the same logic which causes anti-Semites 
to generalize an entire culture as “repellent” based on their “nature” allows Nordau to make 
sweeping generalizations about the nature of degenerates; in fact, Nordau spends a large section 
of his tome defining Wagner as degenerate. Nordau charges Wagner “with a greater abundance 
of degeneration than all the degenerates put together with whom we have hitherto become 
acquainted” (Nordau 171). Moreover, for the Jewish Nordau, Wagner’s “delirium inspired by his 
furious anti-Semitism” also marks him as degenerate; Nordau later explains that “German 
hysteria manifests itself in anti-Semitism, that most dangerous form of the persecution-mania, in 
which the person believing himself persecuted becomes a savage persecutor, capable of all 
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crimes” (172, 209). Yet Nordau does not acknowledge that in writing an entire volume on the 
identification and eradication of the ‘degenerates’ who ‘persecute’ German society, he, too, 
“becomes a savage persecutor.” Paradoxically, many characteristics that Nordau associates with 
degeneracy (mental illness, sexual deviance, etc.) are also historically associated with Jewishness 
in Germany: Sander Gilman explains that in the late 19th century, “the illness dominating the 
discourse of the antisemitic science was madness, and its origin was in the ‘dangerous’ marriages 
of the Jews: their refusal to marry beyond the inner group” (Gilman). Thus anti-Semitism is 
degenerate, but Jewishness is also seen as degenerate.  
This arbitrariness of labeling shows further in Nietzsche’s assessment of Wagner: “This 
decadent corrupts our health—and music as well. Is Wagner a human being at all? Isn’t he rather 
a sickness?” (Nietzsche 620). As I have demonstrated, Nietzsche considers Wagner the “Protean 
character of degeneration that here conceals itself in the chrysalis of art and artist” (622).67 Yet a 
mere four years later, Nordau includes a lengthy section in his work enumerating the ways in 
which Nietzsche is likewise degenerate, citing his “intellectual Sadism, and his mania of 
contradiction and doubt, or mania for questioning” and his “misanthropy, or anthropophobia, 
megalomania, and mysticism” (Nordau 465). Nordau, in labeling those artists (Zola, Tolstoy, 
Hauptmann) who write degenerate characters as degenerate themselves, moreover opens himself 
to the same critique: namely, that his ‘obsession’ might likewise mark him as degenerate. Indeed, 
Daniel Pick notes that “Nordau’s imprudent generalisations and his ‘hysterical’ style of address” 
caused “accusations of degeneracy [. . .] to fly back upon him” (Pick 25). Frank Norris, who 
                                                
67 According to critic Thomas Rütten, Mann “turned against himself” Nietzsche’s critique of Wagner (“wendete sie 
[Nietzsches Angriff] gegen sich selbst”) (Sprecher 165). Mann moreover “regarded himself as a neurasthenic”; in 
that sense, he, like Wagner, might be considered degenerate by Nietzsche (“betrachtete er sich selbst als 
Neurastheniker”) (165). For a more in-depth look at Mann’s relation to health and medicine, see Sprecher’s 
Literature and Sickness in the Fin-de-Siècle.  
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wrote narratives of social decay with similar goals as Nordau, would also be considered 
degenerate by Nordau’s yardstick. In every instance, those naming others as aberrant and 
dangerous to society (Wagner, Nietzsche, and Nordau), are likewise subject to labeling which 
marks their ‘abnormality.’  
If everyone comes under suspicion of degeneracy, one might argue that in fact, 
‘abnormality’ remains an impossible to define concept (as Mann demonstrates). Yet authors such 
as Norris focus on degeneration theory’s contradictions as a sign instead that more specific, 
biologically-based methods are needed to suss out the threat. Works such as Émile Zola’s Nana 
(1880), J.K. Huysmans’s À rebours (1884), Gerhart Hauptmann’s Vor Sonnenaufgang (1889) 
and Ellen Glasgow’s The Descendant (1897),68 in combination with the proliferation of 
‘scientific’ accounts of degeneration (Nordau, Lombroso, Morel, etc.), contribute to a growing 
social concern in Western countries about the presence of the ‘dangerous individual.’ 
 Nordau ends his tome with a call to action, specifically regarding the field of psychology: 
“Medical specialists of insanity have failed to understand their duty. It is time for them to come 
to the front,” to show the public “the mental derangement of degenerate artists and authors, and 
teach them that the works in fashion are written and painted delirium” (Nordau 559). We have 
already seen how Vandover creates art easily classified as “painted delirium,” and his 
“approaching insanity” marks him as a potential candidate for psychological intervention (Norris 
180). Mann likewise presents mental ‘abnormality’ in his story “Tristan,” in which a degenerate 
                                                
68 As mentioned, Zola was a dominant influence on Norris, causing contemporaneous critics to refer to Norris as the 
“American Zola,” and Vandover and the Brute takes up many similar themes as Nana (including shocking sexuality 
and beastly physicality) (McElrath 152). Norris also read Glasgow; he expressed admiration for her in his essay 
“Why Women Should Write the Best Novels—and Why They Don’t” (407). Mann likewise knew of Zola’s works—
his brother Heinrich famously wrote an essay praising Zola’s support of Alfred Dreyfus, while simultaneously 
attacking Thomas’s support of WWI (Hayman 288). Biographer Ronald Hayman speculates that Mann might also 
have been familiar with Hauptmann and Huysmans, as reflected in “The Little Herr Friedemann,” although as I have 
demonstrated, he would have been critical of their brand of biological determinism (66). 
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woman, Gabriele, undergoes treatment at a sanatorium for her mental illness, only to succumb to 
the influence of a fellow patient who insists that she play Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde on the 
piano. Mann intimates that Gabriele herself will die due to the shock of Wagner’s music, yet he 
ends his story with an image of her “fat son,” a baby full of “laughter” and “unexplainable 
delight” who presumably will continue to grow up healthy and strong, further propagating his 
degenerate heritage (Mann 206).69 In both instances, the continued threat of inherited madness 
echoes the social desire for better methods of containment, if not cure.  
As Michel Foucault states, “the notion of degeneration provides a way of isolating, 
covering, and cutting out a zone of social danger while simultaneously giving it a pathological 
status as illness,” yet the proliferation of potential causes and criteria suggests the necessity of 
targeting degenerate individuals based on the specific threat they present (Foucault 119). Thus 
individual fields concentrate on ‘abnormality’ within their specialties; psychology, for instance, 
makes “the knowledge, prevention, and possible cure of mental illness function as an absolutely 
necessary form of social precaution against a number of fundamental dangers linked to the very 
existence of madness” (119).70 My three remaining chapters, therefore, will concentrate on the 
biological turn in and specific aims of three disciplines—psychology, criminal law, and the 
genetic sciences—spurred to action by the perceived decline in humanity’s health at the fin-de-
siècle, and committed to classifying and containing those individuals responsible. The Aarenhold 
twins and Vandover might equally belong to the categories of lunatic, criminal, or genetic 
                                                
69 In the German, “Gabriele Eckhofs dicker Sohn,” “lachen,” and “unerklärlicher Lust.” 
 
70 As individual disciplines react to the ‘threat’ of degeneration, they likewise adopt and change the term 
“degeneration,” which then implies mental, behavioral, and physical ‘abnormality’ depending on its context. For an 
interesting discussion of this transformation, see Daniel Pick’s Faces of Degeneration which aims “to trace 
important shifts in this conception during the second half of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth 
century” in various European countries (Pick 7).  
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monstrosity, and as I will demonstrate in the remainder of this project, those categories feed into 
one another, eventually culminating in the eugenic fervor of the 1930s.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONFINED LUNATICS: 
CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN AND GEORG HEYM 
I. Introduction 
The beginnings of modern psychology are often traced to the mesmerism movement of 
the late 18th century, which started with Franz Mesmer’s theories in the 1770s about a fluid 
present in human bodies. For Mesmer, “disease originates from the unequal distribution of this 
fluid in the human body; recovery is achieved when the equilibrium is restored” through various 
therapeutic means (Ellenberger 62). The unequal balance of fluid was considered the sole cause 
of mental illnesses, and physical treatment, such as using magnetic fluid baths to influence the 
patient’s internal fluid, was expected to cure any symptoms. In the 19th century, the field of 
psychology passed through several subsequent phases, including a focus on spiritualism in the 
1850s and 60s, and a turn to neurology lead by the physician Jean-Martin Charcot at the end of 
the 19th century (Ellenberger). For each of these early movements, psychology remained heavily 
intertwined with a focus on the physical body, drawing from medical sciences to promote 
physical treatments which would ‘cure’ mental illnesses.  
At the turn of the 20th century, however, psychology turns to questions of the mind and 
the unconscious, as heralded by Friedrich Nietzsche’s ideas about “the unconscious as an area of 
confused thoughts, emotions, and instincts, at the same time as an area of reenactment of past 
stages of the individual and of the species” (Ellenberger 273). The most well-known figure in 
psychology, Sigmund Freud, partially drew his conception of psychoanalysis and its ability to 
‘unmask’ the “hidden unconscious motivations” of the individual from Nietzsche, although he 
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downplayed Nietzsche’s influence on him (277).71 This shift, starting in the 1880s, from 
physiological-based treatments of visible symptoms to psychoanalytical treatments based on a 
hidden unconscious, is paradoxically accompanied by a turn in psychology to inherited, or 
biological, explanations of mental illness. This chapter focuses on the biological turn, looking 
specifically at the mental illness historically named “hysteria” as a case study. As Elaine 
Showalter points out, hysteria in particular becomes a cultural phenomenon; “by 1900 hysteria 
had become widespread in the United States and Western Europe [and] doctors explained the 
epidemic as a product of hereditary weakness and cultural degeneration” (Showalter 16, 
emphasis mine). I trace the transformation of the hysteria diagnosis from the 1890s in the United 
States, to the 1910s in Germany, in short stories from two authors uniquely focused on questions 
of mental abnormality and the medical treatment thereof: Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Georg 
Heym. By comparing their stories, I will demonstrate a change in emphasis in psychology from 
physical treatments meant to push individuals back towards desired social norms, to the 
biopolitical goal of sussing out hidden mental abnormality and containing those thereby deemed 
‘dangerous.’ 
Heym and Gilman reveal the adverse effects of totalizing physiological control and 
isolation prescribed in response to health anomalies. Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper,” and 
Heym’s “Jonathan” portray individuals confined within medical ‘institutions’ who become 
grotesque as a result of the disciplinary treatment, including isolation, to which they are 
subjected. The emergence of the grotesque in these stories serves as a critique of medical 
professionals who render their patients passive objects who must submit. In the case of Gilman, I 
                                                
71 Henri Ellenberger gives an accurate account of the many parallels between Nietzsche’s philosophies and Freud’s 
own writing, which become especially obvious in a comparative reading of Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents 
and Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (Ellenberger 277). 
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read the disparity between her anti-authority stance on mental treatments, and her pro-eugenic 
stance on social health, as seen in several essays and her novel Herland, as the result of a 
lingering disconnect between questions of heredity and mental maladies during her time. For 
Heym, however, the incorporation of a biological component in definitions of mental illness, and 
the turn to the theory of the unconscious, suggests danger to social health is ubiquitous; everyone 
is mad. The second Heym story I analyze, “The Madman,” makes clear his ambivalence around 
medical institutions; while he critiques their effect on individuals, they remain potentially 
necessary as a way to contain an otherwise perceived troubling social decline. This chapter will 
end with a closer look at the idea of the “dangerous individual,” which conflates heredity, mental 
illness, and crime as a justification for the increasing confinement of those deemed particularly 
hazardous to society. 
 
II. Gilman’s Grounds-Creepers  
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, born in 1860 in Connecticut, wrote both fiction and nonfiction 
extensively. Her famous story “The Yellow Wallpaper,” published in 1892, has been discussed at 
length not only by Gilman herself, but by contemporaneous as well as contemporary critics from 
a variety of disciplines. Gilman’s own assessment of her story has been oft-quoted: “It was not 
intended to drive people crazy, but to save people from being driven crazy, and it worked” 
(Gilman, Yellow 332). While “The Yellow Wallpaper” certainly should be read as an indictment 
of specific treatments of mental illness, critics have not yet tied the story’s significance to its 
placement within a larger historical biological shift in the field of psychology. Critics focus on 
Gilman’s biographical past and its influence on “The Yellow Wallpaper,” as with Jeffrey 
Berman’s The Talking Cure and Helen Horowitz’s Wild Unrest, or on the significance of the 
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story for women’s rights and changing characterizations of women, as with Jennifer Fleissner’s 
Women, Compulsion, Modernity. By looking instead at the disciplinary aspects of the narrator’s 
medical treatment, I trace a link to the subsequent turn in psychology to genetics-based 
diagnoses which justify the isolation and treatment of large populations, rather than individuals. 
The increase in the narrator’s grotesqueness and that of her surroundings makes clear Gilman’s 
aversion to discipline in cases of mental difference; however, I will end this section with a 
discussion of how other Gilman texts demonstrate an endorsement of biologically-based 
disciplinary mechanisms. 
 Gilman’s story, written in the first person by an unnamed female narrator, tells of the 
narrator’s slow descent into hallucinations and madness as a result of the treatment prescribed by 
her husband John and other physicians. The narrator has been diagnosed with “temporary 
nervous depression—a slight hysterical tendency” by John and “a physician of high standing,” 
presumably S. Weir Mitchell whose name is mentioned later in the narrative (Gilman, Yellow 3). 
In the second half of the 19th century, nervous conditions such as hysteria or neurasthenia, which 
manifest primarily in mental symptoms such as depression or anxiety, are nonetheless treated as 
physical ailments. The cause of these illnesses is placed in the physical body, or specifically in 
the nervous system, a “want of strength in the nerve,” and treatments thus likewise focus on the 
physiological (Beard 217). As Horowitz writes in her biographical account of Gilman’s struggles 
with illness, “a group of American physicians, including S. Weir Mitchell, established 
themselves as neurologists” and “asserted that research on the brain and the nervous system 
demonstrated that mental disorders were physical disorders, with clearly traceable causes” 
(Horowitz 118).  
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Mitchell, practicing medicine in the second half of the 19th century, became famous for 
his prescription of the “rest cure” in cases of hysteria or neurasthenia. As Mitchell describes in 
one case, patients recover “when secluded” and the rest cure involves “shut[ting] out friends, 
relatives, books and letters,” and confining the patient to bed (Mitchell 371). George Beard, a 
physician practicing at the same time as Mitchell, insisted that “the one principle on which 
neurasthenia is to be treated is by the concentration of all possible tonic influence on the nervous 
system—air, sunlight, water, food, rest, diversion, muscular exercise, and the internal 
administration of those remedies […] which directly affect the central nervous system” (Beard 
219). These prescriptions become the basis of Gilman’s narrator’s treatment: she “take[s] 
phosphates […], and tonics, and journeys, and air, and exercise, and [is] absolutely forbidden to 
‘work’ until [she] is well again,” instead expected to spend most of her time resting in bed 
(Gilman, Yellow 3). Likewise, John marks her health through physiological aspects rather than 
her mental state; when she expresses doubts about the efficacy of the treatment, he rebukes her 
by stating that she is “gaining flesh and color, [and her] appetite is better” (11). I mention the 
physical aspects of the narrator’s hysteria here to highlight the connection between this iteration 
of psychological practices with those prominent in early 19th century, where theories of the 
hidden mind are not yet the primary interest for those classifying mental abnormality. 
Gilman incorporates these treatments in her story, partially influenced by her own 
extensive experience with Mitchell and the “rest cure.”72 In what follows, however, I will focus 
rather on the mental effects of the physiological treatment in order to demonstrate the detrimental 
nature of disciplinary mandates aimed at the individual body, mandates which only grow in 
scope in the 20th century as they become biopolitical. In her declaration that she is “forbidden” to 
                                                
72 For a more detailed account of Gilman’s own illnesses and experience with Mitchell, see Horowitz’s biography 
Wild Unrest, or Cynthia Davis’ biography. 
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work, the narrator reveals the disciplinary nature of her treatment. The rigid prescriptions she 
follows correspond with the “existence of a whole set of techniques and institutions for 
measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal,” pushing individuals beyond mere health 
towards a socially-accepted mental and physical norm (Foucault, Discipline 199). In The History 
of Sexuality, Michel Foucault explicitly points to the ‘hysterical woman’ as a “target […] for the 
ventures of knowledge,” where women’s bodies are “integrated into the sphere of medical 
practices, by reason of a pathology intrinsic to it” which must be institutionally corrected 
(Foucault, History 105, 104).  
Gilman’s narrator experiences isolation as a result of her label as hysterical: throughout 
the story, she is unable to amend or discuss her diagnosis with her husband, becoming the object 
of classification rather than a subject in her own treatment. Isolation as a disciplinary mechanism 
is primarily associated with the prison system, where “solitude assures a sort of self-regulation of 
the penalty and makes possible a spontaneous individualization of the punishment”; the prisoner 
experiences a “change of ‘morality’ ” (Foucault, Discipline 237, 239). In Gilman’s story, John 
prescribes isolation with similar goals, of allowing the narrator to change her mental state and 
better fit the desired social norms. However, in his execution, John includes a contradiction 
which causes his wife to become a pliable object, rather than a subject able to “self-regulate” or 
“individualize.” As the narrator explains, “I sometimes fancy that in my condition if I had less 
opposition and more society and stimulus—but John says the very worst thing I can do is to 
think about my condition” (Gilman, Yellow 4). John forbids her from talking about or dwelling 
on her illness; he states that “there is nothing so dangerous, so fascinating, to a temperament like 
[hers]” as talking about the possibility that she has not gained in health, and he often dismisses 
her fears by asserting his authority as a physician (12). She is also not permitted to interact with 
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others who might treat her as a normal member of society, for instance with her cousins, because 
according to John she wouldn’t be “able to stand it” emotionally or physically (10). Gilman’s 
narrator thus remains in limbo—unable to resume normal activities with a familiar sense-of-self, 
and unable to reconcile her emotional and mental state while actively forbidden to ruminate on 
that state. Once diagnosed as having merely “a slight hysterical tendency,” the narrator loses any 
sense of autonomy over her own conception of health or the proper course of treatment. 
Surveillance of the individual, or “hierarchical observation,” is another disciplinary 
mechanism meant to facilitate treatment and the individual’s return to a norm (Foucault, 
Discipline 170). In “The Yellow Wallpaper,” surveillance takes the shape of John and his sister 
Jennie’s constant watching of the narrator, as when John “ask[s] Jennie a lot of professional 
questions” about the narrator’s movements and actions during the day (Gilman, Yellow 16).73 
Discipline uses surveillance to “control or correct the operations of the body”; eventually the 
watched individual begins to regulate his or her own actions to better fit the desired norms 
(Foucault, Discipline 136). The narrator’s treatment begins as a strictly enforced disciplinary 
confinement; she is placed in an attic room and given “a schedule prescription for each hour in 
the day,” unable to openly engage in activities her husband finds dangerous (Gilman, Yellow 4). 
Foucault describes the “time-table” “found in schools, workshops and hospitals” as meant to 
“establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the cycles of repetition” in order to 
discipline the unruly body (Foucault, Discipline 149). 
                                                
73 John Bak in “Escaping the Jaundiced Eye: Foucauldian Panopticism in Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s ‘The Yellow 
Wallpaper’ ” reads the narrator’s confinement as paralleling that of prisoners in a Panopticon under constant 
surveillance, although Bak characterizes the wallpaper as the observer, rather than the narrator’s husband. Bak’s 
reading diverges from my own, however, as he conceives of the narrator’s descent into madness as a triumphant 
overthrow of the patriarchal identity forced upon her. 
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The narrator’s behavior under this strict treatment suggests the extent to which she has 
internalized the disciplinary push towards a desired norm. She strives seriously to ‘fix’ herself by 
obeying her husband’s wishes, even though the effects on her body and mind prove devastating 
by the end. For instance, she heeds John’s constant admonitions that she must exercise “proper 
self-control,” that she must not give in to her own emotions or imagination, but use her “will and 
self-control and not let any silly fancies run away with [her]” (Gilman, Yellow 4, 10). Beyond 
using her “will and good sense to check the tendency” of giving in to her imagination, the 
narrator hides her writing from John because it “weigh[s] on [her] so not to do [her] duty” in 
following his instructions (7, 6). Perhaps the biggest indicator of the deeply ingrained 
disciplinary mechanism comes at the end of the story, when the narrator reveals that even at the 
peak of her mental breakdown, although she wants to, she does not jump out of a window 
because “a step like that is improper and might be misconstrued” by society (18). In each 
instance, her status as mental patient is reinforced by the necessity of her adhering to John’s 
prescriptions, while her inability to conform entirely is evidenced by the continued presence of 
‘abnormal’ “fancies” and desires. 
 Gilman’s critique of such ineffectual discipline arises from the narrator’s slow descent 
into madness as a result of her prescribed physiological treatments. Most critics writing on this 
short story debate whether “the narrator’s heroism lie[s] in her defeated resistance to the male 
hegemony or in her triumphant escape from the external forces responsible for her confinement”; 
in other words, whether the narrator’s end state should be read as positive or negative (Bak 40). 
By characterizing her reaction in grotesque terminology, however, I highlight instead the 
paradoxical nature of the disciplinary mechanism that, rather than achieving its desired norm, 
pushes its object to the opposite end of the spectrum. Whether or not Gilman’s narrator finds her 
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transformation beneficial (and plenty of scholarship exists to support either side), the disciplinary 
mechanism has proved ineffective, as well as distressing, in producing a grotesque subject. 
As Wolfgang Kayser states in The Grotesque in Art and Literature, “the encounter with 
madness is one of the basic experiences of the grotesque which life forces upon us” (Kayser 
184). Gilman’s narrator, as the story progresses, becomes increasingly grotesque in body as well 
as mind, in tandem with her surroundings. At first she becomes obsessed with the idea that the 
wallpaper in her room contains a “faint figure behind [who] seem[s] to shake the pattern, just as 
if she wanted to get out” (Gilman, Yellow 11). As the story progresses, the narrator’s madness is 
marked by the progression of this obsession; first she begins to speak of the figure behind the 
wallpaper as actually present, able to move, and finally she becomes the figure herself, in the 
narrative move which shocked contemporaneous audiences. In succumbing to madness, the 
narrator becomes physically grotesque: she begins crawling around the room, causing Jennie to 
find “yellow smooches on all [her] clothes” rubbed there from the wallpaper (13). She also 
“creep[s] by daylight” and gnaws on the bedpost although it “hurt[s] [her] teeth”; her crawling 
and gnawing mark her as the grotesque mixture of animal and human (16, 18). The final scene, 
where she “creep[s] smoothly on the floor, and [her] shoulder just fits in that long smooch 
around the wall,” exemplifies her transformation into Mikhail Bakhtin’s conception of the 
grotesque body (18). For Bakhtin, the grotesque body involves a “degradation,” a “lowering of 
all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract,” and a “transfer to the material level,” seen in the 
narrator’s literal proximity to the ground (Bakhtin 19). 
Bakhtin further characterizes the grotesque body as “in the act of becoming, […] 
continually built, created, and build[ing] and creat[ing] another body” in connecting to the world 
around it (Bakhtin 317). Gilman’s narrator is a body “in the act of becoming” by virtue of her 
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connection to the yellow wallpaper which surrounds her, as she moves from observing the 
“figure” in the pattern to becoming that figure. As the narrator becomes more grotesque, so too 
does the wallpaper: it conforms to Kayser’s notes on grotesque art as portraying “a world in 
which the realm of inanimate things is no longer separated from those of plants, animals, and 
human beings, and where the laws of statics, symmetry, and proportion are no longer valid” 
(Kayser 21). The wallpaper is “one of those sprawling flamboyant patterns committing every 
artistic sin,” including lines that “plunge off at outrageous angles, destroy themselves in unheard 
of contradictions”; it is “not arranged on any laws of radiation, or alternation, or repetition, or 
symmetry” (Gilman, Yellow 5, 9). Moreover, the wallpaper combines human elements, as with 
the “two bulbous eyes [that] stare” and the woman behind the pattern, with plants such as 
“wallowing seaweeds” and “an interminable string of toadstools, budding and sprouting in 
endless convolutions” (7, 9, 12). The narrator herself calls the wallpaper “the interminable 
grotesque,” and she spends more and more time concentrating on the wallpaper, describing its 
various elements as she slowly becomes part of the wallpaper herself (10). 
Kayser states that “in the insane person, human nature itself seems to have taken on 
ominous overtones [… as] an impersonal force, an alien and inhuman spirit, ha[s] entered the 
soul” (Kayser 184). In the case of “The Yellow Wallpaper,” the “inhuman spirit” of the 
wallpaper has entered the narrator and in the end she becomes the “woman stooping down and 
creeping about behind that pattern”; it is her transformation which causes John to “faint” when 
he sees her (Gilman, Yellow 11). The narrator has become someone else entirely, as evidenced by 
her calling her husband “that man” rather than John, as if he were a stranger, and John’s shock 
may be attributed to the fact that the narrator’s treatment for ‘slight hysteria’ has not cured her, 
but has pushed her further into mental delusions and physiological grotesqueness (19). Instead of 
 74 
conforming more closely to the desired norms of mental health, the narrator embraces their 
opposite; her grotesqueness, resulting from disciplinary treatment, rather “mark[s] the suspension 
of […] norms” (Bakhtin 10). 
While the narrator seems untroubled by her transformation, calling her occupation of 
creeping “pleasant,” Gilman wrote the story not to glorify an embracing of the descent into 
madness, but rather to shock her audience, alongside John, into realizing the detrimental effects 
of Mitchell’s rest cure (Gilman, Yellow 18). Gilman hints at the wider applicability of her story 
through veiled references to other women or persons unknown suffering the same illness as her 
narrator. The room is described as previously used as a “nursery first and then playroom and 
gymnasium […] for the windows are barred for little children, and there are rings and things in 
the walls” (5). Moreover, the wallpaper is “stripped off […] in great patches all around the head 
of [her] bed, about as far as [she] can reach,” which the narrator blames on boisterous children 
(5). At this early point in the narrative, the reader has no reason to doubt the narrator’s state of 
mind, but in light of the ending of the narrative, the “barred windows” and “rings” in the walls, 
and the wallpaper torn precisely in a reachable distance from the bed suggests the confinement of 
other mentally ill patients. The hint of other patients is further reinforced by later descriptions of 
the room: the “floor is scratched and gouged and splintered, the plaster itself is dug out here and 
there, and this great heavy bed […] looks as if it had been through the wars” (8). While the 
narrator each time blames the destruction on the previous presence of children, the ominous tone 
of words such as “gouged” suggests instead great mental distress inciting destruction, as seen 
later in the narrator herself who similarly rips at the wallpaper and pushes the bed around the 
room. Most damningly, “there is a very funny mark on th[e] wall, low down, near the mopboard 
[…], a long, straight, even smooch,” and the “bedstead is fairly gnawed” (15, 17). The narrator 
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marks these features as pre-existing and puzzling, stemming from children or from persons 
unknown, and while she herself may be the cause (she does later smooch along the wall, and bite 
the bedpost), her descriptions suggest the possibility that other women have been confined, like 
her, to the room with the yellow wallpaper to slowly lose their minds. 
Gilman’s critique of Mitchell’s rest cure is most explicitly recognizable as an aversion to 
disciplinary control when we consider “The Yellow Wallpaper” in conjunction with another 
short story, written in 1915: “Dr. Clair’s Place.” This second story acts as a foil, portraying an 
effective and beneficial (in Gilman’s view) treatment style for hysteria and depression. While the 
treatment shares certain similarities, such as requiring the patient to rest and sleep as much as 
possible at first, the key difference is the patient’s autonomy and control over her situation. A 
sign at the door declares, “You come here of your own choice, for your own health and pleasure, 
freely; and are free to go when dissatisfied”; unlike the narrator of “The Yellow Wallpaper,” the 
patients in this later story choose their treatment and are able to discontinue treatment they do not 
find beneficial (Gilman, Yellow 299). A closer look at Gilman’s encounter with Mitchell 
demonstrates the importance of patient autonomy for mental health: Gilman wrote a letter to 
Mitchell prior to treatment in which she stated, “I want to work, to help people, to do good” 
(Horowitz 115). Mitchell’s prescription of the opposite, that Gilman should not write or exert 
herself intellectually, had the adverse effect which dominates the plot of “The Yellow 
Wallpaper.” Mitchell moreover wrote, “to think too much about their disorders is, on the whole, 
one of the worst things which can happen to a man or a woman,” and counseled his female 
patients especially to avoid crying as much as possible (135). These instructions, which made 
their way into “The Yellow Wallpaper” through John’s commands for his wife, again show 
Gilman’s dislike of those aspects of Mitchell’s rest cure which require the patient to conform to 
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disciplinary pressure by governing one’s behaviors. As critic Berman puts it, “what seems most 
offensive about Mitchell’s rest cure was its aim to make patients tractable,” to make (female) 
patients into docile objects (Berman 47). 
 
Gilman’s thoughts on Mitchell and the treatment of women deemed hysterical at the turn 
of the 20th century become significant when considered in juxtaposition with her other writings, 
including the novel Herland (1915) and nonfiction writings, which highlight her approval of 
classifications of abnormality contingent on biology and heredity. Although her fictional 
responses to Mitchell make clear that Gilman’s main gripe with mental health prescriptions is the 
disciplinary mechanism that enforces compliance, she paradoxically does not translate that 
concern to biological prescriptions. Gilman was well-versed in contemporaneous theories on 
biology; as Horowitz explains, “although Charlotte read Charles Darwin’s Descent of Man as 
early as 1880, her primary understanding of evolution came from Popular Science Monthly’s 
presentation of the works of Herbert Spencer, the British philosopher” (and social Darwinist) 
(Horowitz 24). While Spencer advocated a laissez-faire approach to social health, confident that 
evolutionary trends would lead inherently to the betterment of humanity, Gilman took a stronger 
stance and adopted eugenic rhetoric as the appropriate response to perceived biological decline.  
For instance, in her article “Birth Control, Religion, and the Unfit,” Gilman says, “we 
propose to check the undesirable increase [reproduction] by the simple device of sterilizing the 
unfit” (Gilman, “Birth Control” 108). In the same article, Gilman advocates for ‘positive 
eugenics’ as well in stating that “parents above the average, parents to be proud of, should give 
the world as many children as they can” (109).74 These eugenic suggestions call for the 
                                                
74 Eugenics is often classified as positive or negative, where negative eugenics includes “marital restrictions for 
those with conditions deemed genetically transmissible; […] [and] sterilization of individuals deemed feebleminded 
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disciplining of biological reproduction upon classifying certain individuals as either deviating 
from or conforming to the desired norm; in other words, a direct example of the type of 
disciplinary enforcement Gilman condemns in “The Yellow Wallpaper.” In another article, “A 
Suggestion on the Negro Problem,” Gilman goes further in declaring that “the whole body of 
negros who do not progress, who are not self-supporting, who are degenerating into an 
increasing percentage of social burdens or actual criminals, should be taken hold of by the state” 
and made to serve in military, factory, or agricultural capacities (“Suggestion” 81). Again, 
Gilman prescribes a specific treatment to aid social health, which does not take into account the 
individual being treated, but renders them biological objects. 
Other scholars, notably Thomas Peyser, have commented upon the eugenic themes of 
Gilman’s novel Herland,75 which presents biological control in an ideal (or utopian) setting 
where the participants are, at least on the surface, willing subjects. Peyser reads Herland as proof 
that “for Gilman, collective action that overrides any individual objections, or rather collective 
action that arises spontaneously from rigorously like-minded citizens, has an unquestioned 
value” (Peyser 11). He further states that “Gilman clearly favors reliance on authority to 
independence of thought, and, indeed, values conformity for its own sake”; these statements 
confirm Gilman’s reverence for biopolitical mechanisms of normalization (12). In Herland, 
conformity is enforced from the reproductive conception of an individual until her death; the 
women who live in the utopian society have spent “some fifteen hundred years” “work[ing] to 
                                                                                                                                                       
[…] or otherwise deviant” (Smith 11). Positive eugenics on the other hand promotes reproduction among desirable 
groups, calling on the ‘fit’ to “produce more children in the name of racial and national health” (11). Eugenics is 
intricately tied to race during the early 20th century; the racism of concepts like the “Negro Problem” shows most 
succinctly in the burgeoning genetic sciences which are the subject of my final chapter.  
 
75 For an interesting reading of Herland in light of its eugenic themes, specifically in reference to Lester F. Ward’s 




improve that population in quality” in terms of health, intelligence, and abilities (Gilman, 
Herland 71). They also practice “ ‘negative eugenics’ which must have been an appalling 
sacrifice […] to forego motherhood for their country”; those mothers who do not fit the desired 
social norms abstain from giving birth (69). In the utopian setting, the women represent the 
“collective” of like-minded individuals, while outside visitors with their “independent thought” 
represent a threat to the community’s mental and physical health.  
Peyser reads a continuance of thought between “The Yellow Wallpaper” and Herland 
through the idea of the collective; his analysis of “The Yellow Wallpaper” deems the narrator’s 
transformation at the end “the erasure of the boundary between the me and the not-me,” or a 
“conflation of self and other” where the narrator colonizes the body of the woman behind the 
wallpaper (Peyser 12). For Peyser, then, both pieces “depict a self that can survive its own 
liquidation, whether it becomes lost in the idiosyncrasies of a private pathology or absorbed into 
the unquestioned beliefs of the collective” (12). Similarly, Dana Seitler makes the case for 
continuity between the feminist themes of “The Yellow Wallpaper” and the eugenics of Herland 
by exploring the fusion of eugenics and feminism in “regeneration narratives,” where women 
alone have the power to redeem “the vices of the modern world through an adherence to 
biological law” (Seitler 179). Peyser reads Gilman as encouraging the subsummation of the 
individual into a collectively decided ‘greater good,’ and Seitler reads Gilman as primarily 
promoting female rights and autonomy. Both Peyser and Seitler therefore reconcile the seeming 
disparity between Gilman’s best-known works; I wish instead to preserve that gap as indicative 
of the changing nature of psychology at the turn of the 20th century.  
When reading the disciplinary mechanism in Gilman’s works, it becomes clear that in 
fact the only selves that ‘survive’ in any benevolent sense are those who have some measure of 
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autonomy over decisions involving their health. My goal in identifying the paradoxical gap 
between Gilman’s convictions relating to the treatment of women with hysteria, and those 
relating to genetic inheritance, is not to undercut the feminist scholarship that demonstrates 
Gilman’s importance for women’s rights during her time. Rather, I wish to highlight the 
consequences of the biological turn in the discipline of psychology and its potential reduction of 
compassion for those with ‘abnormal’ medical issues. Gilman suggests with her fictional and 
nonfictional writings that the needs of the individual remain secondary to considerations of 
collective health; once psychological illnesses gain a biological component, therefore, individual 
health must necessarily remain secondary to the prescriptions of those with social health in mind. 
In other words, the shift from disciplinary focus on the individual to biopolitical surveys of larger 
populations, accompanied by a turn to inheritance models of ‘abnormality,’ precludes the 
possibility of individualized (and therefore optimal) treatments. It is possible that Gilman, 
writing the same story decades later, might have entirely changed the tone of “The Yellow 
Wallpaper”; indeed, in her “preconsultation letter to Dr. Mitchell she had asked if he was the 
‘first authority’ not only on ‘nervous diseases’ but on ‘brain troubles’ as well” (Horowitz 119). 
Gilman’s distinction between, and anxiety about, “nervous diseases” which were curable and 
“insanity caused by brain disease” which was permanent suggests already a preoccupation with 
the possibility of biologically-determined mental difference (121). 
During Gilman’s time, in the American context, hysteria does not yet include a genetic 
component; Jane Thrailkill in Affecting Fictions lists the various ‘known’ causes for nerve 
disorders at the time, such as industrial growth—“new technologies, market growth, expanding 
cities—[that] were depleting the nerve resources of individuals” (Thrailkill 127). In general, 
“nervous exhaustion was in fact a pathology resulting from too great an expenditure of 
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willpower” so that women over-taxed in their domestic duties, or men traumatized after war, 
were both groups especially susceptible to illnesses like hysteria (129). Thrailkill further points 
out that in “Dr. Clair’s Place,” the female patient admitted for depression heals to the point 
where she “becomes a professional who specializes in invalids” (134). While Thrailkill mentions 
this in the service of explaining Gilman’s unique conception of the proper treatments for mental 
disorders, the patient’s complete recovery highlights the fact that for Gilman, hysterical illnesses, 
unlike racial degeneration, did not include any innate aspect that would compromise a patient’s 
ability after treatment to function in society. The shift to genetics in determining ‘abnormality’ in 
the United States becomes all too clear in subsequent years in cases such as Buck v. Bell from 
1927, where Oliver Wendell Holmes writes that since “heredity plays an important part in the 
transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc.,” “the health of the patient and the welfare of society 
may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of [individuals with] mental defects” (Buck 
v. Bell). Situated between the old, physiological, and new, biological models of psychology, 
Gilman’s writing thus remains entrenched in conflicting ideas about the merits of forced 
treatments. 
 
This chapter will end with a closer look at how the move to genetics in psychology 
relates to criminal law and the perceived danger of those with mental illnesses. First, however, I 
will turn to the literature of Georg Heym, a German expressionist primarily known for his 
macabre poetry. Heym’s short stories were published in 1913, two decades after Gilman’s story, 
at a time when German psychology was dominated by Freud’s theories on the unconscious. 
Gilman, upon reading Freud in the 1910s, “linked her loathing for psychoanalysis to its reductive 
nature [of] attributing all human conduct to sex” and “offered lectures on ‘The Falsity of Freud’ 
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and ‘The Freudian Fallacy’ ” (Davis, Charlotte 342). For Gilman, Freud’s suggestions of 
“inward- and backward-looking therapeutics reversed her outward- and forward-looking 
methodology”; Freud’s theories, in focusing on the internal mental status of an individual, 
promoted self-discovery which might not turn up desired insights for someone worried about 
their mental state (343). Indeed, by turning the “medical gaze” inward to hidden parts of the 
psyche, Freud opened the possibility that anyone might actually be insane.  
The German expressionist movement of the early 20th century was largely characterized 
by this possibility of madness hidden within. As Allen Thiher states in Revels in Madness, “in 
expressionist art the mad are present everywhere: they are the ubiquitous psychic double of every 
writer, wandering in every expressionist landscape and city scene” (Thiher 252). Moreover, “the 
pathology to be explored could apparently be one within or one without”; expressionists did not 
exclude the possibility that they themselves, their subjects, or the medical doctors tasked with 
diagnosing mental illness were in fact afflicted by madness (254). One of the more famous 
examples of this expressionist attitude is the 1920 film The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, directed by 
Robert Wiene, which in its original iteration ended with the revelation that the medical director 
of the insane asylum is himself insane, but in the released version ended with the narrator 
revealed as a patient of the asylum, and the narration merely a hallucinated invention. In both 
instances, the movie’s lasting impact stems from the sudden reveal at the conclusion that an 
individual previously deemed reliable is, in fact, dangerously mad. In the following section, I 
will demonstrate how Heym, writing about the detrimental effects of the disciplinary mechanism 
in similar ways to Gilman, does not establish divisions between the disciplined, objectified 
individual and the collective social body that must remain healthy. Instead, Heym’s stories, like 
other expressionist works, demonstrate a concern with pervasive and hidden mental illness that 
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collapses such divisions, and that precipitates an increased reliance on the biological for 
classification. 
 
III. Heym’s Troubled Flyers 
Georg Heym, born in 1887 in what was then part of Germany but now Poland, wrote 
primarily poetry for which he became well-known only after his death at the young age of 24. 
Heym wrote prose as well, although his prose has received little critical attention; as Allan 
Blunden puts it, the few pieces written about Heym’s stories have caused “the coffin lid [to be] 
briefly lifted, but only to demonstrate that Heym’s prose is indeed buried” (Blunden 107). 
However, Heym’s stories warrant a closer look, particularly as works concerned with health and 
medical treatment in the first decades of the 20th century. Heym’s story “Jonathan,” published in 
a collection in 1913, follows the suffering of a man whose legs have been broken in an accident 
on a ship, and who lies on a hospital bed to heal. As in Gilman’s story, Heym’s protagonist 
undergoes disciplinary treatment by medical professionals, and while his initial condition is a 
physical illness, he too descends into grotesque madness as a result of his treatment.  
The nurses and doctors exert total control over Jonathan’s physical state as he lies inert in 
bed, dictating the levels of light, pain medication, and stimulation Jonathan receives. Their 
treatment takes on disciplinary qualities in Jonathan’s interpretations76 of his responsibilities as a 
patient to suppress negative emotions and submit to medical prescriptions. Just as Gilman’s 
narrator experiences isolation in not talking about her illness with John, Jonathan too is barred 
from discussing his situation with medical professionals. Whenever the nurse “hear[s] him 
                                                
76 Heym’s story is written in a third person limited perspective, most closely aligned with Jonathan; as a result, many 
statements about disciplinary measures are clearly meant as Jonathan’s interpretations of his surroundings, not as 
mandates handed down by those in charge, although the effect is the same. 
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complaining about his pains, she refuse[s] to tolerate this useless bellyaching,” instead leaving 
Jonathan to deal with the pain on his own (Heym 233).77 However, unlike Gilman’s narrator, 
Jonathan does feel obligated to reflect on his situation, and in fact experiences his isolation as 
forcing such reflection. Jonathan remarks how the patients “must lie quietly in their beds, they 
must surrender themselves to their bodily pains, they [are] tortured alive” (235).78 According to 
Jonathan, the Christ figure hung at the foot of each bed serves to “mock their suffering, to hold 
their helplessness endlessly in front of their eyes”; in other words, to ensure their reflection and 
submission to the status of patient (235).79 Jonathan moreover compares his nurse to a “guard” 
who is “able to order him” around, and he submits to prescribed treatments with little protest, as 
when the doctor amputates his legs without first informing him (240).80 Just as Gilman’s narrator 
loses subjectivity through her husband’s refusal to consider her thoughts or feelings about her 
treatment, Jonathan likewise becomes merely a physical problem for the doctors and nurses to 
solve. His emotional subjectivity, his inability to allow the patient identity to overpower all other 
desires, does not interest them. 
Jonathan’s greatest desire is to remove his sense of isolation by connecting with others; 
he often declares that patients “become healthy much quicker […] [if] one doesn’t lock them up 
in this horrible loneliness like criminals” (Heym 237).81 He attempts to build a connection to the 
woman in the next room, informing her that a visit from her would “help [him] more than any 
                                                
77 In the original German, “Als sie ihn über seine Schmerzen klagen hörte, verbat sie sich diese unnütze Nörgelei.” 
All translations of Heym’s writing into English are my own, unless noted otherwise. 
 
78 In the German, “sie mußten ruhig in ihren Betten liegen, sie mußten sich den korperlichen Schmerzen hingeben, 
sie wurden bei lebendigem Leibe geschunden.” 
 
79 In the German, “um ihre Leiden zu verhöhnen, um ihre Ohnmacht ihnen ewig vor Augen zu halten.” 
 
80 In the German, “ein Wächter […] der ihm befehlen konnte.” 
 




doctor”; for Jonathan, physical and mental health are inseparable, even though the doctors in 
charge do not share his opinion (238).82 The “terrible loneliness,” the fact that he has “no-one to 
hold on to, no hand, no comfort, no tender words” exacerbates Jonathan’s physical pain, while 
speaking to the female patient relieves it (233).83 In fact, upon the doctor’s stern pronouncement 
that Jonathan absolutely may not partake in conversation, for the sake of his physical healing, 
Jonathan frantically enumerates the probabilities that he will never again see the woman. 
Immediately, his physical symptoms return and multiply: “a cramp shakes him, he is freezing. 
His hands become ice-cold. He can feel the fever returning” (240).84  
The finality of Jonathan’s isolation, in combination with the involuntary act of 
amputation to ensure his physical health, mark the beginning of Jonathan’s mental slide into 
madness. Heym’s descriptions of Jonathan and the other patients become increasingly grotesque, 
in protest against the medical institution’s objectification of those patients. Jonathan succumbs to 
pain and becomes animalistic, like Gilman’s narrator, in “clutch[ing] at the iron bedpost with all 
his might” and “scream[ing] full-throatedly” (Heym 241).85 The other patients as well are 
reduced to their diagnoses, stripped of subjectivity and described as Bakhtinian grotesque 
decomposing bodies. Jonathan’s scream is echoed: 
[…] by the cancer patients […] in whom the white pus in their intestines again begins to 
flow, by the doomed patients, whose bones are rotting away, slowly, piece by piece, and 
by those on whose heads a terrible tumor proliferates, which from the inside-out eats 
                                                
82 In the German, “wenn Sie kommen, hilft mir das mehr als alle Ärzte.” 
 
83 In the German, “entsetzlichen Einsamkeit” and “niemand, an dem er sich festhalten konnte, keine Hand, keinen 
Trost, kein zärtliches Wort.” 
 
84 In the German, “Ein Krampf schüttelte ihn, er fror. Seine Hände wurden eiskalt. Er fühlte, wie das Fieber 
wiederkam.” I’ve changed the verb-tense from past to present without indication in the English version. 
 




away, erodes, drinks up, their noses, their jaws, their eyes, and rips open huge stinking 
holes, huge pits full of yellow sludge in their white faces. (241-2)86 
 
These patients exemplify the grotesque body that “ignores the impenetrable surface that closes 
and limits the body as a separate and completed phenomenon” by “display[ing] not only the 
outward but also the inner features of the body: blood, bowels, heart and other organs” (Bakhtin 
318). Heym concentrates on bodily fluids and facial features in his extreme descriptions, 
reducing the patients to their physical parts just as the medical institution of his story erases their 
identity as anything but patient.  
The patients become not only animalistic, but also plant-like, the “red swollen heads of 
the sick heaped like huge turnips in an autumnal field” (Heym 242).87 Jonathan’s legs, first 
compared to “two big corpses,” are amputated and his remaining body grows out of the bandages 
“like the body of an exotic God out of a flower-bud” (242, 243).88 In Heym’s other writings as 
well, medical patients take on grotesque plant-like qualities in the service of critiquing medical 
procedures. In another short story in the same collection, “The Autopsy,” Heym describes the 
corpse as “resembling the huge iridescent flower-bud of a mysterious plant from Indian jungles,” 
before the doctors open the body and, focused on the Bakhtinian “inner features,” “take its 
contents out” (231).89 In this story, Heym makes clear the problematic nature of a medical 
                                                
86 In the German, “ein schreckliches Echo bei den Krebskranken, […] denen nun der weiße Eiter wieder in ihren 
Därmen zu rinnen begann, bei den Verdammten, denen die Knochen wegfaulten, langsam, Stück für Stück, und bei 
denen, denen auf dem Kopf ein furchtbares Sarkom wucherte, das von innen heraus ihre Nase, ihren Oberkiefer, ihre 
Augen wegfraß, ausfraß, austrank, und riesige stinkende Löcher, große Trichter voll gelber Jauche in ihrem weißen 
Gesicht aufgerissen hatte.” Again, I’ve changed the verb-tense from past to present without indication in the English 
version. 
 
87 In the German, “die roten geschwollenen Köpfe der Kranken staken wie große Rüben in einem herbstlichen 
Acker.” 
 
88 In the German, “zwei große Leichname” and “wie der Körper eines exotischen Gottes aus einem Blumenkelch.” 
 
89 In the German, “Sein Leib glich einem riesigen schillernden Blumenkelch, einer geheimnisvollen Pflanze aus 
indischen Urwaldern,” and “holten seinen Inhalt heraus.” 
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profession so concerned with rendering visible and classifiable the ill body, through what 
Foucault calls “the medical gaze” (Foucault, Birth 135). For Foucault, the “medical gaze” moves 
“vertically from the symptomatic surface to the tissual surface; in depth, plunging from the 
manifest to the hidden” in order to render knowable the “pathology” in question (135). For 
Heym, the consequences are “the screams of endless torment” of the patients, and that “the 
corpse quietly shiver[s] in [the] bliss” of death until the doctors “br[eak] open the bones of his 
temples”; in other words, the emotional and physical agony of those objectified by medicine 
(Heym 231, 233).90 
Jonathan and his peers thus embody Kayser’s grotesque blend of “plants, animals, and 
human beings,” but Heym’s most explicit critique of disciplinary medical treatment shows in 
Jonathan’s further grotesque swing to madness and hallucinations. In a surprisingly similar 
manner as Gilman’s narrator,91 Jonathan begins to hallucinate: “Suddenly it seems to him as if 
the wallpaper of the room is moving in several spots. It seems to shiver here and there and to 
bulge, as if someone stands behind it who is pressing against it in order to rip it” (Heym 244).92 
In Jonathan’s hallucinations, just as in the female narrator’s, the wallpaper does rip and lets out 
the figure who has been standing behind it; in this case, “whole legions of small tiny men,” or 
“dwarves” (244).93 Jonathan’s hallucinations continue in minute detail for several paragraphs, 
until the conclusion of the story where Jonathan “haul[s] himself over the fields, over deserts, 
                                                
90 In the German, “die Schreie unendlicher Qualen,” and “der Tote zitterte leise vor Seligkeit,” and “die Knochen 
seiner Schläfe aufbrachen.” 
 
91 The striking similarities between their descriptions suggest that Heym read Gilman’s story, although so far no 
biographical or critical writings place their works in conversation. 
 
92 In the German, “Plötzlich schien es ihm, als wenn sich die Tapeten des Zimmers an einigen Stellen bewegten. Sie 
schienen leise hin und her zu zittern und sich aufzubauschen, als wenn dahinter jemand stände, der sich gegen sie 
anstemmte, um sie zu zerreißen.” I’ve changed the verb-tense from past to present without indication in the English 
version. 
 
93 In the German, “ganze Heerscharen kleiner winziger Männchen” and “Zwergen.” 
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while the ghost fl[ies] ahead of him, always further through darkness, through terrible darkness” 
(246).94 The ghost presumably figures as Death, as it is described as a skull, but Heym’s ending 
remains intentionally unclear, whether Jonathan does succumb to his injuries and die, or stays 
locked in hallucinations while his body remains in the hospital bed. In either case, his lack of 
human contact, and his reduction to physical object by the medical staff of the hospital, has 
directly caused his negative mental collapse. 
The focus at the end of “Jonathan” on descriptions such as the “blue [dwarf] heads 
swaying like an ocean of huge cornflowers on breakable stems” and the deathly ghost 
foregrounds the necessity of interpretation, in the vein of Freud’s ideas about dream symbolism, 
in order to make sense of Jonathan’s hallucinations (Heym 244).95 Whereas Gilman disliked 
Freud’s theories, Heym indirectly gestures towards his ideas on dream interpretation, which were 
published originally in 1900 as The Interpretation of Dreams and again in 1911 under the title 
On Dreams. That Heym knew of Freud is evident, beyond the fact of Freud’s immense 
popularity in Germany in the early 1900s,96 from a eulogy written by his friend Erwin 
Loewenson in 1922. Loewenson describes how Heym was told at a club about Freud’s “book, 
with which one can interpret dreams very precisely,” upon which Heym declared the book to be 
“magnificent”97 in a joking manner (Loewenson 11). 
                                                
94 In the German, “er schleppte sich über die Felder, über Wüsten, während das Gespenst ihm voran flog, immer 
weiter durch Dunkel, durch schreckliches Dunkel.” 
 
95 In the German, “blaue Köpfe schaukelten, wie ein Meer riesiger Kornblumen auf zerbrechlichen Stengeln.” 
 
96 The enormous popularity of Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams in Germany is further discussed by Henri 
Ellenberger in his historical work The Discovery of the Unconscious (Ellenberger 783). 
 
97 In the German (dialect), “Das Buch is jrooßartig!!” Dream interpretation shows up again in Heym’s story “The 
Madman,” which I will discuss in the remainder of this section: the madman imagines telling his Doktor (perhaps 
modeled on Freud) about his dreams, to which the Doktor would only reply “so, so” (Heym 229). 
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 According to Freud, dreams constitute a change “from a mode of expression which is 
immediately intelligible to us to another which we can only come to understand with the help of 
guidance and effort,” or interpretation work (Freud 148). Dreams convert material from waking 
life to the unconscious, in sometimes recognizable, sometimes unrecognizable forms. Important 
for our purposes is not uncovering a definitive interpretation of Jonathan’s hallucinations, but 
rather how those hallucinations mark a shift beyond a critique of the medical institution (the type 
of critique at play in “The Yellow Wallpaper”) to a generalization of madness which erases the 
line between the treated and those prescribing the treatment. Freud begins On Dreams with an 
interpretation of his own dreams, making clear that the possibility of hidden meaning, emotion, 
and expression exists in every individual, whether doctor or patient. Moreover, as Kayser points 
out, “from an early date, insanity, quasi-insanity, and dreams were used to define the source of 
creativity,” and the very artists creating portraits of insanity were suspected, or claimed, to 
themselves suffer from the same mental conditions as their characters (Kayser 184). 
 
Heym’s own thoughts on the pervasiveness of insanity, and the blurring of categories, 
become clear when considering his short story “The Madman” (“Der Irre”), also published in the 
1913 collection. While “Jonathan” critiques how the medical profession, supposedly concerned 
with increasing physiological health, instead pushes Jonathan into insanity, “The Madman” 
portrays similar failings within psychological institutions. Biographer Patrick Bridgwater notes 
that in fact several of Heym’s “diary entries show ‘Der Irre’ [“The Madman”] to be a self-study”; 
Heym writes that his fate is “to go mad like Hölderlin” (Bridgwater 262). In a later entry he 
writes: “Facing me I see a poor madman. In my head there is a spark of genius; in his there is 
only darkness. And yet I have much in common with him” (262). These statements illuminate 
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Heym’s conception of himself as a madman, and make the dream-like descriptions of extreme 
violence in his story the more troubling, as the main character swings between calm and insanity 
without warning. The unconscious and its interpretation might reveal hidden insights about any 
individual, and Heym suggests with his story “The Madman” that in some cases, those insights 
are troubling in the extreme. In what follows, I will demonstrate how “The Madman” at once 
condemns and simultaneously proves the necessity of mental institutions, ultimately suggesting 
that dangerous minds are ubiquitous and unstoppable.  
“The Madman” follows the actions of a man who has been released from a mental 
institution, as he journeys home with a plan for revenge. He blames his wife for his involuntary 
committal to the institution (in actuality, he violently beat her and was sentenced by a court). On 
the one hand, the man obviously requires mental care and treatment, considering his violent 
thoughts.98 Immediately upon leaving the institution, he declares “it was high time that they let 
him out, because otherwise he would have killed everyone, all of them,” including the Direktor, 
whom he would have “taken by his red goatee and pulled under the sausage-machine” (Heym 
215, 215-6).99 During his walk home, moreover, a “peaceful smile fl[ies] across his face” as he 
imagines the field in front of him full of “people, all with their heads on the ground,” and he 
stomps around to hear the sounds the various heads make when he breaks them (217).100 He 
finds it “really lovely” to imagine breaking skulls, to imagine how some are so soft that they 
“stay glued to his feet” and how from some the “brain positively squirt[s] out” as he clomps 
                                                
98 This story uses the same narration device as “Jonathan”; it is told in third person, but solely from the perspective 
of the madman. 
 
99 In the German, “Es war aber auch höchste Zeit, daß sie ihn herausgelassen hatten, denn sonst hätte er alle 
umgebracht, alle miteinander. Den dicken Direktor, den hätte er an seinem roten Spitzbart gekriegt und ihn unter die 
Wurstmaschine gezogen.” 
 
100 In the German, “ein seliges Lächeln flog über sein Gesicht,” and “Da lagen viele, viele Menschen, alle mit dem 
Kopfe auf der Erde.” 
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around (218).101 This gruesome imagined scene portrays not only his violent tendencies, but also 
his removal from reality, as seen again when he later chases a rat, convinced it is his wife. At 
another point he deems it “laughable” how crazy some of the other inmates of the institution are; 
the madman exhibits a complete lack of self-awareness concerning the ‘abnormality’ of his 
thoughts and fantasies (218).102 
Unfortunately for those around him, the protagonist’s violent thoughts are soon translated 
into action: he kills four people on his journey home, and the manner in which he commits 
murder proves his mental instability and his need for treatment. First he encounters two children, 
whose crying angers him so that he “beat[s] the heads of the two children together” rhythmically 
until they bleed, which “intoxicate[s] him, ma[kes] him into a God,” and causes him to start 
singing (Heym 219).103 The festive atmosphere surrounding his brutal beating of two children 
shows the madman’s extreme disconnect from others, his lack of empathy. Soon thereafter, he 
becomes animalistic upon encountering an old woman who might potentially make fun of him; 
he runs after her “on all fours” and “the animal springs upon her neck,” biting into her throat and 
drinking the blood (221, 222).104 Here again the madman experiences a break from reality, as he 
first characterizes his anger as a hyena, and then becomes that hyena in an animalistic killing 
that, as in the case of the children, he justifies with nonsensical reasoning. Unlike Jonathan, the 
madman from the first embodies the grotesque, and his committal to a mental institution seems 
well-justified.  
                                                
101 In the German, “wunderschön,” and “Sie blieben an den Füßen kleben,” and “das Gehirn ordentlich spritzte.” 
 
102 In the German, “Das war ja zum Lachen.” 
 
103 In the German, “Er schlug die Köpfe der beiden Kinder gegeneinander,” and “Das berauschte ihn, machte ihn zu 
einem Gott.” 
 
104 In the German, “auf Händen und Füßen,” and “Nun springt das Tier ihr auf den Hals.” 
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The madman’s attempts at self-control and self-discipline as well justify his involuntary 
committal, if those attempts are seen as resulting from his stay in the institution. Foucault names 
mental and medical institutions as disciplinary mechanisms which use a “policy of coercions that 
act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour” in order 
to create “ ‘docile’ bodies” (Foucault, Discipline 136). Upon spending the prescribed amount of 
time in just such an institution, the madman does seem to enact several of the desired 
characteristics of such disciplinary endeavors. After killing the children, for instance, “his mood 
change[s] in an instant” and he feels a “untamable compassion for the two poor children,” 
thereupon attempting to wipe them clean and breathe life back into them (Heym 220).105 While 
his attempt does not last long, his capacity for remorse and his tears after killing suggest his 
ability to grasp the severity of his crimes. Several other moments as well demonstrate an ability 
to view himself in accordance with social norms; while playing naked in a river, “he suddenly 
ha[s] the thought that he was doing something indecent” and that if his old warden were to see 
him, “he would scold him good, he would tell the Direktor on him” (224).106  
Beyond socially-conditioned regret, the madman moreover often experiences a complete 
disconnect, a disassociation, from his crimes and mental illness, suggesting the need to conceive 
of himself as ‘normal.’ Several times he indicates his aversion to the label of “madman”: his 
reason for killing the old woman is that “she will think [he’s] the madman from [house] number 
17” and will “laugh at [him]” (Heym 221).107 At another point he considers returning to the 
                                                
105 In the German, “Mit einem Male schlug seine Stimmung um,” and “ein unbezwingliches Mitleid mit den beiden 
armen Kindern.” 
 
106 In the German, “Plötzlich kam ihm der Gedanke, daß er etwas Unanständiges täte,” and “der wird schön 
schimpfen, der zeigt das dem Direktor an.” 
 
107 In the German, “verrückter,” which may also be translated as “insane person” or “nut job.” The next quote: “die 
denkt, ich bin ja der Verrückte aus No. 17,” and “die lacht mich ja aus.” 
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mental institution, but refuses to ask for directions because the person asked would then “take 
him for a madman, and that wouldn’t do at all” (224).108 Often in the midst of committing his 
violent acts, he disassociates and does not connect himself to the murder, as when he finishes 
tearing out the woman’s throat and upon looking down, wonders “Where does all this blood 
come from?” (223).109 As previously mentioned, he conceives of himself as a hyena in the 
moment of violence, and when a man runs away from him in fear (because of his bloody 
appearance), he thinks to himself that the man is right to run, “because the hyenas could re-
emerge from the corn at any moment” (223).110 During his most intense bouts of violence, 
therefore, the madman remains separate, not acknowledging that in fact he and the “hyena” are 
one and the same. 
While the disconnect might suggest that the madman’s desire to fit social norms is so 
deeply ingrained that he is mentally unable to reconcile his heinous actions with his sense-of-
self, it might also be read as a sign that the disciplinary mechanism of the institution has failed to 
produce adequate self-reflection in the madman. In fact, Heym includes other critiques of the 
institution’s efficacy, not least of which is the fact of the madman’s continued murderous actions 
upon his release. The story begins with “the warden g[iving] [the madman] his things, the cashier 
count[ing] out his money, the doorman unlock[ing] the big iron door before him”; these actions 
prove that those in charge of the institution have decided the madman no longer poses a threat to 
himself or others, a clearly incorrect assessment (Heym 215).111 
                                                
108 In the German, “Dann würde er sicher für einen Verrückten gehalten werden, und das ging denn doch nicht.” 
 
109 In the German, “Wo kommt denn das viele Blut her?” 
 
110 In the German, “Denn hier konnten gleich wieder die Hyänen aus dem Korn kommen.” 
 
111 In the German, “Der Wärter gab ihm seine Sachen, der Kassierer händigte ihm sein Geld aus, der Türsteher 
schloß vor ihm die große eiserne Tür auf.” 
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Their efficacy, and even their desire to help others is further called into question by 
various comments from the madman which suggest the opposite, that the workers of the 
institution actually do not care about the well-being of the patients. The madman claims that “the 
wardens in their white striped aprons […] those villains, stole from the men and raped the 
women in the bathrooms,” actions which would cause anyone “to become insane” (216).112 The 
madman also witnesses wardens punishing misbehaving patients by placing them in hot baths, 
where “more than one was scalded, on purpose, he knew,” and when he mentions these 
occurrences to the head doctor, the doctor’s attempt to talk him out of the possible delusions 
makes him suspect the doctor as complicit (216).113 The reader has been primed to distrust the 
veracity of the madman’s claims due to his repeated violent outbursts and hallucinations. 
However, these abhorrent actions by medical personnel are described vividly enough to not be 
entirely discounted, leaving open the possibility that far from treating mental illness, the 
institution actually increases mental distress. Indeed, as critic Blunden asserts, “we know that 
patients in asylums do sometimes suffer maltreatment at the hands of sadistic guardians, and in 
Heym’s day, when mental illness was even less understood, that maltreatment must have been 
gross” (Blunden 110).114 Richard Sheppard likewise claims (albeit taking suggestion as fact) that 
“far from curing the madman, this legally sanctioned medical violence has had the effect of 
reinforcing and worsening his psychopathic tendencies” (Sheppard 154).  
                                                
112 In the German, “die Wärter in ihren weiß gestreiften Kitteln, […] diese Schufte, die die Männer bestahlen und die 
Frauen auf den Klosetts vergewaltigten. Das war ja rein zum verrückt werden.” 
 
113 In the German, “Da war mehr wie einer verbrüht worden, mit Absicht, das wußte er.” 
 
114 Blunden, however, misses the mark in suggesting that Heym completely severs the “respected alliance of 
established medicine with the forces of law and order”; I have shown that in Heym’s story, medicine in fact does 
retain its ties to discipline, and is at least partially effective (Blunden 110). 
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Just like Wiene’s film The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, Heym’s story thus remains 
ambiguous about the possibility of corruption within the mental institution, questioning whether 
the patients or those running the institution are more mentally ‘abnormal.’ In fact, the 
disciplinary mechanism does affect both its subjects and objects; critic Bak reads the 
Foucauldian Panopticon as creating “elements of fear and paranoia, not just in the observed but 
also in the observers, since they too did not know when they were being watched” (Bak 42). 
Likewise Angela Smith in Hideous Progeny devotes a chapter to horror films about mad doctors, 
claiming that in those films, “the doctors fail to recognize that, even as they occupy the position 
of vision and power, they, too, are subject to the material effects of their own reductive fictions” 
(Smith 175). The doctors “not only wield the medical gaze but are also, eventually, subjected to 
its disciplinary measures,” causing the blurring of divisions between medical subject and object, 
creator and character, which so preoccupies expressionist artists (175). If the madman’s madness 
is merely “the extended trace of a social madness, represented in the custodians appointed by 
society,” the medical professionals, then social breakdown becomes a probability (Vietta 155).115 
  
In both “Jonathan” and “The Madman,” the very institutions meant to produce healthy 
individuals fail in their goals. Both stories end with their protagonists lost at sea, the madman 
hallucinating that “he [is] a big white bird over a large lonely ocean” before he is shot by a 
citizen trying to save another victim from his murderous rage (Heym 228).116 In both cases, 
mental breakdown is not aided but rather exacerbated by the disciplinary actions of medical 
professionals, suggesting the incurable quality of the madness that breaks out unpredictably in 
                                                
115 In the German, “Die Schizophrenie des ‘Irren’ […] erscheint als die verlängerte Spur eines gesellschaftlichen 
Wahnsinns, repräsentiert in den von der Gesellschaft bestellten Aufsichtspersonen.” 
 
116 In the German, “Er war ein großer weißer Vogel über einem großen einsamen Meer.” 
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these individuals. One possible reason behind Heym’s anxieties about pervasive mental illness is 
the change in psychological explanations of hysteria in the 1910s. While Gilman wrote her story 
during a time dominated by S. Weir Mitchell’s physiological ideas on hysteria, Heym would 
have been influenced more heavily by Freud’s account of hysteria.117 That Heym was concerned 
with the concept of hysteria while writing his stories shows in one of his diary entries, where he 
notes that he was experiencing “hideous dreams … Sexual repression. In short, on the threshold 
of a nice bout of hysteria” (Bridgwater 263).  
The possibility that his characters likewise suffer from hysteria shows in his allusions in 
both stories to modern inventions and the industrial boom. As Paul Lerner explains in his 
historical work Hysterical Men, Germany at the turn of the 20th century underwent “widespread 
economic and demographic change” as the population “expanded by some 60 percent” from the 
1870s to the 1910s, and more and more people migrated to the cities and factory work (Lerner 
19). This extreme growth was not seen only as positive; instead, “a common contemporary 
assumption, shared by psychiatrists and numerous other medical thinkers, was that the era’s 
vertiginous changes were taking their toll on national health and fitness” (19). One consequence 
was trauma, and specifically “the traumatic hysteria diagnosis” for men which was “linked to 
jarring physical experiences” such as injuries obtained during labor (26). In “Jonathan,” 
Jonathan’s leg injuries occur during his passage home on a ship (he works as a ship mechanic): 
he is “descend[ing] the iron staircase to the boiler” when the ship turns suddenly and he “f[alls] 
down the stairs into the machinery” where the “piston rod” breaks his legs (Heym 238).118 The 
                                                
117 Interestingly, Freud wrote a review of Mitchell’s work praising his ‘rest cure’ as beneficial, in conjunction with 
other therapeutic techniques, while Mitchell, like Gilman, disliked Freud because of his perceived obsession with 
sex (Berman 306-7). 
 
118 In the German, “die eiserne Treppe nach dem Kessel heruntersteigen,” and “die Treppe hinuntergestürtz in das 
Maschinenwerk hinein,” and “die Kolbenstange.” 
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focused description of metals and machinery links Jonathan’s subsequent mental breakdown in 
the hospital to the type of hysteria induced by the industrial boom and workplace injuries.  
In “The Madman,” several allusions as well suggest the pressure of adjusting to new 
technological advances, such as when the madman sees how “an electric train dr[ives] past” and 
comments on how much the streets have changed since his time in the institution, that “the 
Electric even dr[ives] here already” (Heym 224, 225).119 The madman also often references the 
mental institution’s “butcher shop” with its various machines, although in the context of violent 
fantasies (216).120 One final hint of the possible detriment of the population boom at the turn of 
the 20th century comes at the end of the story, when the madman attempts to kill a woman in a 
crowded department store. Heym describes in gruesome detail how the madman thus incites a 
panic, where “the masses flee through the aisles, tumbling down the stairs on top of each other” 
and at the end when the store has emptied, “only a pair of small children lie in front of the 
entrance, trampled or crushed to death” (230).121 Such negative descriptions of the masses in the 
city suggest Heym’s concerns about social structure and urbanization in the early 1900s, similar 
to the concerns about industrial growth in the United States. The incurable aspect of the resulting 
hysteria in Heym’s characters, however, stems from the addition in the German context of a 
biological, or inherited, component to mental illness. 
Lerner explains that in the 1910s, the definition of hysteria changes, “locat[ing] the 
pathology’s source in the subject’s constitution (rather than exogenously in an accident event)”; 
while accidents might still instigate or exacerbate hysterical tendencies, those tendencies must be 
                                                
119 In the German, “Eine elektrische Bahn fuhr vorbei,” and “jetzt fuhr hier sogar schon die Elektrische.” 
 
120 In the German, “die Fleischerei.” 
 
121 In the German, “die Menge flieht durch die Gänge, stürzt die Treppen übereinander herab,” and “Nur ein paar 
kleine Kinder liegen vor der Treppentür, totgetreten oder erdrückt.” 
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already present in the individual (Lerner 36). Therefore “both normally disposed people and 
those with hysterical constitutions could react hysterically to the same stimuli, but only those 
with premorbid personalities would develop serious neuroses” (38). Freud’s writings on hysteria 
confirm this shift, as he states that “we have […] introduced into the aetiology of hysteria a 
factor which the patient himself never brings forward […] namely, the hereditary disposition 
derived from his progenitors” (Freud 97). Freud further points out that his contemporary Charcot 
claims that “heredity alone deserves to be recognized as the true cause of hysteria, while all other 
noxae of the most various nature and intensity only play the part of incidental causes” (97). 
Heym must have been aware of this new factor of hysteria, as seen in another diary entry where 
he writes: “That genius is somehow allied with disease, is proved by the case of my own 
family…When all is said and done genius really does seem to be a kind of degeneration [or 
mental disease]” (addition by Bridgwater, 262). Heym’s comments suggest the inherited element 
of both genius and disease in referencing his family, and definitions of degeneration likewise 
contain a biological component.122 As critic Thiher explains, “in conformity with psychiatric 
views of madness, the expressionists saw themselves as victims of their constitution, of an 
Anlage that imposed hereditary determinism on them” (Thiher 252). By the 1910s in Germany, 
then, psychology increasingly incorporates the biological in its definitions, and the social fear, 
seen especially in the expressionist movement, that madness is spreading and ubiquitous, 
requires new methods for ensuring social safety and health. 
 
 
                                                
122 Although Bridgwater connects this quote by Heym to Max Nordau’s writings on degeneration, it is equally 





In the 19th century, psychology still conflates mental and physical cause and effect, and 
therefore remains as yet problematic as a general tool of classification for larger populations. 
However, as psychology increasingly focuses on genetic and hereditary understandings of mental 
illness in the 20th century, it becomes an instrument of discrimination; “medicine as power and 
the psychiatric hospital as institution existed to sanction” the exclusion and containment of those 
not conforming to established norms of conduct (Foucault, Abnormal 153). Psychology becomes 
about “treating a social ‘danger,’ […] because [madness] was perceived as a source of danger for 
oneself, for others, for one’s contemporaries, and also for one’s descendants through heredity” 
(“Dangerous” 7). Therefore “psychiatry will tend to seek out pathological stigmata which may 
mark dangerous individuals: moral insanity, instinctive insanity, and degeneration” 
(“Dangerous” 10). “Moral” insanity might include for instance hysterical women who are unable 
to care for their children properly, as in the case of Gilman’s narrator, while “instinctive” 
insanity could apply to Heym’s madman who seems unable to act otherwise. Insanity “is that 
part of the subject which is beyond his responsibility; that is, the insanity which hides in him and 
which he cannot even control because he is frequently not even aware of it” (“Dangerous” 5). If 
madness is inherited, and might lurk beneath the surface of individuals who erupt suddenly, then 
heredity and violent acts (as well as perceived degeneracy) become the justification for the 
confinement of individuals thereby deemed ‘dangerous.’ 
Lerner’s extensive historical research on madness reveals that in Germany in the early 
20th century, “increases in crime and disease replaced the optimistic reformism of mid-
nineteenth-century medicine with the fears of disorder, decline, and degeneration” (Lerner 19). 
As a result, “state statisticians recorded staggering increases in admissions to the already 
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crowded mental asylums,” for instance in Prussia where “between 1880 and 1910, the number of 
asylum inmates rose 429 percent,” leading to the creation of the German word “Irrenboom,” or a 
“boom in insanity” (19). In the United States as well, “by the late nineteenth century, nearly 
every state had one or more asylums and most mental patients resided in them” (McCandless 
173). The asylums, meant to function as “a hospital, not a prison or an almshouse,” nonetheless 
“function[ed] largely as a custodial welfare institution” with patients who were “violent, suicidal, 
epileptics, idiots, criminally insane, feeble-minded and senile of all ages mixed” (188). 
Moreover, at the turn of the 20th century in the United States “the nature of the patient population 
in mental hospitals underwent profound changes,” as “the proportion of short-term cases fell and 
that of long-term cases increased” (Grob 538). In other words, at the end of the 19th century, as 
mental illness and crime become conflated by way of their hereditary components, more and 
more mental patients become confined to asylums and mental institutions for increasingly long 
periods of time.  
The conflation of mental ‘hospitals’ and disciplinary institutions such as prisons meant to 
contain the “dangerous individual” shows in Gilman and Heym’s stories. In “The Yellow 
Wallpaper,” the description of the narrator’s attic room, with its “windows [that] are barred,” and 
the yellow wallpaper which changes in various light so that “by moonlight, it becomes bars” 
behind which the woman is stuck, evokes the bars of a prison cell (Gilman, Yellow 13). In “Dr. 
Clair’s Place,” mental illness itself becomes a type of prison, as one of the patients is described 
as “so sunk in internal misery that her expression was that of one who had been in prison for a 
life-time” (295). Similarly in Heym’s story “Jonathan,” the patients are directly compared to 
prisoners, as Jonathan thinks that “someone sentenced to death had it better, since his agony 
would only last one day,” in contrast to the patients who die more slowly, without an end in sight 
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(Heym 235).123 Jonathan moreover states that the enforced isolation which separates him from 
the other medical patients (inmates) makes him feel “locked up” like a “criminal” (237).124 In the 
case of “The Madman,” the comparisons are even more pronounced: the main character has been 
arrested due to violence against his wife and sentenced to the mental institution, and he 
repeatedly commits violent, criminal acts during periods of mental frenzy and turmoil.  
For Gilman, the disciplinary nature of strict mental treatments which objectify their 
patients and prescribe absolutist labels remains problematic, something to protest through social 
writing and conversation. However, Gilman is unable to connect the problems in mental 
treatments with the same type of disciplinary mechanism at play in eugenic rhetoric, which 
likewise classifies and then attempts to correct perceived ‘abnormality.’ For Gilman, mental 
illness on the whole does not yet include an inherited, biological, component; Heym, writing 
over 20 years later, does connect the mental and genetic. As a result, while Heym points out the 
detrimental nature of disciplinary medical treatment both physical and mental, he and other 
expressionists simultaneously portray the need for such disciplinary institutions as a protection 
against a biological madness that pervades the entire country. However, Heym’s critiques can 
also be read as suggesting that “the line between social normality, and insanity, is in flux, and an 
individual’s insanity is much influenced by collective forms of insanity and their corresponding 
deformation of reality” (Vietta 156).125 In other words, for Heym, society contributes to its own 
problematic decline; either institutions meant to treat the symptoms must improve, or society 
itself must change to effect a decrease in madness.  
                                                
123 In the German, “ein zum Tode Verurteilter hatte es besser, denn seine Qual dauerte nur einen Tag.” 
 
124 In the German, “[einge]sperrt” and “Verbrecher.” 
 
125 In the German, “die Grenzen zwischen gesellschaftlicher Normalität und Wahnsinn fließend sind, und daß die 
Schizophrenie eines Individuums vielfach bedingt ist von kollektiven Formen des Wahnsinns und der ihr 
entsprechenden Deformation von Wirklichkeit.” 
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During the first decades of the 20th century, the fear of the ‘dangerous individual’ thus 
follows a shift in psychology towards the biological, which is then taken up by legal discourses 
surrounding criminality. As Foucault puts it, “psychiatry has functioned as knowledge and power 
within the general domain of public hygiene or protection of the social body, [and] has always 
sought to discover the secret of the crimes that all madness is in danger of harboring, or the 
kernel of madness that must haunt all individuals who may be dangerous for society” (Foucault, 
Abnormal 120). In turning to the biological, psychology is able to regain a measure of control 
over its methods of classification, and criminal law adopts the language of psychology to justify 
the imprisonment of those with perceived abnormality. The gradual inclusion of questions of 
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CHAPTER 3: ARBITRARY CRIMINALS: 
GERTRUDE BARROWS BENNETT AND FRANZ KAFKA 
I. Introduction 
In the early 20th century, criminal law in the United States and Germany experienced a 
shift regarding the importance of an individual’s background when assessing the proper 
punishment for their crime. Prior to this shift, criminal law focused on punishing crime, the acts 
themselves, according to a legal code unwilling and unable to take individuals’ circumstances 
and backgrounds into account. As Michel Foucault states in his lectures on the “abnormal,” the 
early 1900s saw a shift from punishment for a “legal subject who is recognized as being 
responsible” to a legal “technique that consists in singling out dangerous individuals and of 
taking responsibility for those who are accessible to penal sanction in order to cure them or 
reform them” (Abnormal 25). Instead of criminality defined by an individual’s actions against 
accepted norms of behavior, criminality became synonymous with the individual’s very being, 
biologically and mentally, which in turn became an object of the law. 
Two figures in particular mark the changing nature of law in Germany: Rudolf von 
Jhering, whose ideas about ‘norms’ stemmed in part from writings by Karl Binding, and Franz 
von Liszt, a student of Jhering. Jhering’s writings reflect the former iteration of criminality; he 
held the belief that “only coercion transforms social norms into law, and since the state holds the 
monopoly on coercion, it is the ‘only source of law’ ” (Canale 309). For Jhering, “law and state 
appear almost exclusively in relation to social aspects, as institutions and means to control the 
actions and behavior of individuals”; in other words, Jhering believed not only in the need for 
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strong governmental enforcement of criminal law, but also that those laws are directly tied to 
accepted social norms (309).  
Liszt revised Jhering’s ideas by adding attention to the individual committing the crime, 
and his writings echo Foucault’s concept of the ‘dangerous individual.’ For Liszt, the “reasons 
for the perpetrator’s actions were to be examined,” so his or her punishment would “take into 
account the personality of the offender and the punishment’s purpose of education and securing 
the criminal” (Canale 317). His 1883 essay “The Idea of Purpose in Law” called for “punishment 
as protection, i.e., punishment with the purpose of establishing security” by either reforming, 
deterring, or neutralizing offenders (Vormbaum 118). By focusing on punishment, Liszt removed 
the “concept of blameworthiness, for the culprit’s attitude, the decisive issue, is less an 
expression of his blameworthiness than of his dangerousness” (119). In this model of criminal 
law, criminality is directly connected to an individual’s being, although not yet through the 
concept of genetics. Subsequent legal theorists used Liszt’s ideas about tailoring punishment to 
the criminal to support “an individual criminal etiology that focused on factors of 
predisposition,” most famously seen in the works of Cesare Lombroso who defined criminality 
as inherently biological (124).  
In the United States, a similar trend occurred in criminology, as seen through debates 
surrounding the death penalty: in the late 19th century “as crime came increasingly to be viewed 
as a consequence of biological or social forces beyond the criminal’s control, as certain people 
came to be understood as genetically or environmentally predisposed to commit crimes, the 
death penalty correspondingly ceased to be seen as a just punishment” (Banner 208-9). If a 
criminal was inherently predisposed to commit a crime, then the question of responsibility, 
conflated with the idea of free will, made death a problematic sentence. In both countries, 
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criminal law thus moved “from the crime to the criminal; from the act as it was actually 
committed to the danger potentially inherent in the individual; from the modulated punishment 
of the guilty party to the absolute protection of others” (Foucault, “Dangerous Individual” 13). 
This shift follows a larger trend, as outlined by Foucault throughout his oeuvre, from hierarchies 
of the normal and ‘abnormal’ based on socially-constructed norms to hierarchies based in 
biological data collection—from sovereignty (through discipline) to biopower.126 
It is this shift that this chapter explores through two literary works caught between the old 
and new models; The Heads of Cerberus by Gertrude Barrows Bennett, and In the Penal Colony 
by Franz Kafka, both published in 1919. By focusing on the figure of the criminal, an individual 
in direct contact with power and its consequences, Bennett and Kafka make clear the arbitrary 
and thus corruptible nature of various contemporaneous power structures, mirrored in their 
stories by fictitious sovereign governments. Both authors likewise gesture towards the 
biopolitical modes which follow sovereignty, though Bennett suggests biologically-based 
classifications as a remedy to the arbitrary hierarchies upheld by old government forms, while 
Kafka portrays biopower as equally suspect. They use the Bakhtinian grotesque to signal the 
corruption and breakdown of contemporaneous government forms (for Bennett—autocracy, 
communism, and meritocracy; for Kafka—monarchy and bureaucracy), as those governments 
create the grotesque rather than bringing their subjects in line with desired norms. Paradoxically, 
“the grotesque [thus becomes] one of the essential processes of arbitrary sovereignty” (and other 
forms of government) (Foucault, Abnormal 12). However, Bennett ends her novel with the 
                                                
126 Foucault defines sovereignty, prevalent until the end of the 18th century, as identifying the criminal with anyone 
who “attacks the sovereign,” and the sovereign “demands reparation, because [his] right [as] superior man is 
violated and because it offends the dignity of his character” (Discipline 47). In this model, the sovereign arbitrarily 
assigns norms of behavior (what is considered ‘offensive’) as well as the corresponding punishment for deviation 
from those norms. Biopolitics, beginning in the 19th century, is distinguished from preceding types of power by its 
concentration on large populations and on the biological body, establishing norms with the goal of ensuring that the 
population in its entirety remains ‘healthy’ and viable (Foucault, Society, 246). 
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possibility of a less corrupt method of classification through biology, while Kafka extends 
corruption to both biopower and whatever power structures might come next, ending with a 
wariness of power that is all-too-fitting considering the eugenic movements that follow in the 
1920s and 30s. 
 
II. Unintentional Criminals in The Heads of Cerberus 
 Not much is known about Gertrude Barrows Bennett, and less still has been written 
critically on her works, published under the pseudonym ‘Francis Stevens.’ What little 
biographical information exists, stems from the introduction to The Heads of Cerberus written by 
Lloyd Arthur Eshbach in 1952, and an introduction to her short stories in 2004 by Gary 
Hoppenstand. Bennett was born in Minnesota in 1883, and disappeared in 1939, although 
Hoppenstand, citing research by R. Alain Everts, reveals that she likely did not die until 1948. As 
Eshbach states, “if any one word can describe the work of ‘Francis Stevens,’ its background and 
its author, that word is ‘mystery’ ” (Bennett, Heads 13).127 She wrote all of her fiction within a 
span of six years, including several novels and short stories, and Eshbach claims that “when 
planning each of her stories, [she] spent a great deal of time in research” (14). Unfortunately, the 
nature of her inquiries is not known, but her marriage to a news reporter and later work for a 
University of Pennsylvania professor suggests at least that Bennett had access to 
contemporaneous debates around the most important social issues of her time. While I am unable 
to demonstrate, as with other authors I discuss, on which issues precisely Bennett conducted 
                                                
127 Even her influence on other authors remains a mystery: Hoppenstand spends much of his introduction drawing 
parallels between Bennett’s writing and that of H. P. Lovecraft, partially based on a letter supposedly written by 
Lovecraft in praise of a short story by Bennett. However, biographer S. T. Joshi insists that the letter is falsely 
attributed to Lovecraft; if a link exists between them, it can thus only be found in their fictional style (Joshi). 
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research, the themes present in her writing suggest a preoccupation with government corruption, 
the law, and the ‘nature’ of humans.  
Bennett’s interesting writing style has led science fiction critic Sam Moskowitz to name 
her “ ‘the most gifted woman writer of science fiction and science-fantasy between Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley and C. L. Moore’ ” and Hoppenstand to “add that she was also the 
woman who invented dark fantasy” (Bennett, Nightmare xxiv). Her novel The Heads of 
Cerberus, first published serially in 1919, has not yet been taken up by literary critics, but the 
relevance of its themes for literary scholarship on the biological turn suggests the worth of 
further critical study. I will begin by demonstrating the parallels between the fictitious 
government in The Heads of Cerberus and the contemporaneous forms of autocracy, 
communism, and meritocracy which occupy many of the American newspapers published in 
1919, at the end of World War I. Bennett portrays these government structures as corrupt and 
arbitrary in their distribution of power, and the presence of the grotesque makes clear that these 
power structures inherently fail in their goals. Moreover, several moments in Bennett’s novel 
suggest that a more ‘natural’ system of classification and power distribution might exist, 
especially if linked to biological indicators in individuals of their strengths and weaknesses. 
Therefore I end this section by analyzing Bennett’s portrayal of an alternative, bio/political 
method for classifying individuals, which Bennett connects to the type of eugenic rhetoric 
prevalent at the time, without fully realizing its implications.  
 
The Heads of Cerberus follows the story of Drayton, a lawyer in Philadelphia in 1918, 
who is accidentally transported by a mysterious dust (along with his friends Trenmore, Viola, 
and Bertram) to the year 2118, where Philadelphia and its surrounding environment are renamed 
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Penn. Drayton and his friends are immediately arrested as law-breakers upon arrival, and told 
that to escape their death-sentence they must take part in Exams where people compete for 
positions of power. While preparing for the Exams, they meet several top government officials, 
including a man named Cleverest and a woman named Loveliest who attempt to help them. In 
the end, Drayton and his friends escape certain death by ringing a magical bell (presumably the 
Liberty Bell) which dissolves Penn and transports them back to their own century. 
Hoppenstand claims in his introduction to a collection of Bennett’s stories that The Heads 
of Cerberus is a “reworking of Edward Bellamy’s novel, Looking Backward, 2000-1887 (1888), 
transforming Bellamy’s urban utopian narrative into a bleak vision of tomorrow” (Bennett, 
Nightmare xiv). While Hoppenstand does not provide evidence or further contextualize this 
statement, several points in Bellamy’s and Bennett’s novels bear out his claim. Both authors 
write about futuristic societies, where a traveler from their contemporaneous year accidentally 
finds himself a century forward in time, able to comment ‘objectively’ upon the changes wrought 
by the years. Bellamy portrays a socialist society in the year 2000, where the citizens labor for a 
set amount of years, and each earn an equal amount of credit, with one small central government 
elected from and by the citizens maintaining the status quo.  
While Bellamy writes his utopia as a model for a perfect and fulfilling society, where 
each individual has his or her needs entirely met, his description of the governing system leaves 
grey areas of potential power imbalances. For instance, the President and a small cabinet of the 
heads of industry maintain the “discipline” of society and its work force, and “the administration 
[…] holds always in reserve the power to call for special volunteers, or draft any force needed 
from any quarter” (Bellamy 63). Moreover, the President’s “right hand […] the inspectorate” is 
“on the alert to catch and sift every rumor of a fault in the service […] [and] by systematic and 
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constant oversight and inspection of every branch of the [industry] army, to find out what is 
going wrong before anybody else does” (124). Finally, the President “appoints the necessary 
judges year by year,” and “it is a judge who states each side of the case as well as a judge who 
hears it,” so that the President and his elected judges are solely responsible for legal rulings 
(130). Bellamy’s explanations of this fictitious socialist system on the surface seem to account 
for any possible corruption or ill-usage of power by those who make up the government, mainly 
based on the premise that humans with all needs met will not act nefariously towards others. 
However, the possibility of the President’s drafting labor as he sees fit, the inspectorate’s all-
invasive surveillance, and President’s complete control of the legal system suggest that if 
desired, those few in power might quickly topple the status quo. 
The Heads of Cerberus takes to an extreme the possibility of such an imbalance in power, 
demonstrating the potential dangers of a government with only a few individuals at the top 
enforcing rules on the rest of the population. While Bellamy shows the merits of a socialist 
system, Bennett pushes against his utopic vision, instead portraying a dystopian version of the 
future in which various government types, including socialism, have deteriorated through 
corruption. Bennett connects the fictitious government in The Heads of Cerberus to several 
contemporaneous forms of government particularly of public interest in the 1910s—autocracy, 
communism, and meritocracy—presenting these systems as corrupt and arbitrary in their 
distribution of power.  
The Penn version of autocracy, for instance, vests all power in one individual, Mr. Justice 
Supreme, who functions as a king with complete control over his citizens’ lives. Cleverest 
explains that “Penn, the mighty All-Father, stands behind his Servants and justifies their acts,” 
and Mr. Supreme rules over all other Servants, as Drayton sees it, as their “very arbitrary tyrant 
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[…] [with] power absolute” (Bennett, Heads 115, 145). The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
autocracy as “a state or society governed by one person with absolute power,” or as Bennett puts 
it, a “tyrant” with “power absolute” (Oxford). Indeed, Mr. Supreme wields all the authority of a 
traditional sovereign, including the ability to name and enforce compliance with arbitrary norms, 
and to dole out punishment (when desired) for noncompliance. Foucault states that “the 
sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from 
killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring” 
(Foucault, History of Sex 136). In Penn, most ‘crime’ is met with immediate death, seen for 
instance by an incident when the citizens rebel and Mr. Supreme commands the use of machine 
guns to massacre them. Only when “both his hands went up, palms outward,” do the machine 
guns cease firing, showing his ability to ‘refrain from killing’ as well (Bennett, Heads 135). 
The Penn government is explicitly connected to autocracy when Trenmore declares that 
“whoever has done these things to your [Loveliest’s] people has certainly hit a new low in 
autocratic government” (Bennett, Heads 111). Bennett’s reference to autocracy reflects the 
proliferation in 1919 of negative reports on Germany, which was a monarchy (and considered in 
the United States an autocracy) until the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1918 at the end of 
World War I. The Philadelphia Inquirer128 in 1919, while Bennett was drafting The Heads of 
Cerberus, published extensively about the conclusion of World War I and the consequences to 
the countries involved. In particular, news articles made clear that the German form of autocracy 
                                                
128 Bennett’s husband was a news reporter in Philadelphia until his death in 1910, and while the lack of by-lines 
makes it difficult to ascertain exactly when and for whom he wrote, researcher R. Alain Everts claims that Mr. 
Bennett wrote in particular for The Philadelphia Inquirer (Everts). As his wife, Gertrude Bennett would have had 
access to The Philadelphia Inquirer as well as other news publications; therefore I draw several of my examples 
from newspapers specific to Philadelphia at the time. 
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was ‘dangerous,’ and that subsequent Bolshevism in Russia might likewise become a 
‘dangerous’ autocracy. For instance, one editor writes:  
We went to war to put an end to what was termed autocracy. Our idea of autocracy, when 
we declared hostilities in April, 1917, was rule as established by the Kaiser. […] Out of 
the welter of war has arisen a new autocratic power, that of Lenine [sic], the Bolshevist, 
who rules from Moscow by bloody force. (“Facing a New Form”)  
 
Almost every newspaper in Philadelphia for the year 1919129 holds mentions of “German 
autocracy, the foe of civilization and sane liberty”; Bennett almost certainly therefore models her 
own version of autocracy on that of Germany (“World Opinion”).  
As an overthrown and failed system, Germany’s monarchy demonstrates the 
shortcomings of government ruled by one all-powerful individual, and Bennett exaggerates the 
potential dangers even further, demonstrating the total corruption of Mr. Supreme’s rule. For 
example, Mr. Supreme bends his own laws on crime when a man legally “condemned to lose 
both means of living and life” is told with a wink that his punishment will take place “some other 
time, chief, [since] the pit is not working right to-day” (Bennett, Heads 140, 141). The fact that a 
lowly citizen has mere minutes before been killed in the “pit,” a hole full of spikes, makes this lie 
obvious. Moreover, Mr. Supreme ensures that the logic behind his rulings remains obscure to the 
Penn citizens, again demonstrating his kingly status. As Foucault points out, for most 
sovereignties:  
The entire criminal procedure, right up to the sentence, remained secret: that is to say, 
opaque, not only to the public but also to the accused himself. It took place without him, 
or at least without his having any knowledge either of the charges or of the evidence. In 
the order of criminal justice, knowledge was the absolute privilege of the prosecution. 
(Discipline 35) 
 
                                                
129 In a search for the term “autocracy” in digitalized Philadelphia newspapers from 1919, over 1,000 occurrences 
appear, a majority of which are negative opinion pieces on German rule and growing fears of a Russian shift to a 
similar government structure.  
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However, Mr. Supreme takes enforced ignorance to an extreme; in Penn the masses are allowed 
“no concern either with the past or with anything outside [their] own boundaries[.] The law says, 
let every good citizen live his own life. It is forbidden that he should do more than that,” i.e. ask 
questions about other aspects of Penn (Bennett, Heads 111). All information about the city’s 
past, and how the current governmental structure came into being, is strictly guarded, along with 
books and other printed material. In fact, “no one in this city, barring those born in Penn Service 
or the officials under their control, is allowed to read any literature more informing than a sign 
post, an instruction pamphlet or a telephone directory” (114). Thus Mr. Supreme determines 
legal norms and the punishment for failing to obey them, while for the citizens those norms 
remain unexplained. Mr. Supreme and his officials are able to act however they see fit; their 
corruption of their own rules is blatant. 
As American fears about the replacement of German autocracy with a Russian version 
make clear, communist forms of government are equally suspect in 1919. Bennett picks up the 
rampant anti-Bolshevik rhetoric by further connecting her fictitious Penn to communist 
economic models, again exaggerating the potential for corruption. Drayton reveals that Penn was 
created as a direct result of communism: according to historical records he finds, “Communism 
had its way of Europe [and] class war, which spells social chaos, ensued,” causing the (fictional) 
United States to sever all communication with other countries (Bennett, Heads 153). Drayton 
further explains that not only was “the whole world […] mad, in this country, too, Communism 
had been lifting its disorganizing clamor” (154). In order to prevent its spread, officials decided 
that “if some States were rotten, let them rot alone; not infect the others”; thus each state 
ostensibly became a “democratic” republic of its own, “completely isolated from the world” 
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(154). Similarly, in the United States in the 1910s, the popularity130 of socialism begins to rise; 
as historian Richard McCormick explains, “under Eugene V. Debs’s leadership, the Socialist 
Party of America reached a peak of strength between 1910 and 1912 when dozens of towns and 
cities elected Socialist mayors and Debs won nearly a million votes as a presidential candidate” 
(McCormick 177). 
However, the prevalence of anti-Bolshevik news reports demonstrates that 
overwhelmingly, socialism retains its negative connotations in the real United States, as in 
Bennett’s fictitious country. For instance, The Philadelphia Inquirer in 1919 runs several 
columns with sentiments such as: “sympathizers with the murderous maniacs who have appealed 
to bloodshed in Russia have found a foothold in the United States” and “Bolshevism must be 
stamped out, no matter where it appears” (“Editorial Comment”). In Philadelphia in January of 
that year, Bolshevists bomb several private homes of city officials, resulting in fear and panic, 
and in the surveillance and arrest of “well-known Socialist[s]” such as Edward Moore, who “has 
been associated with the Industrial Workers of the World and their Bolshevist sympathizers” 
(“Arrest I.W.W. Leader”). Drayton’s statement that “many clever, wealthy men foresaw 
opportunities for absolute despotism under open colors,” clarifies the potential dangers Bennett, 
and other Americans, saw behind socialist government structures, even as people like Bellamy 
exalted their benefits (Bennett, Heads 154). The economic system in The Heads of Cerberus 
suggests that even socialism, meant to provide an equal distribution of power to entire 
populations, would fall prey to corruption, as it already had (according to American newspapers) 
in its Russian context, instead vesting all power in one violent sovereign-type ruler (i.e. Lenin). 
                                                
130 Another indication of the popularity of socialism in the United States during this time is the bestseller status of 
Bellamy’s Looking Backward. 
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Bennett includes details about the Penn government that highlight its socialist traits, 
while demonstrating that the true spirit of socialism absolutely fails as power remains in the 
hands of a few wealthy men. The tension between actual and utopic socialism shows best in 
Drayton’s question: “Was this system a tyranny, as he had indefinitely suspected, or was it the 
freest and most orderly of governments?” (Bennett, Heads 109). For instance, the Penn monetary 
system follows what Marx would call a C-M-C exchange; their “currency is not based on gold or 
silver,” but rather “the Service sets a valuation on the different sorts of labor” and the laborer 
receives a “certificate of labor” with the hours worked stamped upon it (109, 108). The laborer is 
then “free to spend these [hours] as they please,” on whichever commodities they choose (109). 
Similarly, the laborers in Bellamy’s socialist society receive credit cards, and while the “hours of 
labor in different trades differ according to their arduousness,” each laborer receives the same 
amount of credit to use as they wish (Bellamy 62). As Marx states, “the simplest form of the 
circulation of commodities is C-M-C, the transformation of commodities into money, and the 
change of the money back again into commodities” (Marx 329). In this model, seen in Bennett 
and Bellamy’s novels, the focus is not on money (as with a capitalist model), but rather the 
“certificates of labor” are used as a place-holder to allow a fair exchange of labor and goods.  
However, while Bellamy’s government changes the hours a worker works per day based 
on the difficulty of the labor, in Penn the work hours do not change, but the amount of credit 
received changes based on arbitrary valuations. Thus Bennett’s monetary system holds the 
potential for corruption, if those in power choose to change valuations to benefit or detract from 
certain citizens. Indeed, we immediately see the corruption present in Loveliest’s statement that 
“the Servants of Penn and we Superlatives charge everything to the Service,” and Drayton’s 
reiteration that “the Service itself never pays for anything and takes what it likes of goods or 
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labor” (Bennett, Heads 109, 110). As Drayton rightly points out, the fact that those in power thus 
receive commodities without doing labor renders the “whole population mere slaves, and their 
ownership of property a mockery” (110). Marx makes clear that when “the product of labour 
does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, this can only be because it 
belongs to some other man than the worker,” for instance those in power who can confiscate the 
products at will (Marx 78).  
The economic imbalance is likewise evident in the distribution of property and 
government positions in Penn. The laborers supposedly “own all the property—except the 
Temple itself and the officials’ private residences,” which suggests Marxist communal property 
(Bennett, Heads 108). However, Bennett’s descriptions of the ruling class and their abodes 
makes clear a disconnect between the ideal of communal property and its actual manifestation. 
Mr. Justice Supreme for instance resides within “a long series of luxurious living apartments, 
smoking, lounging, and drawing-rooms, each furnished in a style compatible only with great 
wealth or the system of ‘credit’ peculiar to Penn Service,” suggesting that those outside the 
ruling class would not reside in such luxury (121). Moreover, in a Marxist system laborers would 
choose their own work (as explained in detail in Bellamy’s novel), and everyone would have 
equal opportunity to fill various official positions; indeed, Cleverest states at one point that the 
numbered citizens “have their opportunity to be of those who make the laws” (102). However, he 
goes on to explain their absence in positions of power as a result of being “too lazy or vicious to 
compete,” while in fact, in Penn those in power cheat in order to ensure that ordinary citizens 
have no real chance of gaining official positions (102). Although the Penn government thus at 
first appears to emulate a type of socialism, Bennett emphasizes the corruption which allows a 
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few men and women to remain the most wealthy, and to wield the most power over others rather 
than allowing an even distribution across the entire population.  
The cheating rampant during the Exams which decide positions of power in Penn 
provides a link to one final mode of government under scrutiny in Bennett’s novel: meritocracy. 
Bennett describes the complicated procedure by which Penn officials decide, once a year, who 
will fill various necessary government positions, based on exams meant to determine the 
individual ‘objectively’ most qualified for those positions. These “Civic Service Examinations” 
call to mind the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883, which “created a federal Civil Service 
Commission and introduced competitive examinations” to decide on governmental appointments 
(Foulke 8). While the Pendleton Act was passed in 1883, the publication of the book “Fighting 
the Spoilsmen: Reminiscences of The Civil Service Reform Movement” by William Dudley 
Foulke in 1919, concentrating primarily on civil service laws such as the Pendleton Act, shows a 
lasting interest in the United States in such forms of government. In 1919, Senator Penrose 
moreover promises that he will “give the city [Philadelphia] the most business-like form of 
commission government that could be devised,” providing a possible impetus behind Bennett’s 
particular portrayal of civil service (“Penrose”). Drayton explains that Penn “began under a sort 
of commission government,” where individuals hold power over various branches and agencies 
(Bennett, Heads 155). Newspapers inundated with political promises for reform and suggestions 
for better methods of electing officials potentially motivate Bennett’s combination of a 
commission government with meritocracy, where each official in charge of a specific service 
should be the best qualified. 
However, as seen in the proliferation of ‘muckraking’ articles and the strength of the 
progressive movement in the 1910s, many Americans worried that even such government 
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structures closer to home held the potential for corruption and nepotism. For instance, several 
politicians endorsed what “George Washington Plunkitt of New York’s Tammany Hall […] 
[called the] ‘honest graft’ ” (also known as the ‘corrupt bargain’), where officials would strike 
deals with businesses in return for favors, or simply because of family ties (Flanagan 77). 
Philadelphia, in particular, was seen as “not merely corrupt, but corrupted” by “vicious circles of 
special privilege, fostered by civic neglect, and abetted by a popular hypocrisy,” as Professor 
Arthur Dudden puts it in his 1931 response to Lincoln Steffens’ famous 1904 analysis of 
corruption, Shame of the Cities (Shapiro 71). Indeed, the real Philadelphia in the early 1900s 
parallels Bennett’s fictional portrayal, since “all of the municipal departments obeyed James 
McManes, who at that time was ‘the recognized Boss of Philadelphia,” just as Mr. Supreme acts 
as the ‘boss’ of Penn (74).  
Bennett demonstrates the potential corruption of a meritocracy by emphasizing the 
‘rigged’ and unfair aspects of the Exams. Superlatives gain their positions by competing in the 
exams, and are thereafter named after the won job; for instance, Cleverest is the ‘cleverest’ 
citizen in Penn, and therefore responsible for the legal system, while Swiftest “ha[s] control of 
the City Messenger Service” (Bennett, Heads 102). However, the reader quickly realizes that in 
fact, the names of those holding positions of power (Mercy, Virtue, Justice Supreme, etc.) are 
ironic, given the corrupt way in which they gain their positions, and how they act (Mercy shows 
no mercy, Virtue has no morals when it comes to killing, etc.). When speaking of the hierarchical 
system, those in power refer to it as “a system as democratic as it is natural and logical,” a 
statement obviously false to the reader as the story progresses (102). For instance, during the 
exams an ordinary citizen, No. 57403, competes for the position of “Sweetness of Voice” which 
involves acting as the “Director of Civic Music” (129). No. 57403 sings with a “clear young 
 120 
voice” which causes those watching to sigh in happiness, while the incumbent competitor sings 
“hopelessly off key,” with a “roar [that] crescendo[s] to a terrible disharmonic laugh” and makes 
Viola question what “music he [is] murdering” (131, 132). While the decision is obvious for 
those watching, No. 57403 is declared the loser and sentenced to death in the Pit while the 
incumbent “will continue in office” (133). At another point, Cleverest confirms that the 
examinations are completely rigged, and he, in a privileged position of power, can be sure of the 
outcome; for example, he tells Bertram that he has “excellent reasons for prophesying 
[Bertram’s] success” (104). Instead of merit-based placement, the Exams function through 
nepotism: “every man of the Superlatives […] held his job by pure favor, aided by the pull he 
could exercise through family connections” (152). By rendering the “Civic Service 
Examinations” such an obvious farce, Bennett amplifies the ‘muckraking’ opinions of 
progressives on political organization during her time. 
 
Social anxieties about various forms of government in the 1910s, including autocracy, 
socialism, and meritocracy, thus drive Bennett’s descriptions of the corrupt ways in which Penn 
and its leaders enforce arbitrary rules and punishment on their citizens. Beyond surface 
corruption, moreover, the presence of the aesthetic grotesque in The Heads of Cerberus confirms 
the flaws inherent in the Penn government. If the various hierarchies of power functioned as they 
were meant to, at the very least those holding the majority of power would presumably benefit 
from their positions. However, Bennett’s use of the grotesque makes clear that instead, both the 
ordinary citizens and the Servants of Penn have become twisted and deformed as a result of their 
contact with the corrupt power structures in place. During the exams, for instance, the 
Superlatives, required to attend, are: 
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[D]ressed with a gayety which verged—in many cases more than verged—on distinct 
vulgarity. […] Colors shrieked at one another, or were gagged to silence by an 
overpowering display of jewelry. Some of the older and plainer ladies were quite masked 
in the enamel of their complexions. (Bennett, Heads 123) 
 
The official function of the Exams, to “assert all that was stable, unchanging, perennial: the 
existing hierarchy, the existing religious, political, and moral values, norms, and prohibitions,” 
becomes a carnivalesque mockery instead, as those in positions of power take on aesthetically 
ridiculous qualities (Bakhtin 9). For example, the ‘king’ himself, Mr. Supreme, is described 
during this event not in the regal terms one expects for a sovereign, but rather as “decrepit with a 
loathsome senility […] and his clothes the apotheosis of dandyism” (Bennett, Heads 126). He 
wears mirrored shoes and hat, “a yellow chrysanthemum as a boutonniere […] his vest was of 
white flowered satin, [and] his hands were ungloved yellow claws”; this clash of colors and 
fabrics suggests a court jester rather than a king (126). The overwhelming amount of color, 
clothing, jewelry and makeup renders their wearers a grotesque imitation of what should in fact 
be an elegant display of power. 
The grotesqueness of those in power shows even more prominently in Bennett’s 
descriptions of their physical appearance; Mr. Supreme has a face “lined and scarred by every 
vice,” with “rheumy and red-rimmed” eyes that “blink evilly above purple pouches,” in stark 
contrast to his extravagant clothing (Bennett, Heads 126). Kindness’ wife is a “very fleshy, 
bediamonded and prosperous-looking lady,” while the incumbent music director is described as a 
“waddl[ing] mountain of flesh […] [with] a pair of small, piglike eyes” (129, 130). The apparent 
obesity of the ruling class, and the repeated emphasis of their unappealing eyes, recalls Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s concept of “grotesque forms of exaggerated body parts” such as “monstrous bellies (a 
typical grotesque hyperbola)” (Bakhtin 328). Drayton further describes the judge Mr. Virtue as 
“hawknosed, fat-jowled, coarse-featured and repellant” and says that “his appearance singularly 
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belie[s] his name”; in this instance, physical traits become a more reliable indicator of identity 
than the Exams (Bennett, Heads 81). Kindness is likewise described as having “thin cruel lips, 
narrow-set eyes, and [a] low, slightly protruding forehead [which] indicate[s] several possible 
qualities; but benevolence was hardly of the number” (129). Thus, paradoxically, those in power 
are physically opposite to their titled positions; Bennett’s grotesque descriptions highlight their 
unsuitability for their jobs, and therefore the bankruptcy of the Penn government.  
Within the lower class, as well, the Penn government affects the opposite of its 
intentions; Penn citizens participate in and submit to a type of Foucauldian discipline meant to 
deter nonconformity, through surveillance and a push towards normalized behavior. Penn norms 
include the requirement that each citizen “wear a numbered mark of identification” on their 
clothing, the number acting as their name (Bennett, Heads 101).131 Trenmore makes explicit the 
connection between this labeling system and disciplinary nodes of power when he states, “in jails 
men have numbers, and perhaps in the lunatic asylum […] they have numbers, and wear buttons 
with those same numbers on them” (70). Foucault demonstrates at length how both jails (as seen 
in Discipline and Punish) and mental institutions (as seen in History of Madness) are disciplinary 
institutions, designed to label and correct individual behavior to bring it in line with desired 
norms. Discipline shows as well in Penn’s social surveillance, for instance when a cab driver 
calls the police on Drayton and his friends for their “very serious and peculiar offense” of “going 
about without [their] buttons” (72). Loveliest confirms a systematic web of surveillance when 
she tells Drayton and his friends to “never speak against [Penn Service], even when you believe 
yourself alone or in the safest company. It has a million eyes and a million ears, and they are 
                                                
131 Bennett’s use of “insignia” that each citizen must wear again shows the influence of Bellamy’s Looking 
Backward; in that novel, each “industry has its emblematic device […] in the shape of a metallic badge” which the 
laborers wear to identify their specific rank and employment (Bellamy 90). 
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everywhere” (111). When citizens do not conform to expected behavior, they are sentenced to 
punishment meant to enforce compliance: an Official sentencing Bertram declares, “Let him 
have that three hours to consider and repent of his sacrilege” in isolation, before being thrown 
into the Pit (141). As Foucault states, “solitude assures a sort of self-regulation of the penalty and 
makes possible a spontaneous individualization of the punishment”; the prisoner in solitude must 
reflect on his or her crime and thereby self-regulate, or ‘normalize’ (Discipline 237).132 
In The Heads of Cerberus, however, the disciplinary measures do not produce the desired 
effects; rather, the citizens of Penn are alienated through constant self-regulation, and once 
labeled criminals (because of arbitrarily decided crimes), they become physically grotesque 
when undergoing punishment. The citizens have become absolutely complacent in following the 
norms of behavior, to an extreme which removes their sense of self and ability to interact with 
the world around them. A hotel clerk is described as “a trifle too obsequious for a normal hotel 
clerk,” and other citizens on the streets as well exhibit a “slavish” respect towards those in power 
(Bennett, Heads 92, 108). Living under strict Penn rule has caused these people to “undergo 
positive physical deterioration,” to have a “hangdog, spiritless appearance, as if caring little what 
their labor or their goings to and fro might bring them” (107, 108). Such descriptions echo 
Marx’s conception of alienating labor models, which create a “relation of the worker to his own 
activity as an alien activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, 
begetting as emasculating”—in short, “self-estrangement” in the worker (Marx 74-5).  
Moreover, when the citizens of Penn behave against desired norms, they face immediate 
death, as when Mr. Supreme commands the slaughter of the lower class by machine guns, or 
when individuals are sentenced to be thrown into the Pit. The “space at the bottom of the Pit [is] 
                                                
132 In Kafka’s novella as well, the criminal’s punishment is meant to provide him with clarity about the nature of his 
crime so that he dies enlightened and repentant. 
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filled” with “sharp steel spikes,” and “anything falling there must of necessity be impaled—if not 
fatally, so much the worse for the thing” (Bennett, Heads 86). In both cases, punishment riddles 
the physical body with holes, rendering it a Bakhtinian grotesque body which “display[s] not 
only the outward but also the inner features of the body: blood, bowels, heart and other organs”; 
the traditional borders between the body and everything outside it dissolve (Bakhtin 318). After 
the machine guns, for example, the floor of the Penn temple “resemble[s] more nearly the pit of a 
slaughter house, […] smeared and slimy with trampled blood, fragments of clothing, and other 
fragments less pleasant to contemplate” (Bennett, Heads 138). The citizens have left body parts 
on the floor; rather than normalized citizens, they become estranged and grotesque133 through 
Penn’s power structure, even as they struggle to comply with its arbitrarily-decided norms. 
 
The presence of the grotesque in Bennett’s novel, while pointing out the flaws in Penn’s 
system of government, conversely suggests the possibility for a type of government that would 
work as intended. If the rulers as well as the ruled in Penn are grotesque as a result of their 
contact with power, an alternative arrangement might indicate its success by the lack of the 
grotesque instead. Bennett reinforces the possibility of a functional government by emphasizing 
the unfairness of the current Penn system, as shown by the incompatibility of the officials’ facial 
features with their assigned roles, for instance, or by the obvious cheating involved in the Exams. 
As an alternative, Bennett indirectly proposes a meritocracy connected to one’s individual 
biology and therefore (presumably) not subject to corruption. Bennett uses biological and 
physiognomic descriptions at several points to reinforce her portrayal of Drayton and his friends 
as inherently good, in contrast to the Penn citizens surrounding them. For example, while 
                                                
133 Wolfgang Kayser posits a connection between the grotesque and alienation; for Kayser, “the grotesque is the 
estranged world,” or rather, the individual estranged from the world around him (184). 
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Drayton first appears in the novel as a thief accidentally attempting to rob his friend Trenmore, 
Bennett makes clear that Drayton’s momentary lapse in judgment is in direct contradiction to his 
innate qualities and sense of self. Once caught by Trenmore, Drayton at first refuses to “grasp the 
friendly, powerful hand which his innate and self-denied honesty had prevented his taking except 
on a basis of open understanding” (Bennett, Heads 27). After explaining his mistake, he 
moreover declares himself “cured of crime,” as if the attempted robbery were the result of a brief 
illness, and when he meets an actual thief, Bertram, he is “sickened” because “the parallel to be 
drawn between this sneak thief and himself was not pleasant to contemplate” (31, 96). Drayton’s 
‘innate’ honesty causes physical illness when he considers crime. 
Trenmore and Viola are likewise set apart from other Penn citizens based on their innate 
esteemed traits. Trenmore’s extreme strength, for instance, is constantly referenced; Drayton 
refers to him as a “giant” on several occasions, and only his physical strength, the “bulging 
lumps over his laboring shoulders,” allows him to ring the bell that saves their lives in the end 
(Bennett, Heads 161). Viola’s most valued traits, on the other hand, are her virtue and innocence, 
as seen when Cleverest intimates that she has had “former lovers” and she reacts with a “little, 
horrified cry” and “a burning flood of color” rushing to her face (156). Trenmore responds to 
Cleverest’s statement by physically throwing him against the wall; Viola’s virtue is so highly 
valued (and so far beyond question) that the mere act of suggesting otherwise is met with anger. 
At another point Drayton states that the police treating “Viola of the clear blue eyes and innocent 
white brow” as a criminal causes “an intolerable agony in whose endurance he alternately 
flushed red with shame and paled with ineffective rage” (74). In both instances, her male 
companions become irate that her innate qualities are questioned, precisely because those 
qualities set Drayton and his friends apart from the unsavory rulers of Penn.  
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The rulers reveal their innate corruption and malevolence through their grotesque 
physical appearance, while in the description of Viola’s ‘innocent white brow’ we see the 
converse physiognomic134 suggestion of her benevolent qualities. Bennett thus uses the language 
of physical and innate traits to indicate a more accurate method of classifying individuals than 
that used by Penn’s corrupt sovereignty. The tension between Penn’s system, and this other, 
more privileged method of labeling shows best when Drayton describes the other “convicts” 
placed under arrest: “their ugly heads were close cropped; their faces stupid and bestially cruel” 
(Bennett, Heads 85). The harsh language used to describe these men suggests that unlike 
Drayton and his friends, these convicts deserve their label and subsequent punishment, as 
evidenced by their true nature, read biologically. 
Bennett’s novel, in suggesting biological classifications of criminality, gestures towards 
eugenic rhetoric aimed at culling undesirable individuals based on ‘scientific’ reasoning. While 
Bennett’s novel overall critiques unfounded accusations against individuals, the presence of 
physiognomy in her novel nonetheless suggests the influence of contemporaneous conversations 
around social and cultural decline and criminality. One possible influence is the book The Jukes 
in 1915, written by Arthur Estabrook of the Eugenics Records Office and published in 1916. 
This volume takes up the earlier account The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease and 
Heredity by Richard Dugdale, which describes the criminal lives of the Juke family in particular 
as stemming from environmental factors (more so than heredity). Estabrook on the other hand 
emphasizes the hereditary aspect,135 noting that “not only was much of the original stock bad, but 
                                                
134 For a detailed description of physiognomy and its practice at the turn of the 20th century, see Chapters 1 and 4.  
 
135 Estabrook’s touchstones for his ideas on heredity must stem from August Weismann’s germ-plasm theory; 
although not explicitly mentioned by Estabrook, he writes sentences like: “it is probably that, in the long run, the 
cheapest way to improve a bad germ-plasm is to scatter it” (Estabrook iii). My next chapter takes up the importance 
of genetic sciences and Weismann’s theory for the literary imagination. 
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improvement which might otherwise have occurred was prevented by constant inbreeding” 
(Estabrook iii). Most importantly, in Estabrook’s view the dominant hereditary aspect of the 
Jukes is their “feeble-mindedness,” which corresponds with a tendency towards criminality; 
“indeed, assault and battery, murder, and rape are rather common,” and a change in environment 
moreover does not rid the Jukes of those criminal traits (iii). This study makes clear a 
contemporaneous concern with criminality, and how biology (discernable through physiognomy) 
influences individual behavior. Bennett’s descriptions of the other criminals as ‘bestially cruel’ 
suggests such a correspondence between physical appearance and criminality. 
One other possible influence on the physiognomic details in The Heads of Cerberus is 
Bellamy’s Looking Backward; in one chapter Bellamy’s protagonist learns about the futuristic 
method of dealing with criminality, where “all cases of atavism are treated in the hospitals,” and 
the “old state prison” has been removed entirely (Bellamy 127). Atavism here is “a word applied 
to the cases of persons in whom some trait of a remote ancestor recurred in a noticeable manner,” 
and “crime is nowadays looked upon as the recurrence of an ancestral trait” because the socialist 
society has removed all environmental causes of crime (127). Bellamy thereby suggests that a 
properly functioning socialism makes clear the hereditary aspects of undesirable traits in 
individuals, just as Bennett posits that the “truth” about individuals might be read biologically as 
a remedy to corrupt political structures (and perhaps if Bennett believed in the possibility of a 
non-corrupt form of socialism, she would agree with Bellamy’s take).  
However, while Bennett echoes physiognomic language and the type of rhetoric which 
leads to a resurgence in American fervor for eugenic practices, she also includes details which 
suggest that she does not fully recognize the racial connections in eugenic rhetoric. For instance, 
Bennett describes Trenmore as having a “fierce shaggy mane above a dark savage face”; several 
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times she repeats the image of his “great, black-maned head” (Bennett, Heads 22, 25). Trenmore 
is also Irish, a fact made clear by descriptions such as him shaking “his head like an angry bull of 
the wild Irish breed” (173). According to the eugenic conventions at the time, Trenmore should 
demonstrate criminal or other undesirable traits, as a ‘dark savage’ and member of an oft-
discriminated-against immigrant minority—even the word ‘breed’ connects to eugenic 
rhetoric.136 However, Trenmore’s innate good character remains unquestionable in Bennett’s 
narrative; Trenmore, “his faith once given, resembled a large, loyal mastiff […] ready to give at 
need all that was his, good, gains, or the strength of his great brain and body” (29). Bennett 
therefore suggests biological and physical classifications on an individual-case basis as a remedy 
to corrupt government-determined hierarchies, yet does not anticipate how extrapolating 
genetically-based conclusions to an entire population might again result in dangerous power 
dynamics. Approving of the Foucauldian trajectory from sovereignty to biopower, Bennett does 
not conceive of the possibility that in fact, a biopolitical model might likewise rest on arbitrary 
distinctions of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ as taken to an extreme in the eugenic movements of the 1920s 
and 30s. Franz Kafka, on the other hand, remains acutely aware of the corruptibility of 
governmental structures, no matter whether founded on biological hierarchies or not. 
 
III. Tortured Criminals in In the Penal Colony 
Franz Kafka, born in 1883 in Bohemia (part of what is now Austria), became one of the 
most canonical authors of the 20th century such that critics from many disciplines, including 
                                                
136 Franz Boas for instance rejects what he deems an “unprofitable discussion of the hereditary mental traits of 
various branches of the White race,” including “of the Jews, of the Gypsies, of the French and Irish,” in his writings 
against biologically-determined racism in 1938 (Boas 138). The stereotypes against Irish immigrants show as well in 
crime statistics; “an incipient racial approach to incarcerating individuals has often been alluded to in the case of the 
high incarceration rate of the Irish” in the late 19th century (Wright 120).  
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well-known theorists Walter Benjamin and Gilles Deleuze, have written on myriad aspects of 
Kafka’s works. However, more remains to be said about In the Penal Colony in particular, 
especially on Kafka’s assessment of arbitrary power structures as related to historical forms of 
government. In the Penal Colony (In der Strafkolonie) sets up a government which functions 
mainly as a sovereignty, and like Bennett, Kafka uses this fictional system to critique 
contemporaneous monarchy (or autocracy, as the Americans view it), demonstrating its 
corruption and ultimate failure through the presence of the Bakhtinian grotesque. Within the 
sovereign’s device for punishing the colony’s criminals, moreover, Kafka gestures towards a 
biopolitical method of classifying abnormality through the body, but while Bennett endorses 
such biologically-based classifications, Kafka’s ending makes clear that any hierarchical power 
structure, including biopower, ultimately remains suspect. 
 
In Kafka’s novella, a Traveler137 (“Reisende”) comes to a penal colony to oversee the 
execution of a Convict (“Verurteilte”) and take notes about the legal system at work. The 
execution takes place on a machine, made of three parts (a Bett/bed, Egge/harrow, and 
Zeichner/drawer), which carves certain words into the prisoner until he or she dies of blood loss 
after 12 hours. An Officer (“Offizier”) explains the procedure to the Traveler, hopeful that he 
will convince the Traveler of the necessity and righteous nature of this legal system, which has 
been put into place by a Commandant (“Kommandant”) who has since died and been replaced. 
However, hearing about the torture involved instead horrifies the Traveler, causing the Officer to 
execute himself with the machine, and the Traveler leaves the colony as soon as possible 
thereafter. 
                                                
137 As Kafka does not give any of his characters proper names in this story, I will refer to them by their titles for the 
sake of clarity. 
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Kafka, living most of his life in Prague, part of the Austria-Hungarian empire at the time, 
and having a connection as well to Germany through language and intellectual interests, 
experienced the final decades of two European ‘autocracies.’ In both cases, the sovereign 
governments of Germany’s Wilhelm II (1888-1918) and Austria’s Franz Joseph I (1848-1916), 
while focusing power in the hands of the emperor, also included elements of bureaucracy. 
Anthony Northey notes that “bureaucracy formed one of the mainstays of the Austro-Hungarian 
empire at the end of its life […] [and] Emperor Franz Joseph laid great stock in bureaucratic 
duty,” as seen for instance in the existence of Kafka’s own insurance company, the “Workers’ 
Accident Insurance Company for the Kingdom of Bohemia, a semigovernmental agency” 
(Northey 198, Koelb 25). James Retallack describes how in Germany as well, “the head of the 
federal state was the emperor or Kaiser,” and “although gradually an imperial bureaucracy was 
built up, federal legislation was initially drafted in the offices of the Prussian bureaucracy”; the 
emperor largely left administrative and legislative issues to the federal states (Retallack 36). 
While monarchy and bureaucracy are thus two sides to the same government, I will examine the 
significance of these contemporaneous models for Kafka’s novella individually, first focusing on 
connections to the German monarchy. 
John Röhl discusses the nature of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s rule in Germany, stating that “the 
political system of the German Kaiserreich is to be understood in essence as a monarchy” in 
which “the Kaiser and his court [...] exercised political power and decision-making authority and 
thus laid down the fundamental guidelines of domestic, foreign, and armaments policy” (Röhl 3, 
4). The German monarchy, vesting all power into the person of the Kaiser, becomes the model 
for Kafka’s fictitious government which functions primarily through the power and will of one 
man, the Commandant, who ultimately controls the “right of life” of his subjects (Foucault, 
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History of Sex 136). The “organization of the entire penal colony is his work,” and his “power” 
as a type of sovereign is seen for instance in the “palatial” nature of his home (Kafka 206, 
246).138 Just as Kaiser Wilhelm II established his “monarchy by the grace of God,” the 
Commandant also takes on religious qualities for his subjects (Röhl 5). For instance, the Officer 
speaks of him with extreme reverence and will not touch the Commandant’s old drawings until 
his hands have been washed “pure enough” (Kafka 210).139 
Like the sovereign in Bennett’s novel who wishes to keep everything “stable, 
unchanging, perennial,” here the Commandant sets up a system “so closed in itself” that “nothing 
from the old [system] is able to be changed,” ensuring that his will is carried out even after his 
death (Bakhtin 9; Kafka 206).140 The Commandant reinforces his status as the head of the 
sovereign system through state-sanctioned events of spectacle and ceremony that keep his power 
visible to his subjects. For instance, the Commandant carries out punishment of those individuals 
who commit crimes in an arena filled with spectators: at the height of his power, “already one 
day before the execution the entire valley would be overfilled with people; all came only to 
watch” (Kafka 225).141 As with Bakhtin’s descriptions of official feasts where “everyone was 
expected to appear,” at the penal colony executions “no higher officials were allowed to be 
absent,” to keep the social hierarchy present in the population’s minds (Bakhtin 10; Kafka 
                                                
138 In the original German, “die Einrichtung der ganzen Strafkolonie sein Werk ist,” “Macht,” and “Palastbauten.” 
All translations of Kafka’s writing into English are my own, unless noted otherwise.  
 
139 In the German, “seine Hände […] schienen ihm nicht rein genug.” 
 
140 In the German, “die Einrichtung der Kolonie so in sich geschlossen ist, daß [… man] nichts von dem Alten wird 
ändern können.” 
 
141 In the German, “Schon einen Tag vor der Hinrichtung war das ganze Tal von Menschen überfüllt; alle kamen nur 
um zu sehen.” 
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225).142 The new Commandant also “makes a spectacle out of” his “large meetings with all high-
ranking officials,” holding those meetings in a room with a “gallery [...] that is always full of 
spectators” (Kafka 232).143 Kaiser Wilhelm II, adhering to the old sovereign models, was equally 
concerned with maintaining the status quo through official events, using court life “to reinforce 
the vassal loyalty to the Hohenzollern monarch” (Röhl 105). Eva Giloi notes that he “extend[ed] 
ceremonial [sic] to a far greater number of festive occasions and enforc[ed] court etiquette more 
strictly,” and “the trappings of court dress and military uniforms played a significant role in 
Wilhelm’s visual extravaganza” (Giloi 269). The unusual importance the Kaiser placed on 
military uniforms is mirrored in Kafka’s novella by the Officer’s reverence for his uniform: 
when undressing he “handle[s] every garment very carefully, [and] he even r[uns] his fingers 
specially over the silver cord on his military jacket and shakes a tassel into place” (Kafka 
240).144 For both Kaiser Wilhelm and for Kafka’s Commandant and officers, then, visible 
displays of their all-encompassing power reinforce as well as reassure the population that their 
rule continues as it should. 
However, Kafka, like Bennett, adopts the sovereign model to demonstrate the potential 
for corruption inherent in a political structure where one individual controls everything. During 
the imagined scene at the new Commandant’s ‘official’ meeting, for instance, Kafka makes clear 
the corruption present among the penal colony’s elite by implying their attempts to influence the 
Traveler’s opinions about their legal system. The Officer warns that if the Traveler wishes to yell 
                                                
142 In the German, “kein hoher Beamte durfte fehlen.” 
 
143 In the German, “aus solchen Sitzungen eine Schaustellung zu machen,” “eine grosse Sitzung aller höheren 
Verwaltungsbeamten,” and “es wurde eine Galerie gebaut, die mit Zuschauern immer besetzt ist.” 
 
144 In the German, “[er] behandelte [...] jedes Kleidungsstück sehr sorgfältig, über die Silberschnüre an seinem 
Waffenrock strich er sogar eigens mit den Fingern hin und schüttelte eine Troddel zurecht.” 
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out his opinions from the gallery, “a lady’s hand will hold your mouth closed” (Kafka 230).145 
Likewise, if the Traveler does have the opportunity to speak his mind from a podium, the Officer 
tells him to “lay [his] hands visible for everyone to see, otherwise the ladies will grab them and 
play with the fingers” (234).146 This bizarre image suggests the covert way in which the penal 
colony’s elite might influence outsiders and maintain their control over the colony. 
Kafka’s portrayal of corruption within the sovereign system stems in part from the 
political discontent present in German society in the early 1900s. Röhl argues that “the 
restoration under Kaiser Wilhelm II of a genuinely functioning monarchy claiming legitimation 
by Divine Right [...] was even more forced, artificial, anachronistic, reactionary, grotesque” 
(emphasis mine) and was “bound to lead to severe tensions,” appearing as it did after the 
dissolution of most former monarchies (as in the French Revolution) (Röhl 5). Kafka’s novella 
picks up those tensions by emphasizing the arbitrary and unfair nature of the penal colony’s legal 
structure under the Commandant, who acts as judge, jury, and executioner, every position of 
importance “consolidated in his person” (Kafka 210).147 As a type of sovereign, the 
Commandant decides which crimes constitute an “insult to the superiors”148 (or put in 
Foucauldian terms, which crimes “offend the dignity of [the sovereign’s] character”) (Kafka 203; 
Foucault, Discipline 47). For instance, the Convict is condemned because he has failed to fulfill 
the arbitrary task of “stand[ing] up and salut[ing] in front of the Captain’s door” every hour 
                                                
145 In the German, “eine Damenhand hält Ihnen den Mund zu.” 
 
146 In the German, “Legen Sie die Hände für alle sichtbar hin, sonst fassen sie die Damen und spielen mit den 
Fingern.” 
 
147 In the German, “alles in sich vereinigt.” 
 
148 In the German, “Beleidigung des Vorgesetzten.” 
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throughout the night whether or not the Captain sees him, opting to sleep instead (Kafka 213).149 
The Commandant moreover decides guilt, or rather that “guilt is always doubtless,” a mandate 
that the Officer acknowledges is unique to the penal colony since “other legal structures [...] are 
many-headed and have even higher courts above them” which could overturn verdicts of guilt 
(212).150 In Kafka’s system with one head, then, legal decisions about what constitutes crime and 
guilt rest with the sovereign Commandant, who likewise determines and oversees proper 
punishment for convicted criminals. 
Not only are all aspects of the law arbitrarily decided by one individual, the potential for 
corruption is increased by the imbalance of knowledge available to the sovereign versus to his 
subjects. As in The Heads of Cerberus, in Kafka’s penal colony the “criminal procedure, right up 
to the sentence, remain[s] secret” with the prisoner having no “knowledge either of the charges 
or of the evidence,” and only those in positions of power are privy to knowledge (Foucault, 
Discipline 35). The Officer tells the Traveler that the old Commandant used to provide all 
explanations of the legal procedures, and that the Traveler, as “such an exalted visitor,” likewise 
deserves knowledge of the procedures (Kafka 210).151 The Convict, on the other hand, “does not 
know his own sentence,” or “that he has been convicted at all,” which the Officer relays to the 
Traveler as self-evident (211).152 Although the Convict attempts to follow the Officer’s 
                                                
149 In the German, “Er hat nämlich die Pflicht, bei jedem Stundenschlag aufzustehen und vor der Tür des 
Hauptmanns zu salutieren.” 
 
150 In the German, “Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos” and “Andere Gerichte können diesen Grundsatz nicht 
befolgen, denn sie sind vielköpfig und haben auch noch höhere Gerichte über sich.” 
 
151 In the German, “einen so hohen Besuch.” 
 




explanations, those explanations occur in a language he does not speak, so that he remains 
voiceless and uninformed during the entire process of his conviction and punishment.  
The obscured nature of the colony’s legal system reflects not only the sovereign’s ability 
to arbitrarily decide an individual’s fate, but also the incomprehensibility of contemporaneous 
bureaucratic law. The Traveler’s position as an outsider able to pass ‘objective’ judgment on the 
penal colony’s legal system leads to the Officer’s insistence that the Traveler use his influence to 
convince the new Commandant that the system must remain as it has always been. In the 
Officer’s long imagined scene of how the Traveler will speak with the new Commandant, 
Kafka’s prose becomes properly Kafkaesque as the Officer’s insights demonstrate the 
bureaucratic side of the sovereign penal colony. Reza Banakar explains how Kafka’s work in 
various legal capacities, as an insurance lawyer and a student of criminal law under Hans Gross 
and Alfred Weber,153 influences his stories, in particular the bureaucratic tales The Trial and The 
Castle. Banakar illuminates the “paradox that lies at the heart of the relationship between modern 
law, which strives toward generality and universality, and justice, which requires the recognition 
of singularity and specificity”; in other words, individuals in contact with the law must deal with 
general laws which nevertheless in some cases do not fit their singular situations (Banakar 480). 
According to Banakar, Kafka interprets this paradox in his stories by creating a form of law that 
“encompassed not only an understanding of law as an organizing tool of Gesellschaft (i.e., the 
top-down structure of state law) but also a consideration of law as it is experienced by the 
modern individual” (481). Put another way, Kafka’s speculative legal structure is “highly 
bureaucratic in a modern rational sense, but overtly arbitrary and nonrational with respect to its 
substantive outcomes and judgments” because of the disconnect between the law as theorized, 
                                                
153 Kafka studied law at the University of Prague and graduated “under the pro forma direction of Alfred Weber” 
with a J.D. degree in 1906 (Koelb 20). 
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and the law as actually experienced (479). Kafka marks this disconnect at several moments in his 
novella, critiquing bureaucratic law at the level of language, through a break between signifier 
and signified, and at the level of sentencing, where the reasoning behind the punishment and the 
criminal’s experience of that punishment is disjointed. 
Kafka highlights the absurdity of bureaucracy through the proclamations of the Officer 
about his beloved machine and government, where a rupture exists between the Officer’s 
intended meaning (signifier), and the meaning the Traveler (and reader) can find in his 
statements (signified). Banakar identifies Kafka’s “rhetoric” as a result of his familiarity with 
“legal forms of ‘double thought’,” with the difficulty in legal systems of constructing words and 
phrases carefully to either allow or disallow multiple meanings (Banakar 477). While Banakar 
connects ‘double thought’ to contradictions within other Kafka stories, the following explanation 
succinctly summarizes its importance in In the Penal Colony as well: 
Kafka’s “rhetoric”—which exploits discourses’ openness to divergent interpretations, 
allowing him to identify and employ “double thoughts” in his narratives—places him in 
the company of postmodern writers and legal scholars whose works often highlight the 
fragmentary, contradictory, and paradoxical nature of modern law. (477) 
 
The Officer remains convinced of the value of the penal colony’s method of punishment, and 
states for instance that during executions spectators would sometimes close their eyes in 
supposed bliss for “they knew: now Justice will happen” (Kafka 226).154 After hearing a long 
description of the machine’s lengthy torture process, the Traveler however certainly does not 
think of such executions as justice, and those spectators might just as well close their eyes in 
horror instead. While the Officer assumes that the Traveler finds this system “the most human 
and humane,” his actual opinion is the opposite (229).155 
                                                
154 In the German, “[sie] lagen mit geschlossenen Augen im Sand; alle wußten: Jetzt geschieht Gerechtigkeit.” 
 
155 In the German, “das menschlichste und menschenwürdigste.” 
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In fact, the Officer speculates that in his conversation with the new Commandant, the 
Traveler’s thoughts will be twisted from pro-execution machine to anti-machine, when in fact the 
Traveler has already made clear his position as anti-machine. For instance, the Officer says to the 
Traveler, “Your judgment is certainly already made; if however some small uncertainties should 
remain, the sight of the execution will remove them” (Kafka 231).156 The reader knows in this 
moment that the Traveler’s judgment is already made against the machine’s execution method, 
and that having to watch such torture would certainly strengthen that opinion, while the Officer 
assumes that the Traveler will be delighted by the viewing and lose all doubts about the 
machine’s fairness. Later, the Officer again states that “for the resentfulness that one will notice 
in you [the Traveler], there is plenty cause, even if not for the reasons the Commandant thinks”; 
the Officer assumes the Traveler’s resentment of the procedure will stem from the current 
Commandant’s budget-cuts, which have forced the machine into disrepair (232).157 However, the 
Traveler’s resentment would stem from exactly the reasons that the new Commandant would 
assume: that the mechanical execution is inhumane and outdated. Through such instances of 
double-speak, Kafka points out the inherent obscure and undecipherable nature of bureaucratic 
communications.  
A disconnect between intended meaning and actual experience occurs moreover in the 
carrying out of the legal sentencing; in the penal colony, the criminal is condemned to have his 
crime “written onto the body” in front of an audience, so that everyone including the criminal 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
156 In the German, “Ihr Urteil steht gewiß schon fest; sollten noch kleine Unsicherheiten bestehen, so wird sie der 
Anblick der Exekution beseitigen.” 
 
157 In the German, “Für die Verbitterung, die man Ihnen anmerken soll, ist ja genügend Anlaß, wenn auch nicht im 
Sinne des Kommandanten.” 
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will understand the nature of his transgression (Kafka 210).158 However, the writing used in the 
machine is unreadable to all but the Officer. The words are indecipherable; as Britta Pawlak 
points out, “in the unreadable, cryptic drawings of the old Commandant […] is mirrored the 
intransparency and the arbitrariness of the judicial evidence-gathering,” i.e. the Captain’s 
complaint against the Convict (Pawlak 14).159 The sovereign uses public torture to “publish the 
truth of the crime in the very body of the man to be executed,” yet without a trial the criminal is 
not privy to the logic that has ascertained the ‘truth’ of the crime, nor can the criminal ‘read’ his 
crime prior to his punishment (Foucault, Discipline 44). Instead of becoming enlightened, 
therefore, the criminal is alienated when the phrase representing his crime—in the case of the 
Convict, “Honor your Superiors”—is tattooed into his skin (Kafka 210).160 For someone like the 
Convict who has not been given any indications of his new classification as condemned criminal, 
the carrying out of his sentence causes self-estrangement as his classification becomes a 
permanent mark on his skin. On a large, theoretical scale the execution machine perhaps 
achieves its goals, but on the smaller scale, it fails to produce a compliant subject because its 
intentions (in the form of written commands) remain obscured, just as bureaucratic law fails in 
the ‘experience’ of the ‘modern individual.’ 
 
Kafka thus demonstrates the arbitrary nature of the penal colony’s method of governance 
to indict the European monarchies and their version of modern bureaucracy. In the remaining 
sections, I will focus primarily on the moment of punishment, so alienating to the ‘criminal,’ as 
                                                
158 In the German, “auf den Leib geschrieben.” 
 
159 For German critical works that have not been translated into English, such as Pawlak’s book, all translations into 
English are my own. In the German, “In den unleserlichen, kryptisch erscheinenden Zeichnungen des alten 
Kommandanten […] spiegeln sich die Intransparenz und die Beliebigkeit des Beweisverfahrens.” 
 
160 In the German, “Ehre deinen Vorgesetzten!” 
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reinforcing the inherent failures of the penal colony’s power structure through the aesthetic 
grotesque, and as gesturing towards a new biopolitical mode of power which likewise ultimately 
breaks down. The execution machine of the penal colony, rather than enforcing the sovereign’s 
desired norms of behavior and maintaining the status quo, turns those it encounters into 
grotesque bodies through its very mechanism. Bakhtin describes grotesque bodies as marked by 
“convexities and orifices” where “the confines between […] the body and the world are 
overcome”; as previously mentioned, such bodies “display not only the outward but also the 
inner features of the body: blood, bowels, heart and other organs” (Bakhtin 317, 318). Kafka’s 
machine enacts such border-erasing through multiple facets: first, the Convict must lie face-
down on the machine and take a piece of grimy cloth into his mouth, upon which he “closes his 
eyes in irresistible nausea and vomits” (Kafka 223).161 His stomach contents become outward, 
just as the machine’s workings will later cause the Officer’s blood to “pour in a hundred 
streams” out of his body (245).162 The machine, by writing163 on the body, moreover makes that 
body grotesque in permeating the otherwise closed border of skin, forcing contact to the outside 
world (and to the machine) through newly created ‘orifices.’164 
The grotesque is further seen in the animalistic traits developed in those subjected to the 
penal colony’s power structure. Bakhtin states that “the combination of human and animal traits 
is, as we know, one of the most ancient grotesque forms,” and on the first page Kafka describes 
how the Convict looks “dog-like” in his position as prisoner, covered in chains (Bakhtin 316, 
                                                
161 In the German, “als der Verurteilte in einem unwiderstehlichen Brechreiz die Augen schloß und sich erbrach.” 
 
162 In the German, “Das Blut floß in hundert Strömen.” 
 
163 The script used to write on the body is also grotesque; it incorporates “labyrinthine lines constantly crossing” 
(“labyrinthartige, einander vielfach kreuzende Linien”) (Kafka 217). 
 
164 Just as the sovereign killing pit in Bennett’s novel ‘impales’ prisoners thrown in, Kafka’s execution machine 
likewise impales its victims with several small spikes. 
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Kafka 203).165 The Convict’s obedience is clear from the humorous observation that he looks so 
much like a dog that one feels “one could let him run around free on the hills and at the start of 
the execution would only need to whistle, for him to come back” (Kafka 203-4).166 As his 
punishment is meant to begin, the Convict’s clothes are ripped from him even though he tries “to 
grasp the falling things, to cover his nakedness”; here again the system requires its objects to lose 
their humanity (220).167 Once strapped into the machine, the Convict immediately “begins to 
snap up the mush [rice pudding] with his tongue”; although in imminent danger, he becomes 
animalistic in caring only about his hunger, oblivious to the intricacies of the situation in which 
he finds himself (227).168 The legal system of the penal colony through its mechanism of 
punishment thus causes those within to become physically grotesque, losing their human sense of 
self and bodily autonomy rather than moving closer to the colony’s desired norms. 
The colony’s execution machine, which therefore participates in the failures of the 
sovereign/bureaucratic government model already in place, simultaneously gestures towards a 
new biopolitical mode which might follow. Like Bennett, Kafka provides hints of a turn to a 
biologically-based system of classifying people, as the execution machine causes an individual’s 
crimes to be “written onto the body” for all to see. The machine is built in a way that highlights 
that crime for the rest of society; “in order to make it possible for everyone to monitor the 
carrying out of the verdict, the Egge was made out of glass” to not obscure sight, simultaneously 
                                                
165 In the German, “hündisch,” a word which also implies a canine (slavish) devotion. 
 
166 In the German, “als könnte man ihn frei auf den Abhängen herumlaufen lassen und müsse bei Beginn der 
Exekution nur pfeifen, damit er käme.” 
 
167 In the German, “er wollte nach dem fallenden Zeug greifen, um seine Blöße zu bedecken.” 
 
168 In the German, “als er mit der Zunge nach dem Brei zu schnappen begann.” 
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writing and spraying water to keep blood from obscuring the words (Kafka 215).169 While the 
length of punishment remains the same in Kafka’s work, the words being carved into the 
criminal change according to the crime, so that the criminal’s body becomes a legible 
representation of their ‘abnormality.’ Mark Anderson also notes that the ‘tattoo’ punishment 
references Lombroso’s thought that “certain human types—‘born’ criminals [...]—displayed 
symptoms of ‘graphomania’ ” and therefore often “had tattoos applied to large parts of their 
bodies” (Anderson 178).170 The machine, thus recalling contemporaneous theories of 
biologically-based ‘abnormality,’ moreover does the work of removing that abnormality from 
society through death. After 12 hours, the criminal has lost enough blood to succumb to his 
injuries and his corpse is thrown by the machine into a ditch, symbolically separate and no 
longer harmful to the health of the penal colony. 
Critic Britta Pawlak has written a thought-provoking piece on the presence of biopower 
in Kafka’s novella, investigating “to what degree the barbaric punishment ritual, in whose center 
a highly-technical execution-apparatus stands, is steeped in modern power mechanisms, and [to 
what degree] the transition to biopolitics is reflected in In the Penal Colony” (Pawlak 10).171 
Pawlak compares the Officer’s beloved apparatus to the Hollerith-Machine invented by Heinrich 
Rauchberg, which analyzes data and statistics about individuals, stating that the Officer’s 
machine, collecting data from human flesh, operates the same as the Hollerith-Machine 
                                                
169 In the German, “Um es nun jedem zu ermöglichen, die Ausführung des Urteils zu überprüfen, wurde die Egge 
aus Glas gemacht.” 
 
170 Anderson’s book Kafka’s Clothes provides several insights into Kafka’s relation to physiognomic thought during 
his time, although Anderson’s reading of In the Penal Colony remains focused on ornament, the aesthetic, and 
Kafka’s meta-commentary on his own writing style. 
 
171 In the German, “Inwiefern das barbarische Strafritual bei Kafka, in dessen Zentrum eine hochtechnisierte 
Hinrichtungsapparatur steht, von ‘modernen’ Machtmechanismen durchdrungen ist und sich in der Strafkolonie 
bereits der Übergang zur Biopolitik niederschlägt.” 
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collecting and sorting data from “Individual-Cards” containing information about citizens (27). 
She also takes a quote about the “dim-witted wide-mouthed man [Convict] with shabby hair and 
face” as possibly referencing “the beginning of race-biology thoughts, according to which a 
person deemed ‘lowly’ or ‘degenerate’ is no longer considered human and therefore does not 
deserve pity”172 (Kafka 203, Pawlak 33).  
While Pawlak’s insights reinforce the possibility of the execution machine as biopolitical, 
her evidence misses the significance of Kafka’s critique of modern power structures—Kafka 
makes clear the arbitrary and corruptible nature of not only sovereignty and bureaucracy, but 
also of biopower and any structure that might follow. Rather than collecting data from flesh (as 
with the Hollerith-Machine), the colony’s apparatus is only shown as imparting information onto 
the body through its tattoos. Moreover, once placed onto the machine the body is rendered 
immediately grotesque, therefore blocking the machine from collecting accurate data about that 
body in its usual state. Most importantly, in the final pages of the novella the machine entirely 
falls apart, marking the failure of biopower. At the end of the novella, the Officer suddenly 
decides that he has become criminal himself in failing to follow the order, “Be Just” (Kafka 
238).173 Upon learning of the Traveler’s negative opinion of his beloved machine, the Officer 
experiences his own moment of ‘enlightenment’; “with clear eyes” he places himself on the 
machine, becoming the ‘abnormal’ body to be corrected rather than an enforcer of norms 
(236).174 Unfortunately for the Officer, the machine malfunctions, stabbing him so quickly that 
                                                
172 In the German, “der Verurteilte, ein stumpfsinniger, breitmäuliger Mensch mit verwahrlostem Haar und Gesicht,” 
and “Möglicherweise spielt Kafkas Erzählung hier auf ein beginnendes rassenbiologistisches Denken an, nach 
welchem einem als ‘nieder’ und ‘entartet’ angesehenen Individuum das Menschsein aberkannt wird und es demnach 
kein Mitleid verdient hat.” 
 
173 In the German, “Sei gerecht!” 
 
174 In the German, “mit hellen Augen.” Just as those in power in Bennett’s novel become part of the spectacle, here 
the abhorrent manner in which the Officer dies makes him a spectacle as well. 
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he dies without experiencing the clarity promised to criminals in the 6th hour, and leaving his 
body a mangled mess rather than a legible representation of his crime. 
Not only is the Officer consumed and destroyed by the legal apparatus he supports, the 
killing machine itself begins to explode its parts into the air and break down entirely. The 
machine consumes itself, vomiting its inner workings one by one onto the ground, and becoming 
grotesque in that act of vomiting. Nicholas Dungey elaborates that in this moment “the act of 
defining and naming, and the discursive powers from which it flows, are circular and unstable. 
As circumstances and those in power change, so too does the dominant paradigm of whom and 
what is normal and abnormal” (Dungey 36). Although Dungey remarks that the reversal of 
Officer and Convict as criminal is troubling in suggesting that “we are all equally susceptible to 
the strategic exercise of […] marginalizing judgment” (implying that the colony’s mechanism 
does succeed in controlling its subjects), I find that the arbitrary nature of the penal colony’s 
categories suggests instead the corruptibility of biopower, alongside those power models which 
precede it (36).  
Kafka’s critique of biopower as equally grotesque and arbitrary as bureaucratic 
sovereignty, in contrast to Bennett’s hopeful portrayal of such a biological mechanism, stems 
perhaps from his awareness of the changing nature of criminal law in Europe at the turn of the 
20th century. Kafka, as a student of the criminologist Hans Gross, was certainly aware of Gross’s 
support for “the creation of penal colonies and the deportation of ‘degenerates’ who must be 
removed from society” (Pawlak 9). Gross was an avid follower of Lombroso’s theories about 
physiognomy and criminality, and for Gross, “prostitutes, homosexuals, gypsies, anarchists, the 
mentally insane, and to a certain extent Jews and women, all exhibited [...] physiological and 
moral traits resembling those of the ‘born’ criminal” (emphasis mine) (Anderson 148). As 
 144 
Foucault states, “once the mechanism of biocriminal was called upon to make it possible to 
execute or banish criminals, criminality was conceptualized in racist terms”; in other words, the 
addition of biological considerations to labels of abnormality allowed the type of discrimination 
already prevalent in German culture at the time (Society 258). Röhl notes that “anti-Semitism of 
the salon, consisting of personal prejudice and collective but still informal discrimination against 
Jews [...] was the type of anti-Semitism with which the Jewish minority [...] was faced in the 
imperial period” under Kaiser Wilhelm II (Röhl 194). Anti-Semitic writings and speeches by 
celebrities such as Richard Wagner, Otto Weininger, and Karl Kraus moreover prove a similar 
“anti-Semitic atmosphere of the Austro-Hungarian fin de siècle,” so that Kafka was faced with 
such racism from multiple directions (Anderson 198). Kafka, as a Jewish man,175 therefore 
would have been wary of biologically-based decisions about criminality, perhaps even using In 
the Penal Colony to directly push against his professor’s beliefs. 
Rolf Zimmermann contends that Octave Mirbeau’s novel Le Jardin des Supplices from 
1899 heavily influences Kafka’s novella, not only in content (both deal with torture), but because 
Mirbeau is one of the few authors in France who sides with Émile Zola in favor of Alfred 
Dreyfus, in the infamous Dreyfus Affair (Zimmermann 184).176 As evidence that Kafka’s novella 
in part refers to Dreyfus, Zimmermann points to several factors such as the story’s location, on 
an island easily linked to the Île de Diable where Dreyfus serves his banishment, and to the fact 
                                                
175 Clayton Koelb describes how Kafka’s father suppressed their Jewish roots during Kafka’s early life, so that he 
grew up speaking only German, but that Kafka began to immerse himself in Jewish culture in 1911 following a 
theater performance by Yiddish players. Prejudice and general anti-Semitism meant that “Austrian Jews were still in 
many ways second-class citizens” during his lifetime, giving Kafka a sense of the ‘outsider’ or minority position 
which became a major theme of his writing (most famously, in The Metamorphosis) (Koelb 12). 
 
176 Zimmermann goes on to show how Kafka’s story accurately predicts the concentration camps of the Nazis and 
the gulags in Russia, to support his overall argument that speculative settings allow authors to write in a way that 
moves beyond their own contemporaneous historical settings, while my own argument remains focused on those 
historical settings.  
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that the Officer and Traveler converse in French (186). The Dreyfus Affair involves the 
condemnation of an innocent man largely based on his Jewishness, in the European anti-Semitic 
climate at the turn of the 20th century. Kafka’s own Jewish heritage, his position as an ‘outsider’ 
(as evidenced by many critics), explains his critique of the type of ‘natural law’ endorsed by 
Bennett’s novel. Critic Sander Gilman points out that Kafka “avoids any mention of the 
Jewishness of the prisoner[;] neither the word ‘Jew’ nor any easily decoded reference appears” in 
his novella (Gilman 82). However, through images of torture, Gilman highlights an implicit link 
to the Dreyfus Affair, stating that “for Kafka, the lesson of the Dreyfus case was that Dreyfus 
[…] remained the condemned Jew” even after his innocence was proven (85). Kafka’s relation to 
biopolitical thought therefore is twofold: he refuses an explicit portrayal of biological categories 
which condemn Jewishness as ‘abnormal,’ while simultaneously referencing the harmful effects 
of such categorization. Kafka, like Dreyfus, would find himself on the wrong end of a legal 
system based on biological classifications.  
 
If Kafka critiques both more traditional power structures such as sovereignty, as well as 
the beginnings of biopower, as ultimately arbitrary and corrupt, failing in their intentions, what 
alternatives does he provide? In fact, it is Kafka’s refusal to speculate on possible well-
functioning legal systems that renders his novella particularly insightful. Unlike Bennett, Kafka 
ends In the Penal Colony with an intentional rejection of alternatives, instead suggesting the 
inescapability of power structures aimed at organizing populations according to arbitrary 
hierarchies. Kafka hints at further alternatives through the character of the new Commandant, 
who apparently has ideas for changes which have not yet been implemented. The Officer states 
that the “new one [Commandant] has already shown the desire to mix himself in [the Officer’s] 
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justice system,” but so far the Officer has been able to “fend him off” (Kafka 212).177 His 
comments lead the Traveler to “place many hopes in the new Commandant, who apparently, 
even if slowly, was intending to introduce a new system,” and who is clearly “no supporter of the 
[old] system, and acts almost hostile towards the Officer” (214, 223).178 The Traveler seems to 
assume that a new system would be modeled more closely after modern laws, without the use of 
torture or execution. This is corroborated by the fact that the new Commandant has done away 
with the budget for the execution machine parts (in the Officer’s mind, as a “pretense to fight old 
infrastructures”) (221).179  
While Kafka therefore hints at a new legal system to replace the old, he never gives 
explicit indications of what that system might look like. The closest indication of a new system 
comes during the Officer’s speech of hypotheticals, when he speculates on what the new 
Commandant will say:  
‘A great researcher [the Traveler] […] has just said that our legal system based on old 
customs is inhumane. After this verdict from such a personage I am obviously no longer 
able to tolerate this [old] system. As of today, therefore, I mandate that—and so on 
[usw.].’ (Kafka 229)180 
 
The Officer uses the abbreviation “usw.” to indicate that the Commandant would next enumerate 
which new mandates he will use to replace the old, but the Officer’s speculation ends there 
                                                
177 In the German, “Der neue hat allerdings schon Lust gezeigt, in mein Gericht sich einzumischen, es ist mir aber 
bisher gelungen, ihn abzuwehren…” 
 
178 In the German, “Außerdem aber setze er einige Hoffnung auf den neuen Kommandanten, der offenbar, allerdings 
langsam, ein neues Verfahren einzuführen beabsichtigte…”; and “der Kommandant […] kein Anhänger dieses 
Verfahrens war und sich gegenüber dem Offizier fast feindselig verhielt.” 
 
179 In the German, “wie der neue Kommandant behauptet, dem alles nur zum Vorwand dient, alte Einrichtungen zu 
bekämpfen.” 
 
180 In the German, “ ‘Ein großer Forscher […] hat eben gesagt, daß unser Verfahren nach altem Brauch ein 
unmenschliches ist. Nach diesem Urteil einer solchen Persönlichkeit ist es mir natürlich nicht mehr möglich, dieses 




abruptly. Kafka, at first introducing the hope that a less troubling legal system might soon be 
implemented in the penal colony, thus refuses details of what might replace the old.  
Instead, Kafka ends his novella with a sense of futility, that in fact the system will not 
change (the old Commandant has after all ensured that “nothing from the old [system] is able to 
be changed”), by emphasizing the continued presence of the old Commandant. Even though the 
Officer admits that there are “no more open supporters” of the old legal system in the penal 
colony, he insists that “the supporters have holed up, there are still many, but they do not admit 
it” (Kafka 224).181 Not only his supporters, but also the old Commandant himself remain present 
in the colony, his burial place in a teahouse under a table where men gather and drink. The 
engraving on his headstone holds an ominous tone, stating that “there is a prophecy, that the 
Commandant will be resurrected after a certain number of years and will lead his supporters out 
of this house to reconquer the colony. Believe and wait!” (247).182 Soon after reading this 
headstone, the Traveler abruptly flees the colony, violently forcing the Convict and his guard to 
remain behind; his refusal to let them on his boat suggests that they remain entrapped in the old 
system, even if the Convict has escaped his imminent execution. Kafka’s novella, displaying the 
Foucauldian trajectory from sovereignty to biopower like The Heads of Cerberus, nevertheless 
ends without alternatives to such corruptible forms of governance and suggests instead a 
wariness of whatever future system might follow.  
 
 
                                                
181 In the German, “infolgedessen haben sich die Anhänger verkrochen, es gibt noch viele, aber keiner gesteht es 
ein.” 
 
182 In the German, “Es besteht eine Prophezeiung, daß der Kommandant nach einer bestimmten Anzahl von Jahren 





 The Heads of Cerberus and In the Penal Colony reveal the inherent failures of systems of 
government which force arbitrary norms onto entire populations, even, in the case of Kafka, 
when those norms are attached to biological ‘science.’ Bennett and Kafka use the figure of the 
criminal in particular to demonstrate the consequences to individuals classified and punished by 
power structures which do not take into account their personal circumstances. However, 
classifications of criminality based on (supposedly) less arbitrary means, for instance through the 
practice of physiognomy, introduce their own problematic consequences. As criminology moves 
towards an interest in sussing out and containing the biologically ‘dangerous individual,’ 
criminality becomes conflated with the idea of monstrosity. Stefan Andriopoulos points out, 
following Foucault, that in the early 20th century the definition of ‘criminal’ changes:  
A delinquente nato [born criminal] is not a criminal in the juridical sense, not a legal 
body with free will, who has committed an offense, but rather a ‘dangerous monster’ with 
specific anatomical stigmata, from whom society must be protected. (Andriopoulos 52)183 
 
My next chapter looks at two stories from 1931, which reflect this new biological mode of 
labeling the individual, and which extrapolate perceived ‘monstrosity’ as a justification for the 
larger-scale biopolitical and eugenic actions aimed at certain population categories. 
                                                
183 In the German, “Ein delinquente nato ist nicht ein Verbrecher im juristischen Sinn, also nicht ein Rechtssubjekt 
mit freiem Willen, das ein Delikt ausgeführt hat, sondern ein ‘gefährliches Monster’ mit bestimmten anatomischen 
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CHAPTER 4: GENETIC MONSTERS: 
H.P. LOVECRAFT AND FRITZ LANG184 
I. Introduction 
 The monster has long dominated our imagination; Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park in 
Wonders and the Order of Nature locate depictions of humanized monsters as early as the 15th 
century. Previously the term ‘monster’ referred to flora and fauna, but in the 15th century the 
term became anthropocentric, encompassing “men completely wild in appearance and way of 
life” (Daston and Park 175). During the 16th century in particular, monstrosity was associated 
with physiological difference, in the form of babies with deformities, and these births provoked a 
horror stemming from “the perceived violation of moral norms” (181). The term ‘monster,’ then, 
applied to human-like beings whose abnormal appearance was seen as “divine retribution in 
response to human sin” (181). In the 20th century, the concept of ‘monster’ still conveyed a sense 
of horror, and of moral violation, as certain actions or behaviors were deemed monstrous (for 
instance in the case of violent criminals). However, advances in science and medicine shifted the 
focus from mystical causes to biological ones, and ‘monster’ no longer applied only to those with 
outward differences. Instead, in the 20th century “monstrosity and grotesquerie merge in the 
hybrid forms that disrupt the borders separating what is acceptable within the categories of 
‘human’ and ‘non-human’ ” (Edwards 40). Defining the monstrous thus becomes the task of 
revealing visible and invisible markers of the crossing between human and nonhuman. 
                                                
184 Portions of this chapter, on Fritz Lang’s M, previously appeared as an article in the University of Toronto 
Quarterly. The citation is as follows: Kuhn, Lina. “Oh the Monstrosity: Vigilante Mobs and Biopolitical Justice in 
1930s Film.” U. of Toronto Quarterly 87.1 (Winter 2018): 62-80. Print. 
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In this chapter, I look at how the new paradigm of partially-hidden monstrosity becomes 
conflated with contemporaneous genetic science’s investment in determining the invisible causes 
behind human development. Many scientists explored the significance of Darwin’s theories of 
evolution for human society at the turn of the 20th century; two in particular tied genetics and 
character development together. The first is August Weismann, whose germ-plasm theory from 
the late 19th century states that “all the biological information for organic development inhere[s] 
in the germ plasm of the sex cells,” meaning that genetics, rather than external factors, holds 
primary influence over an individual’s development (Lovett-Graff 176). This theory confirmed 
the “notion that not only were individuals the cumulative products of their unvaried, randomly 
generated genetic heritage, but, more significantly, they were stuck within that heritage” (177). 
As Richard Hofstadter points out in Social Darwinism in American Thought, “Weismann’s 
germ-plasm theory stimulated a hereditarian approach to social theory”; if an individual’s actions 
were the result of their biological background, consequent responses to those actions would need 
to be based on that background as well (Hofstadter 163). 
 Weismann’s contemporary Ernst Haeckel also published theories about evolution and 
biology that caused him to be labeled a social Darwinist. Haeckel believed that “ontogenesis, or 
the development of the individual, is a short and quick repetition (recapitulation) of 
phylogenesis, or the development of the tribe to which it belongs, determined by the laws of 
inheritance and adaptation” (Haeckel 310). In other words, for Haeckel one’s development was 
determined by the longer historical development of one’s particular race (Haeckel believed in ten 
distinct human races). Following Haeckel, individual actions could then be generalized as 
directly corresponding to their biological heritage, including their race or ethnicity.  
 154 
For both Weismann and Haeckel, therefore, one’s genetic past was a large determinant of 
one’s physical and mental development, although of course the technological tools for laying 
bare that past through genetic mapping did not yet exist. Instead, the early 1900s saw a renewed 
interest in professional expertise in physiognomy and phrenology as methods of rendering 
genetics visible (Seitler ch. “Late Modern Morphologies”). The ‘scientific’ practice of 
physiognomy, of reading facial features to reveal biological ‘truths’ about an individual, was in 
part an attempt to regain control over the perceived decline (or degeneration) of a culture. As 
Dana Seitler explains in Atavistic Tendencies, biologists following Darwin “understood the 
evolutionary concept of retrogression not simply as a possibility, but as an actuality and a threat” 
(3). Only by making racial background readable through scientific means could society classify 
and contain those individuals who threatened it. The internalization of monstrosity, where 
outward appearance no longer necessarily contains obvious markers of one’s inner nature, 
therefore precipitates the emergence of new professional methods for detecting and interpreting 
monstrous qualities. As Michel Foucault states in his lectures on the ‘abnormal,’ “the recurring 
problem of the nineteenth century is that of discovering the core of monstrosity hidden behind 
little abnormalities, deviances, and irregularities,” a preoccupation which continues into the 20th 
century (Foucault 56).  
In the humanities, literature and film act as equally expert technologies, able to bring 
inner and outer qualities into focus, to make visible otherwise unknowable or unexplored 
possibilities. For H. P. Lovecraft’s The Shadow Over Innsmouth and Fritz Lang’s M from 1931, 
the logic of genetics in the 1920s and 30s185 drives the plot of danger hiding beneath a seemingly 
                                                
185 Theories related to biology and genetics circulated freely at the turn of the 20th century across the United States 
and Europe, as evidenced for instance by the correspondence between Darwin and Haeckel (Kelly). Lovecraft read 
theory by American, English, and German scientists with equal interest, and even for Lang, not explicitly interested 
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‘normal’ human exterior. The stories’ protagonists carry a hidden monstrosity which calls into 
question their humanity, and both stories turn to scientific tools such as physiognomy and 
genetic inheritance to interpret those moments where monstrosity reaches the surface and 
becomes visible. For Lovecraft’s narrator, his monstrosity comes from generations of 
interbreeding between humans and aliens, whose progeny are biologically human and non-
human, and who violate social morals in the act of procreation. In Lang’s film, a man who 
abducts and kills young girls is labeled a monster and condemned by the community from the 
start; his actions are so particularly heinous that he is seen as inhuman.  
Both Lang’s killer and Lovecraft’s narrator do not at first glance outwardly show their 
monstrous quality, and in both cases, the horror of the stories arises from the hidden quality of 
the monstrous. Monstrosity “in its movement back and forth between the exterior and the interior 
of the body, its surface and its depth, […] seems intent on concealing itself in the hidden, 
impenetrable spaces beneath the surface,” making categorization the most pressing concern 
(Hantke 34). Lovecraft and Lang both posit physiognomy as a potential solution to that concern, 
highlighting moments of visible genetics through the aesthetic trope of the grotesque face, as 
defined by Mikhail Bakhtin. In their stories, the aesthetic grotesque provides the impetus for 
physiognomic readings of their characters, which in turn supply potential taxonomies of the 
characters’ personality traits and genetic background. Thus the grotesque occurs where the 
division between surface and depth, visible and invisible, collapses and hidden monstrosity rears 
its ugly head.  
In The Shadow Over Innsmouth and M, the moments where the monstrous appears briefly 
on the surface are moreover closely linked with characters’ most intense emotional outbursts, 
                                                                                                                                                       
in Darwinism, the general debate around nature or nurture dictating a person’s development would have been ever-
present (Hofstadter, ch. “Evolution, Ethics, and Society”). 
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both in horror and sympathy. Looking at moments of grotesqueness and the character reactions it 
provokes (neither wholly benevolent, nor wholly negative) thus brings into relief the fraught 
nature of subsequent social and governmental response. In these two stories, that response is 
biopolitical in attempting to classify, to make visible and knowable the nature of the monstrosity, 
and then in trying to control the underlying genetics through eugenics. However, in both stories 
classifications of ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ break down, and as a consequence in Lovecraft’s 
tale eugenics fails because it is predicated on a falsely constructed hierarchy, and in Lang’s film 
the proper course of action, eugenics or institutionalization, cannot be decided. Lovecraft and 
Lang have almost opposite political views (Lovecraft’s infamous racism, versus Lang’s rejection 
of fascism), yet their constructed tales operate under the same logic of genetics, and for both that 
logic leads to the collapse of biopolitical categorization, without offering alternate solutions to 
the problem of monstrosity among humans. Lovecraft and Lang pose the question: How are we 
to react to monstrosity, once brought to the surface, when that monstrosity is merely an estranged 
version of humanity, recognizable yet horror-provoking? 
 
II. Monstrous Aliens in The Shadow Over Innsmouth 
Howard Phillips Lovecraft, born in 1890 in Rhode Island, spent most of his life devoted 
to writing weird, fantastic, and horror fiction, whose singular nature has spawned a cult 
following. Lovecraft died in 1937, yet only in recent years has his fiction been taken up by 
literary scholars as rich ground for analysis,186 in part due to the efforts of biographer S. T. Joshi 
who links Lovecraft to the biological and eugenic debates of his time. The logic of Haeckel and 
                                                
186 One reason that Lovecraft has been previously overlooked is due to the genre of his writing: science fiction in 
general still holds a stigma as non-serious, frivolous, or unworthy of critical attention in academic circles, although 
works such as Fredric Jameson’s Archaeologies of the Future show the tide turning. 
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Weismann’s genetics drives The Shadow Over Innsmouth’s plot of danger hiding beneath a 
seemingly ‘normal’ human exterior. Only by making racial background readable through 
scientific means could society classify and contain those individuals who ‘threatened’ it. 
Eugenics, using genetic background as the justification for reproductive control of groups 
deemed inferior, became one such response aimed at correcting social decline. Hofstadter shows 
how eugenic ideas about actively shaping human development gained popularity in the United 
States during the first decades of the 20th century via England, mainly through the writings of 
Francis Galton, Darwin’s cousin. Galton was also a strong proponent of physiognomy (as were 
many eugenicists), and the same racist tendencies of physiognomy carried over into eugenics. 
 Galton coined the term eugenics as not only referring to restrictions on procreation, but 
also to “tak[ing] cognisance of all influences that tend in however remote a degree to give to the 
more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less 
suitable than they otherwise would have had” (Galton 25). For Galton, taking “cognisance” of 
‘influence’ included identifying and activating social means of aiding desirable groups, and the 
‘less suitable’ people were those of non-white races, or those with mental or physical ‘defects’ of 
some kind. The popularity of eugenics in the United States at this time was largely driven by 
Galton’s adherence to ‘conclusive’ scientific data about individuals based on the ‘objective’ 
technology of photography, and on physical and mental measurements (Seitler 71). Hofstadter 
states that, “accompanied by a flood of valuable genetic research carried on by physicians and 
biologists, eugenics seemed not so much a social philosophy as a science,” and therefore gained 
credibility as a method of dealing with people considered ‘undesirable’ (Hofstadter 161). Groups 
such as the American Breeders’ Association, the Eugenics Record Office, and the National 
Conference on Race Betterment prove the intensity of American desire in the early 1900s to have 
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an impact on human development, as do the subsequent sterilization programs, some of which 
have only recently been repealed.187  
While the fervor for actively shaping human populations through eugenics somewhat 
lessened in the U.S. by the 1930s, Lovecraft’s novella remains entrenched in the eugenic rhetoric 
of the early 20th century. As Angela Smith states in Hideous Progeny, “official eugenics directed 
much of its energy toward identifying, representing in monstrous terms, and seeking to control 
the agglomerate body of America’s and the world’s ‘unfit’ ” (Smith 13). Likewise, Lovecraft 
represents his characters as “fabulous monsters of abhorrent grotesqueness and malignity,” to 
recall eugenic rhetoric which according to Smith conceived of the monster as “the product of 
‘inferior’ racial, class, or national groups, whose innate genetic defect and danger to normative 
reproduction was manifest as visible deformation” (Lovecraft 595, Smith 36). A closer look at 
Lovecraft’s scientific influences makes clear his investment in categorizing humanity based on 
genetic hierarchies and neutralizing those deemed monstrous, which carries into his fictional 
writings. 
 Lovecraft’s ideas about human development were heavily influenced by scientists and 
philosophers from this period, including Haeckel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and John 
Fiske (Joshi, H.P. Lovecraft). Through them, Lovecraft honed his own materialist belief that a 
scientific focus on the body provides ‘truths’ about human life. Lovecraft’s confidence in science 
encompassed everyday experiences; he believed, for example, that “psychological discovery, and 
chemical, physical, and physiological research, have largely destroyed the element of emotion 
among informed and sophisticated people by resolving it into its component parts—intellectual 
                                                
187 For an account of the lasting impact of early eugenic fervor on American political policy as well as on popular 
culture, see the volume Popular Eugenics: National Efficiency and American Mass Culture in the 1930s, edited by 
Susan Currell and Christina Cogdell. 
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idea and animal impulse” (309).188 His materialist views extended to the macro as well; 
following Nietzsche and Hugh Elliot in particular, Lovecraft decided that there is no guiding 
force or telos towards which human development tends, likewise rejecting spiritual or religious 
explanations of human existence (Joshi, Dreamer, 131). As he says, “I think it is damned 
unlikely that anything like a central cosmic will, a spirit world, or an eternal survival of 
personality exist” (Joshi, H.P. Lovecraft, 208). Rejecting spiritual forces as the drive behind 
humanity, Lovecraft turned instead to various scientific ideas about how humans could, in 
theory, influence their own evolutionary process—through eugenics, for instance.  
Although not specifically discussed by Lovecraft, his interest in scientists such as 
Haeckel and Fiske suggests that he was exposed to the types of debates around genetics incited 
by those scientists, including Weismann. Indeed, Joshi shows how several of Lovecraft’s 
personal letters reveal his determination to prove his own racially pure English ancestry through 
careful research of his paternal and maternal background. Similarly, Joshi asserts that “to the end 
of his life Lovecraft retained a belief in the biological (as opposed to the cultural) inferiority of 
blacks, and maintained that a strict colour line must be enforced in order to prevent 
miscegenation” (Joshi, H.P. Lovecraft, 70-1). Even in his remarks to his Jewish wife, that she 
“no longer belonged to these mongrels” because she had assimilated sufficiently to American 
culture, we see Lovecraft’s two-fold racism, based on genetic background (Joshi, Dreamer, 222). 
First, he had an extreme dislike for racial mixing (as seen in the word choice “mongrel”), and 
second, that dislike came out of his conviction that certain groups of people are inherently 
inferior. Lovecraft’s primary touchstones for his ideas on race and genetics stemmed from the 
                                                
188 This insistence that science lays the emotional mechanism bare, pulled from Freud’s works, shows in The 




mid- to late 19th century, and he did not update those beliefs to match new scientific evidence 
(such as Franz Boas’s proofs in the 1930s against biologically-based racism). Until his death, 
Lovecraft remained racist in his personal views, even voicing support of Adolf Hitler’s anti-
Semitic fears (360). 
Consequently, most Lovecraft critics focus on how his racist and eugenic affinities enter 
his fiction. Such interpretations are certainly necessary, but in the case of The Shadow Over 
Innsmouth, looking only at the anti-miscegenation overtones gives an incomplete account of the 
story. In what follows, I will show how Lovecraft’s racist logic, which assumes genetic 
hierarchies, contains inherent instabilities. Focusing on the classification of ‘abnormal’ 
individuals in The Shadow Over Innsmouth reveals not only Lovecraft’s concern with 
maintaining hierarchies, but more importantly how those hierarchies fall apart. I will look first at 
the hidden quality of the monstrous in Lovecraft’s story, and the horror it provokes as driving the 
need to make individual genetic backgrounds visible. Then I turn to the role of physiognomy as a 
means of categorization and, along with the protagonist’s emotional reactions, as a literary 
mechanism meant to ‘naturalize’ the story’s implicit favoring of racial purity. Finally, I 
demonstrate how Lovecraft’s writing in fact undermines such preferences, as distinctions 
between ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ break down both biologically and through the parallel 
eugenic actions of the humans and aliens. The story thus ends with ambiguity, not moral 
certitude, surrounding the valuing of human and nonhuman life. 
 
Lovecraft’s novella takes the form of a journal entry written by an unnamed narrator 
(identified in Lovecraft’s notes as Robert Olmstead) that details the events following his journey 
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to find out about his ancestry. Olmstead189 travels to Arkham, Massachusetts in 1927, hoping to 
look at historical records on his ancestors, but instead becomes drawn to the shunned and 
decrepit town named Innsmouth. Although warned not to visit due to the unpleasant nature of the 
Innsmouthers, Olmstead spends the afternoon there talking to locals and wandering around 
alone. The locals respond to his inquisitiveness by trying to kill him, a fate which Olmstead only 
narrowly escapes. By the end Olmstead (and the reader) realizes that the Innsmouthers are so 
protective of their secrets because they have a deal with amphibious aliens, the Deep Ones, who 
give them gold and plentiful fishing in return for their cooperation in inter-species procreation.  
In this story “Lovecraft’s monsters do not stray radically from the human form,” but 
instead are “characterized above all by their hybridism—a hybridism that is not the simple 
juxtaposition of disparate elements [. . .] but a result of a sort of contamination or collective 
pollution” (Lévy 56).190 We are here faced with a hidden ‘contamination’ of the categories of 
human and nonhuman; Olmstead emphasizes the unknown nature of the monstrous by providing 
several possible reasons for the Innsmouther’s slightly odd appearance. He first invites us to 
entertain the idea that their look might stem from an “insidious disease-phenomenon”: 
Only a very rare affliction, of course, could bring about such vast and radical anatomical 
changes in a single individual after maturity—changes involving osseous factors as basic 
as the shape of the skull—but then, even this aspect was no more baffling and unheard-of 
than the visible features of the malady as a whole. (Lovecraft 605) 
 
The narrator moreover proposes “biological degeneration” and “alienage” as further possibilities 
of cause, both concepts tied to inherited genetics (598). Even if “the ‘Innsmouth look’ [is] a 
disease rather than a blood strain,” though, the ‘abnormal’ appearance of the Innsmouth residents 
                                                
189 Although the namelessness of the narrator is important in terms of the reader’s ability to project onto him as a 
blank slate, I will refer to him as Olmstead for the sake of clarity. 
 
190 Lévy, like other Lovecraft scholars, focuses on the “degenerate” and contaminated aspect of the Innsmouthers as 
an allegory for Lovecraft’s fears about race, and as a metaphor for the dark places in the human psyche (using 
psychoanalytic theory). He, too, misses the importance of the ambiguity of Lovecraft’s ending. 
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connects to their biology, through inherited illness or contagion (609). The specific causes of 
their outward appearance may be at first unknown, but the fact that it is an inborn danger remains 
certain. 
Lovecraft keeps the full truth about the alien interbreeding in Innsmouth suppressed until 
the end of the tale; the horror in the story arises from this partially hidden191 quality of the 
characters’ monstrosity. The uncertainty, or “failure to orient ourselves in the physical universe” 
due to the “incomprehensible” nature of the characters connects to Mikhail Bakhtin and 
Wolfgang Kayser’s conception of the grotesque as horror-inducing (Kayser 185). Lovecraft 
belongs to Kayser’s category of “Schauerliteratur [which] aims at making the reader’s flesh 
crawl (a sensation he seeks for himself) and at revealing abysses to him (at the brink of which he 
gladly stands)” (141). Surrounded by the grotesque, Olmstead experiences a “cosmic terror, the 
fear of the immeasurable, the infinitely powerful” which he does not yet have the tools to define, 
making identification and categorization the most pressing concern (Bakhtin 335). 
Lovecraft posits physiognomy as a potential solution to that horror, highlighting moments 
of visible genetics through the aesthetic trope of the grotesque face. Lovecraft ensures that his 
readers will search for coded meaning behind the visible manifestations of monstrosity by giving 
several physical descriptions of the Innsmouthers’ faces: 
[The bus driver] had a narrow head, bulging, watery blue eyes that never seemed to wink, 
a flat nose, a receding forehead and chin, and singularly undeveloped ears. His long, thick 
lip and coarse-pored, greyish cheeks seemed almost beardless […] (Lovecraft 597-8) 
 
This depiction repeats whenever Olmstead encounters an Innsmouth native; for instance, at the 
beginning of his journey he remarks about the “queer narrow heads with flat noses and bulgy, 
                                                
191 This sense in Lovecraft’s story of a mounting horror where the reader only gains knowledge slowly, piece by 
piece, mirrors the same type of device at work in Lang’s film; for Lang, the hidden space is instead “off-screen.” 
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stary eyes,” and later in a restaurant he describes a “stooped, narrow-headed man with staring 
unwinking eyes, and a flat-nosed wench” (591, 627). 
Bakhtin conceives of the “nose and mouth [as] the most important part in the grotesque 
image of the body,” as well as “protruding eyes” (Bakhtin 316, 317). The emphasis on facial 
orifices, for Bakhtin, reveals a body “in the act of becoming,” a body where strict divisions 
between human and non-human are permeable because the body is not physically autonomous 
and contained (317).192 In Lovecraft’s story, this mutability also includes the traditional sense of 
the grotesque as blending human and animal (or alien), when Olmstead for instance illustrates 
locals as “simian-visaged,” or draws our attention to the fingers of his bus driver which “seemed 
to have a tendency to curl closely into the huge palm” like those of an ape (Lovecraft 601, 
598).193 In fact, Olmstead describes the Innsmouth people as not only “hideous and abnormal,” 
but often uses the word “grotesque” regarding his experience in Innsmouth (609). The grotesque 
hybridity of Lovecraft’s characters focuses Olmstead’s (and the reader’s) attention on 
deciphering those characters. 
The ‘scientific’ practice of physiognomy would have provided readers one method of 
making the Innsmouthers’ monstrosity legible, by supplying potential taxonomies of the 
characters’ personality traits and genetic background based on their abnormal faces. Looking at 
Johann Caspar Lavater’s 18th century physiognomic descriptions provides a possible motive for 
Lovecraft’s characterizations. Just as the Innsmouthers often have “narrow heads,” Lavater notes 
                                                
192 Few critics focus on the presence of the grotesque in Lovecraft’s writing, although in his article “From beyond: 
H. P. Lovecraft and the place of horror,” James Kneale reads another Lovecraft story, “The Unnamable,” in relation 
to Bakhtin’s ideas about the grotesque as that which allows permutation across thresholds, as the body that is 
“becoming.” 
 
193 Abel Alves in “Humanity’s Place in Nature, 1863-1928: Horror, Curiosity and the Expeditions of Huxley, 
Wallace, Blavatsky and Lovecraft” gives an interesting analysis of the affinity of apes and humans in Lovecraft’s 
texts, including both species’ propensity for simultaneous xenophobia and curiosity, but does not explicitly discuss 
the concept of atavism, which becomes important when considering physiognomy. 
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that where “the back part of the scull [. . .] is compressed [. . .] it is a sign of a weak mind,” and 
likewise “a narrow forehead is usually the sign of a froward disposition,” and if the forehead 
“incline[s] backward, we may then anticipate rashness and want of reflection” (Lavater 23-4, 
27). Cesare Lombroso’s racially-charged update of this science agrees with Lavater; he states 
that for criminals (recalling the bus driver with the “receding forehead” and ape fingers), 
“sometimes the forehead is receding, as in apes [. . .], or low and narrow” (Lombroso Ferrero 
12). As for the “watery blue eyes” of the bus driver, “blue eyes are frequently found in persons 
of phlegmatic character; they are often indications of feebleness and effeminacy” (30). And for 
his “long, thick lip,” Lombroso states that “if the lips are thick and fleshy, this is a sign of 
sensuality and of slothfulness; it is always a characteristic of a phlegmatic temper” (33). For each 
specific that Lovecraft gives about the typical Innsmouth face, the slightly older, yet highly 
popular ‘science’ of physiognomy gives a corresponding negative characteristic associated with 
criminality, animality, and degenerate tendencies.194 
In the United States the interest in physiognomy often corresponded with the social 
concepts of degeneration and atavism, the fear of a general backward evolution or return to an 
animalistic state (explored in the first chapter of this project). As Seitler explains, at the turn of 
the 20th century scientists in various fields and disciplines were “convinced that certain social 
behaviors, practices, and other modern realities, including criminality [. . .] were both causes and 
symptoms of an imminent and widespread cultural degeneration” (Seitler 55). The idea of 
cultural degeneration or atavism was moreover linked to race; physiognomic traits were often 
used to indicate “which people had the capacity for modernity and which did not,” with non-
                                                
194 The characteristics of ‘effeminacy’ and ‘sensuality’ connect to Max Nordau’s description of degenerate artist 
figures in his work Degeneration, and indeed Nordau dedicated this text to Lombroso. Criminality for Lovecraft 
might equate to the Innsmouthers breaking human or natural law by procreating with aliens. In Lang’s film, we will 
see a more detailed version of how the criminal becomes monstrous. 
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white ancestry, and especially African ancestry, largely connected to primitive characteristics 
(63). The practice of physiognomy therefore already assumed the hierarchical superiority of 
‘pure’ racial background, and in The Shadow Over Innsmouth the descriptions of the 
Innsmouthers encode their undesirable degenerate and atavistic qualities.  
Physiognomy and its latent hierarchical indicators, emphasized through the grotesque, 
mark the Innsmouthers as dangerous, a conclusion corroborated by Olmstead’s intense negative 
bodily and emotional reactions while in Innsmouth. Olmstead’s initial ignorance about 
Innsmouth’s history results in his reactions being chalked up to natural instinct, an innate sense 
of the biological danger of those surrounding him. Literary critic Mitch Frye locates the reason 
for this instinctive reaction in Lovecraft’s own prejudice, explaining that Lovecraft justifies “his 
fear of the racial unknown and his creative reaction thereto [as] perfectly natural byproducts of  
‘an instinct as old as history’ ” (Frye 240). Olmstead’s first encounter with the bus driver causes 
a “wave of spontaneous aversion which could be neither checked nor explained,” and he 
thereafter finds it “very natural” that outsiders want nothing to do with the Innsmouth folk 
(Lovecraft 597). When he first sees an overtly alien/human mix in an Innsmouth church, he 
again feels “sharp intensity and unaccountable horror” which “analysis” and logic cannot dispel 
(602). That this negative reaction is instinctual is reinforced when Olmstead later recalls the 
“face for whose horror [his] conscious mind could not account” (628). Throughout the story, our 
narrator feels “horror,” “terror” and “shock” that cannot be displaced by “reason,” “logic,” or 
“rationality,” although he often tries to explain away his bodily reactions against the Innsmouth 
folk. The ‘naturalness’ of his negative feelings reinforces the sense that the monstrous 
Innsmouthers are inherently an undesirable group, as compared to their all-human counterparts. 
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Finally, as it dawns on Olmstead that the ramblings of the old man Zadok might be 
accurate, that the Innsmouth locals might actually breed with an alien species living underwater, 
he comes face to face with some of those locals. Immediately, he is “horrified by the bestial 
abnormality of their faces and dog-like sub-humanness of their crouching gait”; it is the 
monstrous dissolution of the line between human and nonhuman that incites such a negative 
response (Lovecraft 641). Olmstead’s most intense emotional reaction occurs, in fact, when his 
own categorization as human is threatened. At the end of the novella, he begins to change 
physically, and soon realizes that his grandmother (and therefore he himself) shares genetics with 
the Deep Ones. When Olmstead begins “to study the mirror with mounting alarm,” he notices on 
his own face the very characteristics which have previously defined the ‘other’ for him (652). He 
comes face to face with his own inner monstrosity, a trope that repeats in Lang’s film, causing 
him to experience an emotional crisis as surface (appearance) and depth (genetics) collapse, and 
he becomes part of the grotesque previously shunned. Olmstead “acquire[s] a sort of terror of 
[his] own ancestry,” and upon learning further details about his family, he claims his life has 
become “a nightmare of brooding and apprehension, nor do[es he] know how much is hideous 
truth and how much madness” (649, 650). Frye explains this reaction as belonging to the genre 
of the “genotypic horror story [which] shows the individual at war with a cold, chaotic world as 
well as with the mysterious machinations of his own genes” (Frye 239). At this point Olmstead, 
and the reader, associate only negative emotions with such a connection to the Deep Ones, 
mirroring the contemporaneous social fear that “the actions and behaviors of families are 
encoded in their descendants, always threatening to reemerge” and become visible (243). 
However, Lovecraft’s writing complicates a straight-forward condemnation of the 
biological monster in the last few paragraphs of his novella:  
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The tense extremes of horror are lessening, and I feel queerly drawn toward the unknown 
sea-deeps instead of fearing them. I hear and do strange things in sleep, and awake with a 
kind of exaltation instead of terror. [. . .] In that lair of the Deep Ones we shall dwell 
amidst wonder and glory forever. (Lovecraft 652-3) 
 
Other scholars have read this ending as proof of Lovecraft’s aversion to biological mixing. For 
instance, Bennett Lovett-Graff reads this story as a “public allegory of the threat of 
immigration,” which combines horror and disgust for those with different genetic backgrounds 
with a taboo fascination (Lovett-Graff 186). For Lovett-Graff, the ending contains a revulsion for 
biological ‘otherness,’ and Olmstead’s ecstasy at returning to the Deep Ones stems instead from 
Lovecraft’s love for his mother, and a secret desire to return to that maternal ancestry, to let “her 
protection mask the tragic condition of his biological being and origin” (188). He moreover 
contends that Olmstead does not have agency in his decision to rejoin the aliens; the ending 
shows the “powerfully disturbing effects of the narrator’s biological coercion” (186). In either 
scenario (mother love or coercion), Olmstead’s willing embrace of an alien existence is regarded 
as the ultimate horror. 
 Frye likewise reads Lovecraft’s tale as promoting a racist worldview; Lovecraft describes 
the aliens as a “limitless stream” that is always “surging” from place to place, and therefore links 
to the racist rhetoric of Lothrop Stoddard who speaks of a “sea” of non-whites threatening to 
overwhelm populations (Frye 249). Frye thus states that while “a commonality between the Deep 
Ones, the villagers, the narrator, and the entire human race” might serve to “lessen the horror of 
Olmstead’s concluding resolution to join his relatives under the sea, ‘Innsmouth’ does not seem 
to support such a reading” (251). Rather, in Frye’s reading, the ending “acknowledges that 
general truth underlying the theory of common descent, but [. . .] argues that some races are 
further along a presumed evolutionary ‘track’ than others” (251). In this reading, Olmstead, 
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because his genetic background is revealed as connected to the inferior ‘race,’ must be removed 
from the general human population in order to prevent further miscegenation.  
Joshi too acknowledges the possible ambiguity of the ending, but decides that Olmstead’s 
ecstatic embrace of his change is the “pinnacle” of the “horrific scenario” as his mind decays as 
well (Joshi, H.P. Lovecraft, 500). Therefore, Olmstead is seen by these critics as a pawn for 
genetic drives and impulses, and the ending increases a sense of horror as our reliable narrator 
loses his ability to resist the monstrosity within. However, this sudden turn-about from a narrator 
who associates Innsmouth with abominable degeneracy and dread, to someone slowly drawn to 
the underwater alien community, instead suggests an ambiguity present in Lovecraft’s writing 
which deserves further scrutiny. In what remains I will demonstrate how Lovecraft, in spite of 
himself, undermines a purely xenophobic account of the ‘other’ (in this case aliens) by 
dismantling the hierarchy his story implicitly sets up. Instead of a clear distinction between the 
human and alien cultures, a closer look at those cultures reveals their similarities, and therefore 
the inherent problems with biologically-based classification and subsequent action against 
perceived monstrosity. 
 
The ambiguity dismissed by the above critics has multiple sources, including Olmstead’s 
sudden use of phrases such as “queerly drawn,” “exaltation,” and “wonder and glory” to describe 
a situation that the entire novella has previously primed as abhorrent and ‘abnormal.’ The 
implicit hierarchy of heroic humans against monstrous aliens is called into question by 
Olmstead’s decision to join the Deep Ones. Moreover, Olmstead’s loss of pure humanity 
suggests that no one can ultimately be sure of his or her ancestry (in fact, humans in Lovecraft’s 
speculative fictions often stem from ancient alien races). Several moments in the novella signal 
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that for Lovecraft, humans remain fundamentally connected to the nonhuman in terms of their 
evolutionary background, a fact kept present by his reliance on animal imagery (such as the ape 
comparisons to the bus driver). For instance, when Olmstead finally sees the aliens clearly, their 
“bestial babel of croaking, baying, and barking” reminds him of dogs and their “fishy odour” 
recalls the amphibious origins of life on Earth (Lovecraft 644, 641). Even the atavistic 
vocabulary of the novella, for example referring to the Innsmouthers as “degenerate creatures,” 
emphasizes the connection between modern individuals and previous human states closer to 
animality (644). While Lovecraft attempts to limit such descriptions to undesirable populations, 
his foregrounding of evolutionary theories instead naturalizes a biological link between humans 
and the nonhuman, undermining the anti-miscegenation fear of non-purity. Olmstead, the easily 
relatable human narrator whose physical changes place him firmly on a family tree populated 
with the nonhuman, is not the exception but rather the rule. Beyond biological connections, a 
closer look at alien and human actions in the story further demonstrates that objectively, 
distinctions cannot be drawn between the cultural values of the two groups. 
Both humans and aliens use eugenics to control their respective population development; 
a sympathetic reader concentrates on the eugenic response of the American government against 
Innsmouth as understandable. If natural instinct tells us to fear the monsters (and their grotesque 
physiognomy upholds the implicit sense of their inferiority), then they must hold some danger 
for humans. In fact, in Lovecraft’s created world, the monsters supposedly do have the potential 
to annihilate the whole human population, or to overcome humans through forced procreation. 
Negative eugenics, including “marital restrictions for those with conditions deemed genetically 
transmissible” and the removal of the ‘unfit’ from the population, becomes the primary means of 
response against this biological threat (Smith 11). On the first page of the story Olmstead tells us 
 170 
the outcome of his sharing this tale with others; the government begins with “a vast series of 
raids and arrests [. . .] followed by the deliberate burning and dynamiting” of Innsmouth so that it 
is left largely depopulated (Lovecraft 587). In other words, the government here identifies a 
threatening population, and deliberately kills off as many inhabitants as possible in a straight-
forward attempt at preserving ‘pure’ humanity. Socially as well, those living in towns 
surrounding Innsmouth make sure the population doesn’t expand outward, in part by “everybody 
rais[ing] Cain” when one of their own attempts to marry someone from Innsmouth (590). Even 
more extreme, in a different part of the world a community of islanders who also have a 
relationship with the Deep Ones are “all wiped aout” by other islanders, and their buildings 
entirely destroyed (617).195 These eugenic practices, to contain and destroy all humans who have 
potentially bred with the alien species, are treated as the only logical reaction; even “complaints 
from many liberal organisations” are withdrawn once those organizations are “taken on trips to 
certain camps and prisons” and can see the offending individuals for themselves (587). 
Although Lovecraft focuses on this human reaction, and his personal sentiments would 
appear to endorse such a reaction, the story itself complicates easy separations of the human 
from its ostensible other. The aliens have their own sense of hierarchy, and utilize surveillance as 
a way to protect their positive eugenics agenda, of producing more hybrid children to maintain 
their populations. Innsmouth holds countless abandoned, or seemingly-abandoned, buildings and 
warehouses, and as Olmstead wanders through town, “the tightly shuttered condition of many 
third-story and attic windows” gives him the “sensation of being watched from ambush on every 
hand by sly, staring eyes that never shut” (Lovecraft 610). The Innsmouth residents purposefully 
                                                
195 Interestingly, the Kanakys (islanders) who wipe out the offending community are in possession of several little 
stones that have “somethin’ on ‘em like what ye call a swastika naowadays,” which protects them from retaliation. 
Lovecraft here draws a link between the eugenicist islanders and Nazis, a move which Lovett-Graff explains is an 
intentional nod at Lovecraft’s own sympathy for Nazi sentiments. 
 
 171 
foster this sense of surveillance: they tell Olmstead not to wander in certain areas of the city and 
not to talk to certain citizens, and he is constantly reminded that his movements are being 
watched. Beyond merely keeping outsiders from prying into their affairs, the Deep Ones 
themselves also enact a type of negative eugenics by killing off anyone who opposes their 
breeding with humans. If threatened, Zadok explains, the Deep Ones could “wipe aout the hull 
brood o’ humans ef they was willin’ to bother” (615). Indeed, in Innsmouth’s past the Deep Ones 
had killed all humans unwilling to adhere to the agreement of breeding with them. Lovecraft 
therefore connects the practice of eugenics to both sides (the human norm and the alien 
grotesque), through their attempts to ensure the ‘health’ of their populations through biological 
control.  
 Reading Lovecraft’s story in this way, where the human and alien societies enact similar 
agendas of population control, makes unclear who, exactly, are the villains. Just as a fear of 
biological contamination has caused the U. S. government to bomb towns and imprison 
survivors, the fear of biological extinction causes the Deep Ones to enforce community-wide 
secrecy and kill any opposition. The last few pages of the novella reveal that the eugenic 
practices of the American government have not, in fact, resulted in lasting damage to the Deep 
Ones, suggesting the futility of such measures. Likewise, several times the enforced secrecy of 
the Deep Ones is broken, such as when the drunkard Zadok spills the entire story to Olmstead, 
and the growth of their hybrid community remains limited. In the end, both sides have attempted 
to categorize and contain ‘external’ threats, with little efficacy and at great cost.  
 
At the conclusion of this chapter, I will return to the implications of the ineffective nature 
of eugenics, and the difficulties of definitive categorization of human and nonhuman in The 
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Shadow over Innsmouth. First, however, I will turn to filmmaker Fritz Lang; born in the same 
year as Lovecraft, and directing his film M in the same year as Lovecraft first penned his story, 
Lang has unmistakably similar interests driving his narrative. Lang, however, approaches these 
interests from an almost opposite political point-of-view. To my knowledge, no criticism exists 
which places works by Fritz Lang and H. P. Lovecraft into conversation. This is due, in part, to 
the difference in discipline; I acknowledge that difficulties exist when ‘reading’ written fiction 
and visual film side by side,196 but the payoff is clear when considering their similarities. The 
stories belong to different genres; Lovecraft’s narrative fits the categories of science fiction and 
horror, while Lang’s film is often placed in the genre of New Objectivity. We have on the one 
hand a racist author who uses allegorical and fantastical landscapes as a way to project his ideas 
into the realms of deep time and deep space, and on the other hand a more politically moderate 
artist whose film remains firmly rooted in a recognizable, ‘realist’ city. What remains fascinating 
about reading these two story-tellers together, then, is how, exactly, they seem to converge upon 
the same conclusion of ambiguity in racial (bio)politics.  
 
III. Monstrous Murder in M 
 Fritz Lang, born in 1890 in Vienna, Austria, has a less fraught biographical background 
than Lovecraft in terms of his political and social alliances. However, certain pieces of his 
biography are equally important as potential inspirations for the themes of monstrosity, eugenics, 
and the grotesque present in several of his films. Lang as a child had a general interest in science 
fiction and fantasy writing, as evidenced by his sci-fi films Metropolis and Woman in the Moon, 
which both deal with problematic technology and humans pushing the limits of science. While 
                                                
196 For instance, the two disciplines require a distinct vocabulary, and I will therefore adhere to literary terminology 
versus film terminology where appropriate. 
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his film M does not generally fit the genre of sci-fi, or deal overtly with technological discovery, 
certain salient aspects of science remain in the film, such as an interest in physiognomy and 
forensics. Indeed, biographer Patrick McGilligan claims that “Lang valued the work of Cesare 
Lombroso, who pioneered the theory of the ‘criminal type’ and used phrenology to ‘prove’ 
antisocial tendencies by measuring face shapes and the bumps on people’s heads” (McGilligan 
148). Lombroso’s theory, that biological development reflects and influences criminal behavior, 
shows in Lang’s murderer character, who distorts his face in physiognomically strange ways and 
whose motivations remain ambiguously psychological, biological, and social. Lang moreover 
frequented dinners in the company of authors such as Thomas Mann, so presumably would also 
have had familiarity with the concept of degeneration and its connections to physiognomy 
(McGilligan).  
 As for his stance on racial issues, Lang had Jewish ancestors on his mother’s side, 
although he was raised Catholic. Before Hitler’s rise as chancellor in 1933, McGilligan intimates 
that Lang’s Jewish background was either ignored or underplayed by Lang, but after 1933 it 
became clear that his heritage would be held against him in Germany.  Unlike Lovecraft, whose 
desperate concern about his ancestry led to an extreme right-wing politics against the ‘other,’ 
Lang was much more liberal politically. His Jewish heritage led to him disavowing Nazi 
Germany and fleeing to France, and later the United States, but while in Germany he was also 
part of an artistic community with left-wing radicals, including his mistress Lily Latté. He 
divorced his wife Thea von Harbou in 1933, in part because of the rift caused by her pro-Nazi 
leanings, and in the late 1930s Lang became active in donating time and money to anti-fascist 
causes. While some of his films have been subsequently deemed “condescending and, at best, 
politically naïve” in relation to racial issues in the United States, overall Lang’s relationship to 
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the question of race remains much less problematic than Lovecraft’s (McGilligan 227). 
Therefore, unlike with Lovecraft, film critics interested in Lang do not focus so heavily on his 
biographical background. 
Film critics have analyzed almost every conceivable theme of M; however, so far no 
critics have concentrated on the potential biological and eugenic implications following hidden 
monstrosity in the film.197 By placing this canonical film in juxtaposition with Lovecraft’s story, 
I show how in both, the monster hiding within the body of an otherwise unremarkable man gives 
insight about biopolitical impulses to control human development. I will explore first the concept 
of hidden space and its accompanying horror in M, then the city-wide desire to make the hidden 
visible, then the monster himself, Hans Beckert, and how his grotesqueness is presented to the 
audience. Finally, I examine how distinctions between the ‘inhuman’ monster and the enforcers 
of the human ‘norm’ break down, as in Lovecraft’s story. Lang’s film ends with what critics dub 
a ‘kangaroo court,’ where Beckert’s motivations and his inner workings are scrutinized. This 
ending, I argue, shows an inability to make decisions about responses to monstrosity, advocating 
neither eugenics nor mental institutions as proper facility for someone who needs to murder. As 
with Lovecraft, neither death nor institutionalization provide the answer to erupting monstrosity. 
 
Fritz Lang’s film M begins with a similar type of hidden menace as Lovecraft’s novella, 
although for Lang the hidden becomes literal off-screen space, that which remains outside the 
frame of the camera. In M, an unnamed city (reminiscent of Berlin) searches for a child-
murderer, Hans Beckert (played by Peter Lorre), whose true identity is at first elusive; like 
Lovecraft, Lang keeps his audience in suspense for the first half of his film in order to emphasize 
                                                
197 Tom Gunning, for instance, does take up the theme of the monster in his analysis, as synonymous with 
“bogeyman,” but does not examine the link between M and the logic of genetics. 
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the menace of a lurking monstrosity. Lang begins his film in a manner that primes the audience 
for off-screen space, with the famous gong sounding against a black screen, followed by the 
sound of children chanting before finally an image appears. Tom Gunning in his chapter “M: The 
City Haunted by Demonic Desire” interprets this opening scene as setting up an affinity with the 
genre of New Objectivity, and a “camera [that] does not align itself with any character” 
(Gunning 166). Gunning emphasizes the impersonal aspects of the film, how the city swallows 
individuals and takes their place as protagonist because the camera refuses to place any one 
person in the forefront. However, I intend to focus, against the camera’s will, on the character of 
Beckert and how his monstrosity, flitting across the surface of his face at unexpected moments, 
parallels the logic of hidden genetics even if Lang, unlike Lovecraft, does not explicitly reference 
genetic sciences.  
Our first encounter with the ‘other’ comes five minutes into the film, when the shadow of 
the murderer hovers over a telephone pole covered in a flyer asking for information on his 
whereabouts. The audience hears his whistling and his menacing soft voice, but Lang 
deliberately refuses a visual of the murderer, or his actions. Lang continues to keep the murderer 
off-screen, or barely legible, for the first half of the film: whenever we catch glimpses of 
Beckert, we see either his back, or the back of his head, or his face mediated/blocked by various 
objects such as a mirror, leaves, shadows, or his hat. As Gunning puts it, “Beckert plays hide and 
seek with us, appearing, usually indirectly or obliquely, then withdrawing into the darkness, the 
realm of the unseen,” so that the nature of his monstrosity remains unknowable, just as the 
Innsmouthers’ affliction is unknowable at the beginning of Lovecraft’s story (Gunning 164).   
The murderer’s actions likewise are ‘unseen,’ so that the audience must fill the gaps 
visually and aurally themselves, a technique which increases the suspense and horror. For 
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instance, at the moment of Elsie Beckmann’s murder, we get a series of still images devoid of 
humans: a shot of a staircase, an attic with clothes drying, a chair at a dinner table. Through these 
images, Elsie’s mother’s voice rings loudly, yelling “Elsie” in vain, but the last two shots in the 
sequence contain only silence instead: first, a ball (Elsie’s) that rolls across the grass, and second, 
a balloon (also Elsie’s) that dances through telephone wires before floating away. As Stephen 
Brockmann points out in A Critical History of German Film, the specifics of the murder are 
hinted at when “a policeman tells his colleagues, ‘and we know how [in what state] we have 
found them,’ but he never elaborates on the ‘how’ ”198 and we are left to imagine what, exactly, 
Beckert does with his victims (Brockmann 118). The silence, and lack of human presence in this 
murder sequence, serves to dehumanize Beckert, leaving his actions all the more horror-inducing 
because they are grotesque: “incomprehensible” and “impersonal” (Kayser 185).  
Not only is the moment of murder visually off-screen; Lang also refuses his audience any 
sound clues, a motif which he repeats several times throughout the film. For instance, during a 
police raid 20 minutes into the film, Lang gives us a full minute of absolute silence, while 
images of men fighting, marching, and running make clear that the absence of aural information 
is deliberate. Here, too, the lack of aural clues destabilizes the viewer and renders the danger of 
the uncaught murderer solemn. The empty shots in buildings also repeat near the end of the film 
as the criminals close in on the murderer in his hiding place: like Lovecraft, Lang uses blank 
windows and abandoned buildings to increase menace, as the potential danger lurking within the 
buildings remains hidden from view. The buildings mirror the logic of the human body, where 
                                                
198 Translation is Brockmann’s; in the original German, “Wenn man sie [die Opfer] wiederfindet, na, wir wissen ja, 
wie wir sie gefunden haben.” Due to the relative difficulty of obtaining the German film transcript, I include the 
original German dialogue in footnotes wherever I (or another critic) quote directly, based on my own viewing as 
well as on an incomplete version of the transcript edited by Gero Gandert and Ulrich Gregor. Unless noted 
otherwise, as in this case, all translations of Lang’s dialogue into English are my own. 
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the surface might suggest one state (emptiness, or normalcy), while the interior/depth holds a 
different state (inhabited, or ‘abnormality’).  
As in The Shadow Over Innsmouth, the citizens in Lang’s film react to such hidden 
danger with an impulse to classify and explain the ‘other,’ in order to lessen their fear. Again we 
have two groups of people, the government (represented by the police force) and the community 
(represented by the criminal underground), who wish to delineate a strict division between 
themselves and the child-murderer, to understand the cause of his actions. The persona of ‘child-
murderer,’ synonymous with ‘monster’ in the film, becomes a separate category against which 
both government and community define themselves. As film critic Stephen Brockmann puts it, 
“both [groups] rely on structures of order and hierarchy, and both discourage individual 
peculiarities,” which gives them the common goal of drawing a line around Beckert (Brockmann 
121). In Lovecraft’s story, the two categories of ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ each have their own 
‘norm’ to protect; in M, the same two categories exist, although only Beckert is placed into the 
second, and the position of ‘non-human’ (‘monster’) does not have a ‘norm’ to defend. The film 
thus follows a struggle between those attempting to define the ‘nonhuman’ and who belongs 
there, and Beckert who sways from ‘monster’ to human without the agency to wholly embrace 
either category. 
 As Gunning states, Lang “anticipates Foucault, not only in founding this modern space 
in actions of surveillance and the discursive organization of the archive, but as thoroughly 
absorbed into the practices of everyday life” (Gunning 181). The biopolitical impulse to classify 
shows not only in official channels, but also in the general public reaction; for instance, one man 
is almost beaten to death by a mob because he speaks to a young girl, an action which 
automatically marks him as suspicious, with the potential of ‘monstrosity.’ The criminals 
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moreover refer to Beckert as a “beast” (translated in the English subtitles instead to monster), an 
“outsider,” and insist that “between the man wanted by the police and [themselves], [they] draw 
a thick line” (Lang, M).199 Although technically a murderer and a gangster are both criminals, the 
‘normal’ criminal element places the murderer in the entirely different category of the non-
human. The murderer himself, at the end of the film, reinforces that division, telling the 
criminals that they cannot possibly understand his actions, as they practice a different sort of 
crime. 
 While the criminals complain about the police tendency to search for the murderer in 
their midst because they think of themselves as separate from Beckert, the police also 
desperately try to make the off-screen visible and legible, through biopolitical methods of 
classification and analysis. Instead of words like ‘beast’ and ‘outsider,’ however, the police refer 
to Beckert through his intellect and drives; they call him “heavily pathological,” and try to 
identify him accordingly (Lang, M).200 The police gather massive amounts of evidence, and 
search biopolitical nodes of power—“welfare offices, prisons, medical clinics, insane 
asylums”—in order to find clues, even hiring a graphologist to analyze Beckert’s handwriting.201 
Graphology, the methodical analysis of writing, has been largely discredited as an unreliable 
practice, especially because of the open question as to whether genetics or environment has a 
greater impact on handwriting. Still, Lang’s use of graphology emphasizes that one can read 
personality and intention through the body, a theme that runs through the entire film. The results 
of handwriting analysis include remarks about the murderer’s personality and character traits; he 
                                                
199 In the German, “Bestie,” “Außenseiter,” and “zwischen dem, den die kriminal Polizei sucht, und zwischen uns, 
da ziehen wir einen dicken Strich.”  
 
200 In the German, a “schwer pathologische Mann.” 
 
201 In the German, “Fürsorgeanstalten, Gefängnise, Nervenkliniken, und Irrenanstalten.” 
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has a “pathologically strong sexuality,” exhibits signs of “indolence” and “lethargy,” and most 
importantly, of “madness.”202 The graphologist reads all of these traits in his handwriting, but 
also speaks to the murderer’s potential motives when he calls Beckert a “triebmenschen,” which 
has no direct translation but means something like “a man reduced to his drives.” I will return to 
the question of cause and motive for murder, but first will look at the transition from off-screen 
to on-screen danger, and its accompanying introduction of the grotesque.  
 Only half-way through the movie does the audience know the murderer’s name, and 
finally get an unmediated shot of his face. However, the most important (and famous) scene in 
the film for analysis of Beckert’s face arrives fairly early, when we see Beckert study himself in 
the mirror as the graphologist classifies his traits in a voice-over. The audience now shares the 
criminal and police impulse to make the hidden legible, as we are forced to examine every 
minute movement in Peter Lorre’s face. Like Lovecraft’s alien-human hybrids, Beckert’s face 
fits Bakhtin’s grotesque characterizations perfectly: he pulls on his thick lips and bulges out his 
eyes, emphasizing again the “nose and mouth [as] the most important part in the grotesque image 
of the body,” and the “bulging eyes [that] manifest a purely bodily tension” (Bakhtin 316, 317). 
The shot of Beckert in the mirror, echoing Olmstead’s mirror scene, serves to direct our attention 
to Beckert’s (and Olmstead’s) own examination of himself. Gunning states, “what we see in the 
mirror in horrifying compression is the essence of Beckert’s private drama which begins with 
attraction and ends with repulsion and self-horror” as Beckert “enacts his own transformation 
into a monster” (Gunning 179). As we discover later, Beckert does not himself comprehend the 
                                                
202 In the German, “pathologisch starke Sexualität,” “Schauspielerei, die nach außen hin die Form der Indolenz, ja 
der Trägheit wählen kann,” “wahnsinn.” The graphologist’s remarks echo Max Nordau’s definition of degeneration 
including “a sexually psychopathic nature;” Beckert, like Olmstead, thus combines elements of criminality and 
degeneration (Nordau 452).  
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impulse that drives him to murder, and as he pulls on his cheeks and grimaces, we understand 
that he finds himself grotesque as well.  
 The grotesqueness203 of the face repeats in most shots of Beckert: we see him eating a 
piece of fruit (with the focus on his chewing), and when he catches a glimpse of a young girl 
later on, again the eyes bulge. As Steffen Hantke explains in his article “Monstrosity Without a 
Body,” in most serial killer films “bodily inscription of monstrosity is relegated to a secondary 
ontological level, distinct from (yet dependent on) the primary level where serial killers are 
physically inconspicuous,” and manifests on screen “every once in a while, [when] the mask of 
normality slips, revealing the face of evil underneath” (Hantke 40, 37). These slips occur when 
the killer is at his or her most agitated state, when desires and fears can no longer be suppressed. 
Thus, at the trial scene at the end of Lang’s film, Beckert’s face never returns to a resting 
position: when confronted by photos of his victims, for instance, he sticks his entire fist into his 
mouth, and when trying to escape, fighting his captors, his entire face scrunches up to be almost 
unrecognizable. He moreover continues to pull at his face and lips, sweats profusely, and snarls 
and yells, showing his teeth. Throughout, his eyes retain their exaggerated wide state. In fact, the 
only moment during this scene when his face relaxes is in his describing the actual murder act, 
where his eyes roll back in his head and he has a slight grin on his face, a change in demeanor 
even more horrifying than the previous tension. 
 The utter concentration through camera angle and shot length on Lorre’s face 
emphasizes the grotesque features, and asks the audience to read those features for clues about 
the reason behind his gruesome actions. Lang, like Lovecraft, makes the face most prominent to 
ask his audience to read those bulging eyes or thick lips in accordance with popular 
                                                
203 Like with Lovecraft, there is also an element of animal grotesqueness with Beckert, as the citizens and criminals 
often call him “Hund” (dog), “Schwein” (pig), or more generally “Tier” (animal).  
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physiognomic opinions of the time about the appearance of criminals. While of course Peter 
Lorre only has so much control over aspects such as the shape of his skull, he does purposely 
distort his face in ways which call to mind certain aspects of Lombroso’s descriptions of the 
criminal man. For instance, when Lorre’s face relaxes at the moment of describing the actual 
killing, he exhibits a “drooping of the upper eyelid, which gives the eye a half-closed 
appearance,” a feature Lombroso connects to anomalies of the face particular to a criminal 
(Lombroso Ferrero 14).  Lorre also frequently over-emphasizes his words and expressions to 
draw attention to his lips; as Lombroso states, “the lips of violators of women and murderers are 
fleshy, swollen and protruding” (16). 
 In Germany, physiognomy had different objectives than in the U.S. context; instead of a 
connection to atavism and racism against African Americans, here it is Jewish ancestry that 
corresponds to negative identity traits. For instance in her article “The Art and Science of 
Reading Faces” Jennifer Hansen discusses how the 1940 Nazi propaganda film Der ewige Jude 
uses “cinematic techniques such as close-ups [etc.] to ‘unmask’ the most accessible level of the 
visual, to scratch the surface of that which appears to the untrained eye and to uncover a hidden, 
deeper reality” about the characteristics of Jewish people (Hansen 84). Of course the ‘science’ of 
physiognomy has long been discredited, but at the time, Lorre’s performance was so convincing 
that Der ewige Jude even used a clip of Lorre to prove that “the Jew is interested instinctively in 
all that is abnormal and depraved,” conflating his real identity (his Jewish background) with the 
fictional identity of his character (96).  
 Thus we have again a character whose facial features cause him to be labeled criminal 
and monstrous; however, for Lang these classifications do not contain a straight-forward 
connection to genetic background. Unlike Lovecraft, who eventually reveals the hidden genetic 
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danger which causes the monstrosity of Innsmouth, Lang refuses to reveal the causes of 
Beckert’s drive to kill. Instead, he provides several possible biographical clues to Beckert’s 
actions, using the logic of genetics as hidden, instead of actual genetic sciences, to maintain the 
ambiguity of Beckert’s monstrosity. The police search the records of mental institutions, where 
they find his file, suggesting that Beckert has been diagnosed with mental illness. As Paul Jensen 
says in The Cinema of Fritz Lang, Lang originally intended his film to be an in-depth portrayal 
of mental illness; Beckert’s compulsion to kill young girls might therefore be read as a mental 
issue with little relation to genetics. However, several moments in the film connect his 
compulsion to his body, and suggest that in fact Beckert’s monstrosity potentially stems from 
biological causes. Jensen himself connects Beckert’s actions to his body, calling him “a fat 
psychopath who murders involuntarily” (Jensen 95). As one police official explains, “the 
instincts of the moment drive the murderer,” emphasizing that the murderer kills from a bodily, 
pre-cognitive “instinct” rather than by mental decision (Lang, M).204 This is reinforced by 
Beckert himself at the end, explaining that he “must” obey the “compulsion” to kill no matter 
how much he doesn’t “want” to do so, that he has no control over his actions.205 In the field of 
psychology, it has been proven that the compulsion to kill often stems from a combination of 
nature (genetics) and nurture (life circumstances). Lang does not give a definitive answer to the 
mystery of Beckert’s past; the hidden cause of the monstrosity remains hidden.  
 Beckert’s past, then, stays off-screen unlike Olmstead’s, but Lang echoes Lovecraft in 
complicating the biopolitical classifications206 that have been set in place by the various 
                                                
204 In the German, “die Instinkte des Augenblicks bestimmen den Mörder.” 
 
205 In the German, “muss,” “Zwang,” “will nicht,” “kann ich denn anders?”. 
 
206 For instance, Lang famously uses a sound bridge and crosscutting to connect the criminal element with the police 
when the Schränker begins the phrase “I ask” and sweeps with his hand, and a cut reveals the police chief likewise 
sweeping his hand, ending the phrase “you to give your opinions” (in the German, “Ich bitte … sich dazu zu 
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communities. Just as Lovecraft’s ending decimates the strict division between alien and human, 
Lang’s stylistic choices complicate the categories of human and ‘inhuman,’ drawing parallels 
between Beckert and others, for instance through whistling. Beckert’s capture results from his 
tell, a nervous whistling of composer Edvard Grieg’s “In the Hall of the Mountain King,”207 
which he does prior to his killings and which quickly symbolizes danger and threat for the 
audience. When the criminal element, through their agents the beggars, searches for Beckert, 
they whistle sharply upon spotting him, creating an auditory link between the hunters and the 
hunted. Maria Tatar likewise examines “the implicit blurring of the boundaries between victim 
and perpetrator,” between the sacrificed children and their killer (Tatar 166). In her chapter “The 
Killer as Victim: Fritz Lang’s M,” Tatar gives a psychoanalytic reading of Beckert as driven by 
sexual urges, and identifying with the position of children who find their own urges sanctioned 
by maternal regulations. Tatar points out that not only does Beckert enjoy the same pleasures 
(candy, toys) as children, he also becomes victimized in the final scene, someone to pity.  
At another moment, the visual creates an association between Beckert and Herr 
Lohmann, the police chief; late in the film, we have a low angle, medium-long shot of Lohmann 
sitting in his chair. The extremely unflattering angle highlights his overweight body, making him 
somewhat grotesque and recalling for the audience Beckert’s likewise plump body. Tatar, in 
marking multiple ways in which Beckert blurs the line between victim and perpetrator, also notes 
that Lohmann is linked to Beckert through their mutual passionate fits. When Lohmann 
discovers that Beckert has been captured, he must “suppress his excitement by dousing himself 
                                                                                                                                                       
äußern.”) (Lang, M). This linking of two groups who otherwise think of themselves as opposing forces intimates that 
in Lang’s created city, any classification of desired versus undesired groups is problematic. 
 
207 Critic Maria Tatar points out that this particular song comes at a moment from Ibsen’s Peer Gynt where the 
protagonist is “nearly turned into a monster” while among “trolls and goblins” (Tatar 158). 
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with cold water,” just as Beckert becomes overly agitated at several points in the movie (Tatar 
167). Lang’s film M, famous precisely for its unique use of sound, does not include a single 
superfluous or trivial auditory component, and the visual shots likewise are purposeful. Thus 
these connections between Beckert, the criminals, and the police, far from incidental, prove an 
intentional blurring of boundaries, and Beckert is a true monster swaying between ‘beast’ 
(nonhuman) and humanity. Tatar’s analysis in particular notes the importance of this blurring; 
she states that the film “reveals the ineffectuality and collapse of the visible power structure in 
the face of the irrational, of the foreign body that resists assimilation, taming, or expulsion” 
(169). However, she does not elaborate on the profound implications of this classification 
breakdown for a biopolitical structure all too real in its portrayal, as I will in the remainder of 
this chapter; instead she moves on to further analysis of how the film both condemns and 
beseeches the maternal figure.  
 Lang, like Lovecraft, ends his story ambiguously: two possible solutions are proposed 
(eugenics and confinement) for dealing with the monster, yet neither is foregrounded as 
preferable. Siegfried Kracauer, in his 1947 tome From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological 
History of the German Film, reads Lang’s ambiguous ending as a “statement on the 
psychological situation of the time,”208 a time of economic distress and an increasing divide 
between left-wing, socialist movements and the totalitarian right-wing movement of National 
Socialism (Kracauer 215). For Kracauer, M confirms a moral view that “in the wake of 
retrogression terrible outbursts of sadism are inevitable;” the film therefore “anticipate[s] what 
                                                
208 The language Kracauer uses here connects to the German view of physiognomy as reflecting social context; 
Kracauer wrote a novel considered by Walter Benjamin an important study of physiognomy (Gamper). Benjamin 
also reviewed the physiognomic study Face of Our Time, by German photographer August Sanders, as a scientific 
view of the influence of historical circumstances (Aiken). Thus Lang’s concentration on the face possibly also 
comments on the ‘psychological situation’ in Germany; Lorre’s facial performance suggests the situation is dire. 
 
 185 
was to happen on a large scale unless people could free themselves from the specters pursuing 
them” (222). Kracauer sees Lang’s film as poised between “anarchy and authority,” at a time 
when the potential for the ‘specter’ of politically-sanctioned sadism was just growing. Kracauer 
suggests this indecisiveness as a purposeful cautiousness, a desire to grapple with themes of 
social and political importance while retaining a “sustained detachment,” although I will contend 
that M resides instead in the realm of helpless inaction (215). 
The criminal element decide that extermination is the only solution that guarantees 
Beckert will not have the chance to murder again. Their particular language (and the shouts of 
the watching crowd) makes clear that the killing of Beckert is a duty to future generations, a way 
of ensuring that one undesirable category disappears. Early in the film the Schränker states that 
the ‘beast’ must “disappear,” must be “exterminated” (or “eradicated” or “wiped out”) “without 
clemency or mercy” (Lang, M).209 Tatar notes that the Schränker “describes his plans for 
exterminating this ‘beast’ in precisely the terms (ausrotten and vertilgen) that the Nazis used to 
frame their genocidal campaign against the Jews” (Tatar 59). As previously noted, Beckert (and 
Lorre’s) coding as Jewish therefore allows the suggestion of Beckert’s extermination to connect 
to the eugenic rhetoric against Jewish people at this time. As Tartar puts it, “like the real-life 
serial killers who were apprehended during the years of the Weimar era, the criminal Beckert and 
the actor-criminal-alien-Jew Peter Lorre are cast as pathogens—as sources of fatal contamination 
that must be eliminated before infecting the general population” (171).  
At the scene of Beckert’s trial, the Schränker elaborates on this sentiment, telling Beckert 
that the reason they wish to exterminate him is “to make [him] harmless” and the only way to do 
                                                
209 In the German, “Die muß weg! Die muß ausgerottet werden, vertilgt, ohne Gnade und Barmherzigkeit.” 
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so with certainty is through his “death.”210 The language of extermination, and harmfulness, 
again suggests a biological component to Beckert that cannot be fixed and therefore must be 
removed from the human gene pool. Indeed, Joseph Goebbels, a top advocate of eugenics in 
Germany at the time, famously read the film in line with his beliefs, writing of the film: “Against 
humanitarian soppiness. For the death penalty.” (McGilligan 157). Even if the film itself does 
not immediately suggest the danger of Beckert’s genes to the larger population development, its 
historical audience certainly draws such conclusions. Because of the horrible nature of his 
crimes, and the devastated faces of the mothers watching him, Beckert at the moment of his trial 
seems potentially deserving of a death penalty.  
In Germany, Ernst Haeckel was among those scientists whose writing on genetics 
included a racial component, as “he believed that the development of culture was dependent on 
innate biological, intellectual, and moral traits” and therefore “ ‘civilized’ peoples with their 
allegedly higher intellectual capabilities have a higher value of life than the ‘primitive’ people” 
(Weikart 109). These ideas led eugenicists such as Alfred Ploetz, Wilhelm Schallmayer, and 
Ludwig Woltmann to emphasize the difference between inferior and superior races, and 
“campaign to rid the world of ‘inferior’ (minderwertig) or ‘degenerate’ people” (196). In 
Germany, “racial extermination was becoming more and more intellectually acceptable by the 
early twentieth century,” and the category of ‘inferior’ included non-whites of any kind, disabled 
people, and most prominently Jewish people (203). The end result of this swell in eugenic 
thought has been well-documented, in the form of the Holocaust perpetrated by Hitler during 
World War II. However, as Richard Weikart makes clear in his book From Darwin to Hitler, the 
wave of scientific and social ideas leading to the Holocaust began much earlier, and culminated 
                                                
210 In the German, “Wir wollen dich unschädlich machen, das wollen wir. Und ganz sicher unschädlich bist du nur, 
wenn du tot bist.” 
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in the 1930s. Lang’s film M in some cases reflects the fervor of citizens concerned with 
categorizing and then eliminated those deemed too ‘abnormal’ to live, especially in the character 
of the Schränker. However, even as Goebbels attempts to claim Lang’s film as a pro-eugenic 
piece, M ultimately refuses to either advocate or speak against this social trend, instead 
presenting an equally balanced account of two possible reactions to a child murderer who cannot 
help his monstrous urges. 
 Lang does not leave us merely with the perspective of those advocating eugenics; he also 
presents a pitiable side to Beckert as someone with mental issues, with physical compulsions 
who cannot help himself. As Jensen says, Lang “creates tension in the viewer by forcing him, 
almost sadistically, to observe the writhings of a helplessly trapped victim,” and in the ending 
scene of the film Beckert straddles the line between victim and perpetrator (Jensen 103). Beckert 
explains his perspective as best he can, that he always feels a pressure as though being chased by 
the “ghosts of mothers…of children” from whom he desperately wants to escape, and that the 
pressure only disappears in the moments when he kills another child (Lang, M).211 His manic 
demeanor while explaining his compulsions reveals a desperation; here is a serial killer who does 
not enjoy being a serial killer (although he does enjoy the moment of killing), but rather acts in 
order to relieve painful feeling. As his defense attorney suggests, he is a “sick man, and one 
doesn’t give a sick man to the executioner, one gives him to a doctor.”212 From the modern legal 
perspective, this solution of placing Beckert into a mental hospital makes logical sense; after all, 
a defendant declared mentally insane is not responsible for his or her crimes. However, the 
                                                
211 In the German, “Und mit mir rennen die Gespenster von Müttern…von Kindern…Die geh’n nie mehr weg…Die 
sind immer da! […] Nur nicht…wenn ich’s tue.” 
 
212 In the German, “Ich will damit sagen, daß dieser Mensch ein kranker Mensch ist! Und einen kranken Menschen 
übergibt man nicht dem Henker, den übergibt man dem Arzt!” 
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Schränker points out that criminals are released from mental hospitals, that Beckert’s impulses 
will never disappear, and that alive, he will always pose a threat.  
 Lang ends his film with a fade to a courtroom, where Beckert will presumably stand 
(legal) trial, and a group of mothers sitting on a bench speak the last line: “One just needs to keep 
an even better watch over the children, all of you!”213 (Lang, M). After this pronouncement, a 
fade to black ensures that Beckert’s fate remains off-screen; whether he is killed, or sent to an 
asylum remains unclear, as does Lang’s ultimate motive for the film. Like Lovecraft’s story, 
Lang’s film ends with intense emotions and multiple possible readings, leaving the audience to 
decide for themselves how to feel about monstrosities in their midst. The mother who speaks the 
last line forces this decision on us, by breaking the fourth wall in staring directly into the camera, 
and speaking the word “ihr” (you all), just as Lovecraft’s narrator, through journal form, seems 
to expect the reader to come to his or her own conclusions about the events that have unfolded. 
However, in the case of Lang not one of the solutions presented is accompanied by benevolent 
emotion; the children remain murdered no matter what, and whatever happens to Beckert will be 
unsatisfying. There is no question of ‘let live’ for Lang, for even if Beckert were able to live, 
albeit in a facility which prevents his further murdering,214 his haunting feeling would remain to 
shadow him.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Michel Foucault in his lectures on the ‘abnormal’ takes up the issue of the monster from 
the 16th century onward. Especially for the monster of the 19th and 20th century, he demonstrates 
                                                
213 In the German, “man muß eben noch besser auf die Kinder acht geben, ihr!” 
 
214 For argument’s sake, if ‘let live’ in Beckert’s case meant letting him continue with his murders, he still would not 
feel the ecstasy of Olmstead; Lang makes clear that his existence would still be plagued by negative emotion.  
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a connection to criminality215 and poses the following question: “As a being of a monstrous 
nature and the enemy of the whole society, should not society get rid of him without calling upon 
the might of the law?” (Foucault 96). In the case of M, the kangaroo court at the end attempts 
precisely such a solution to the monstrous; if a criminal acts contrary to laws, then the law will 
also be inadequate in rectifying the criminal’s behavior. Foucault further explains that “crime is 
to be punished at the level of the interest that underpinned it,” that the criminal’s reasons for 
acting should determine his or her punishment (114). However, for Beckert, the reason for his 
murders remains off-screen; his genetic or circumstantial motivations cannot be explained, so 
neither exile nor death can be foregrounded as proper punishment. At the end Beckert remains a 
‘monster,’ ‘beast,’ but ultimately also a human male, a “Mensch” no matter how often his 
accusers insist that he is “not a human!” (Lang, M).216 Thus Lang portrays an utter breakdown of 
biopolitical classification; ultimately his characters cannot decide who deserves the title of 
‘human’ and the Foucauldian “right of life” it names (Foucault, Society 240).  
For Lovecraft’s story, a similar dilemma arises, although the cause of the Innsmouthers’ 
monstrosity is known; these citizens straddle the line between human and nonhuman, and 
because of the striking similarities between the human and alien cultures, neither gains a position 
of superiority. Although Lovecraft would have outright rejected Boas’s contemporaneous theory 
of cultural relativism, it nevertheless provides a potential way to understand this ambiguity in 
The Shadow Over Innsmouth. Boas refutes previous assumptions about the mental, physical, and 
cultural superiority of white communities when he states: 
                                                
215 For instance, in the 1931 film remake of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, James Whale adds an important detail: the 
brain of Frankenstein’s monster is taken from a jar with the label “abnormal,” and once belonged to a murderous 
criminal. For a more comprehensive look at the monstrous and eugenic aspects of other 1930s films such as 
Frankenstein, or Tod Browning’s Freaks, see Angela Smith’s Hideous Progeny: Disability, Eugenics, and Classic 
Horror Cinema. 
 
216 In the German, “Das ist ja kein Mensch!” 
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What then is the difference between the civilization of the Old World and that of the New 
World? It is only a difference in time. [. . .] This difference in period does not justify us 
to assume that the race which developed more slowly was less gifted. (Boas 224) 
The gap between our society and theirs always remains open and for this reason their 
mind cannot be expected to work in the same manner as ours. (234) 
 
Throughout his writings Boas makes clear that two difference races, or cultures, or species, 
cannot be deemed inferior or superior; rather, their qualities are just different. Likewise, in 
Lovecraft’s story, the similar actions of the aliens and humans, and their evolutionary 
commonality suggests that though their cultures appear on the surface vastly different, we cannot 
make hierarchical distinctions between them. Given enough time, the blurring of alien and 
human genes might even close the Boasian gap and render categorization moot. The Shadow 
Over Innsmouth, then, reveals the inherent fallacy of Lovecraft’s racist logic; even an author 
ostensibly writing in support of hierarchical distinctions instead shows their arbitrariness. 
The film M and the novella The Shadow Over Innsmouth deal with a genetic ‘other,’ 
recognizable to us as monstrous only through coded facial features, and whose realization of his 
own alterity provokes horror and regret. Lang and Lovecraft elicit both sympathy and disgust for 
their protagonists in order to reflect and comment upon conflicting social ideas about who 
deserves to live, and who should be eliminated. The ambiguity in proper response to the monster, 
stemming from the breakdown of classification, mirrors both sides of the eugenics debate at this 
time: to employ eugenics dehumanizes and strips a population of their rights, while to abstain in 
some cases could mean sanctioning an undesirable abnormality. Ambiguity allows these fictional 
tales to both illustrate and deconstruct the inherent danger Foucault locates in biologically-based 
classifications of a “racism against the abnormal, against individuals who, as carriers of a 
condition, a stigmata, or any defect whatsoever, may more or less randomly transmit to their 
heirs the unpredictable consequences of the evil, or rather of the non-normal, that they carry 
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within them” (Foucault 316).217 Ultimately Lovecraft and Lang both demonstrate the difficulties 
of biopolitical classification and action against those considered ‘abnormal’ or monstrous due to 
their genetic background, without decisively providing solutions—an entirely preferable attitude 
in light of the historical circumstances which follow.  
 
                                                
217 While Foucault makes clear that his term ‘racism’ is distinct from historical racism based on race, because it is 
based on an individual’s internal characteristics, he acknowledges that in the case of Germany (and in the United 
States as well), the racism against ‘abnormal’ genetics becomes conflated with the more historical type, as we saw 
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